Nussbaum defends a version of the capabilities approach to justice. This approach holds that justice is centrally concerned with making possible the realization of certain human functionings or capabilities. She demonstrates how this approach can address the most serious charges made by relativists against ethical universalism.

"...in the countries for which reliable health care...in the countries for which reliable education of children is given, for political rights or free speech of development opportunities. They are often excluded from participation in popular government and from the better jobs. Women, a majority of the world's population, receive only a small share of development opportunities. They are often excluded from development opportunities."

-Nussbaum, Martha C.

"Women are a majority of the world's population, receive only a small share of development opportunities. They are often excluded from participating in popular government and from the better jobs."

-Nussbaum, Martha C.
data are available, the female human development index is only 60 percent that of males.


Were our state a pure democracy there would still be excluded from our deliberations women, who, to prevent depravation of morals and ambiguity of issue, should not mix promiscuously in gatherings of men.

—Thomas Jefferson

Being a woman is not yet a way of being a human being.

—Catherine MacKinnon

1. FEMINISM AND COMMON HUMANITY

Begin with the human being: with the capacities and needs that join all humans, across barriers of gender and class and race and nation. To a person concerned with the equality and dignity of women, this advice should appear in one way promising. For it instructs us to focus on what all human beings share rather than on the privileges and achievements of a dominant group, and on needs and basic functions rather than on power or status. Women have rarely been kings, or nobles, or courtiers, or rich. They have, on the other hand, frequently been poor and sick.

But this starting point will be regarded with skepticism by many contemporary feminists. For it is all too obvious that throughout the history of political thought, both Western and non-Western, such allegedly unbiased general concepts have served in various ways to bolster male privilege and to marginalize women. Human beings are not born kings, or nobles, or courtiers. They are, or so it seems, born male and female.

I shall argue nonetheless that we should in fact begin with a conception of the human being and human functioning in thinking about women's equality in developing countries. This notion can be abused. It can be developed in a gender-biased way. It can be unjustly and prejudicially applied. It can be developed in ways that neglect relevant differences among women of different nationalities, classes, and races. But I shall argue that, articulated in a certain way (and I shall be emphatically distinguishing my approach from others that use an idea of "human nature") it is our best starting point for reflection. It is our best route to stating correctly what is wrong with the situations that confronted Saleha Begum and Metha Bai, and on behalf of the huge numbers of women in the world who have been excluded from participation in the economic, cultural, and political arenas of contemporary society.

I note that the concept of the human being has already been central to much of the best feminist and internationalist thinking. Consider, for example, J. S. Mill's remarks on "human improvement" in The Subjection of Women; Amartya Sen's use of a notion of "human capability" to confront gender-based inequalities; the Sen-inspired use of a notion of "human development" in the UN Report to describe and criticize gender-based inequalities; Susan Okin's proposal for a "humanist" theory of justice; the work of various international human rights organizations.

I don't mean to suggest that these or other contemporary internationalist thinkers consider the core of the human being to be a fixed entity that cannot be expanded or changed. But they do tend to focus on what is common to all human beings, rather than on differences.

2. COMMON HUMANITY

Becoming a woman is not yet a way of being a human being.
I 498 OLQBALJVSTJCE: SEMiNAL ESSAYS MARIHA C. NUSbdAUM • 4

example ofWestern neglect ofdifference. Someone (it might have been
by the British eradicated the cult of Sittala Devi, the goddess to whom
me) objects that it is surely better to be healthy rather than ill, to live rather
one used to pray in order to avert smallpox. Here, she says, is another
expresses regret that the introduction of smallpox vaccination to India


2. The same French anthropologist now delivers her paper.


1. At a conference on "Value and Technolog3" an American econo


an economist delivers a paper urging the preservation of traditional ways oflife in a rural area of India, now under threat of contamination from Western development
projects. As evidence of the excellence of this rural way of life, he points


3. We shift now to another conference two years later.


2. The same French anthropologist now delivers her paper. She


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I 500 GLOBALJUSTICE: SEMINAL ESSAYS

The question of whether and how to define terms like gender, race, and class often appears to be at the center of the current debates in women's studies. Many of the essays in this volume explore the complex relationships between these concepts and their implications for understanding and addressing social inequality. However, the authors also highlight the importance of not imposing a universalistic framework on diverse contexts and cultures. Instead, they argue for a more nuanced and flexible approach that recognizes the multiplicity of identities and experiences.

In his essay, "The Assault on Universalism," the author discusses the challenges posed by the contemporary debate on the nature of human universals. He points out that the notion of universals in ethics and science is often taken for granted, but it is actually a highly contested issue. The author argues that universalism is not always desirable, and that it can sometimes lead to ignoring important cultural differences.

The author also emphasizes the importance of critical reflection on the assumptions underlying our thinking about human nature. He argues that metaphysical realism, which posits that there is a single, objective reality independent of human experience, is not always the best way to understand the complexities of human life. Instead, he advocates for a more contextual and relativistic approach that recognizes the influence of cultural and historical factors on our understanding of human nature.

The author concludes by emphasizing the need for ongoing dialogue and reflection on the nature of human universals. He argues that this dialogue can help us develop a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of human nature, and that it can also help us address some of the most pressing issues of our time, such as inequality and human rights.

The essays in this volume provide a rich and diverse exploration of the complex relationships between gender, race, and class, and their implications for understanding and addressing social inequality. They highlight the importance of critical reflection on the assumptions underlying our thinking about human nature, and they call for ongoing dialogue and reflection on the nature of human universals.
appear strategically wise for an ethical and political view that seeks broad support not to rely on the truth of metaphysical realism, if it can defend itself in some other way. If, then, all universalist and humanist conceptions in ethics are required to regard the universal conception of the human being as part of the independent furniture of the world, unmediated by human self-interpretation and human history, such conceptions do appear to be in some difficulty, and there may well be good reasons to try to do without them.

But universalism does not require such support. For universal ideas of the human do arise within history and from human experience, and they can ground themselves in experience. Indeed, if, as the critics of realism allege, we are always dealing with our own interpretations anyhow, they must acknowledge that universal conceptions of the human are prominent and pervasive among such interpretations, hardly to be relegated to the dustbin of metaphysical history along with rare and recondite philosophical entities such as the Platonic forms. As Aristotle so simply puts it, "One may observe in one's travels to distant countries the feelings of recognition and affiliation that link every human being to every other human being." Or, as Kwame Anthony Appiah eloquently tells the story of his bicultural childhood, a child who visits one set of grandparents in Ghana and another in rural England, who has a Lebanese uncle and who later, as an adult, has nieces and nephews from more than seven different nations, comes to notice not unbridgeable alien "otherness," but a great deal of human commonality, and comes to see the world as a "network of points of affinity." Pursuing those affinities, one may accept the conclusions of the critics of realism while still believing that a universal conception of the human being is both available to ethics and a valuable starting point. I shall be proposing a version of such an account, attempting to identify a group of especially central and basic human functions that ground these affinities.

But such an experiential and historical universalism is still vulnerable to some, if not all, of the objections standardly brought against universalism. I therefore need to introduce those objections and later to test my account against them.

The opposition charges that any attempt to pick out some elements of human life as more fundamental than others, even without appeal to a transhistorical reality, is bound to be insufficiently respectful of actual historical and cultural differences. People, it is claimed, understand human life and humanness in widely different ways: and any attempt to produce a list of the most fundamental properties and functions of human beings is bound to contribute to the over-categorization and over-functionalist tendencies of our culture. The opposition charges that any attempt to pick out some elements of human life as more fundamental than others, even without appeal to a transhistorical reality, is bound to contribute to the over-categorization and over-functionalist tendencies of our culture.

2.1. NEGLECT OF HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
If we operate with a determinate conception of the human being that is meant to have some normative moral and political force, we must also, in applying it, ask which beings we shall take to fall under the concept. And here the objector notes that, all too easily—even if the conception itself is equitable and comprehensively designed—the powerless can be excluded. Aristotle himself, it is pointed out, held that women and slaves were not full-fledged human beings; and since his politics were based on his view of human functioning, the failure of these beings (in his view) to exhibit the desired mode of functioning contributed to their political exclusion and oppression.

It is, once again, hard to know what this objection is supposed to show. In particular, it is hard to know how, if at all, it is supposed to show that we would be better off without such determinate universal concepts. For it could be plausibly argued that it would have been easier to exclude women and slaves on a whim if one did not have such a concept to contend with. Indeed, this is what I shall be arguing. On the other hand, it does show that we need to think not only about getting the concept right but also about getting the right beings admitted under the concept.

Each of these objections has some merit. Many universal conceptions of the human being have been insular in an arrogant way, and neglectful of differences among cultures and ways of life. Some have been neglectful of choice and autonomy. And many have been prejudicially applied. But none of these objections show that all such conceptions must fall in one or more of these ways. But at this point I need to advance a definite example of such a conception, in order both to display its merits and to argue that it can in fact answer these charges.

Here, then, is a sketch for an account of the most important functions and capabilities of the human being, in terms of which human life is defined. The basic idea is that we ask ourselves, 'What are the characteristic activities and capabilities of the human being? What are the human being's distinctive achievements in the universe?' The idea is that, as a member of a particular group or a particular community, and as a member of a particular cultural tradition, we are to ask ourselves what makes us a member of the human species. We are to ask ourselves, in short, what do we believe must be there, if we are to base some conclusion? In short, what do we believe must be there, if we are to reach that conclusion? We are to ask ourselves, in short, what do we believe must be there, if we are to reach that conclusion?

This inquiry proceeds by examining a wide variety of self-interpreted notions of human beings in many times and places. Especially valuable are myths and stories that situate the human being in some way in the universe, and that describe the human being's distinctive achievements. We often tell ourselves stories about anthropomorphic creatures who do not get classified as human, on account of some feature of their form of life. We often tell ourselves stories about anthropomorphic creatures who do not get classified as human, on account of some feature of their form of life. We often tell ourselves stories about anthropomorphic creatures who do not get classified as human, on account of some feature of their form of life.
Here then is a first approximation of a story about what seems to be part of any life we will count as a human life:

8. The concept "human being" is thus the view understood in this way.

7. The list is heterogeneous for it contains both limits against which we press and capabilities through which we aspire. Although the account appeals to consensus in this way, it is different from consensus as we understand it mostly as a record of broadly shared experiences of human beings within history. The notion of consensus in this context is not the same as the consensus it appeals to; there is no simple account of how consensus is produced. This is as it should be understood since the concept is applicable to new things which are not part of the consensual record of human history.

6. The account is not intended to deny that the items it enumerates are to some extent differently constructed by different societies. It claims only that in these areas there is considerable continuity and overlap, sufficient to ground a working political consensus. This may commend it to feminists: for the label "person" has frequently been withheld from women, without substantial argument.

5. The concept "human being" is not a biological concept. It is a normative concept. Of course, it is also a normative concept that every human being has certain capacities and characteristics, but the account is meant to be both tentative and open-ended. We may also shift to each other our concept of human beings, and certain capacities will be very important to some of us. There may be some important shifts as a result of this, but the account is not meant to be both and open-end.
3.1. Level One of the Concept of the Human Being:
The Shape of the Human Form of Life

3.1.1. Mortality

All human beings face death and, after a certain age, know that they face it. This fact shapes more or less every other element of human life. Moreover, all human beings have an aversion to death. Although in many circumstances death will be preferred to the available alternatives, the death of a loved one, or the prospect of one's own death, is an occasion for grief and/or fear. If we encountered an immortal anthropomorphic being, or a mortal being who showed no aversion to death and no tendency at all to avoid death, we would judge, in both of these cases, that the form of life was so different from our own that the being could not be acknowledged as human.

3.1.2. The Human Body

We live all our lives in bodies of a certain sort, whose possibilities and vulnerabilities do not as such belong to one human society rather than another. These bodies, similar far more than dissimilar (given the enormous range of possibilities) are our homes, so to speak, opening certain options and denying others, giving us certain needs and also certain possibilities for excellence. The fact that any given human being might have lived anywhere and belonged to any culture is a great part of what grounds our mutual recognitions; this fact, in turn, has a great deal to do with the general humanness of the body, its great distinctness from other bodies. The experience of the body is culturally shaped, to be sure; the importance we ascribe to its various functions is also culturally shaped. But the body itself, not culturally variant in its nutritional and other related requirements, sets limits on what can be experienced and values placed on experience. The human body is our home, our world, and our sphere of action. Its needs are a part of what makes us human, and the experience of meeting these needs is a part of what we mean by the human condition. We live all our lives in bodies of a certain sort, whose possibilities are limited by the needs and the experience of meeting these needs.

3.1.3. Capacity for Pleasure and Pain

Pleasure and pain are two of the most basic experiences of human life. They are universal in the sense that all human beings experience them in some form. But they are also highly individual, as the intensity and nature of these experiences can vary widely from person to person. Pleasure can be experienced in a variety of ways, from simple physical sensations to complex emotional experiences. Pain, on the other hand, is generally viewed as a negative experience, although it can also have positive aspects, such as being a signal of injury or danger.

3.2. Mortality

The concept of mortality is central to the human experience. It is the recognition that all human beings are destined to die, and that this fact shapes every other aspect of human life. The idea of mortality is closely tied to the concept of the human body, as it is through the body that we experience death. The body is our home, our world, and our sphere of action, and it is through the body that we experience pain and pleasure, joy and sorrow. The body is where we live, where we experience the world, and where we experience ourselves. The body is the foundation of our humanity, and it is through the body that we experience our mortality.
The fundamental evil is a primitive and it appears, unlearned part of being a human animal. A society whose members altogether lacked that aversion would surely be judged to be beyond the bounds of humanness.

3.1.4. Cognitive Capability: Perceiving, Imagining, Thinking

All human beings have sense-perception, the ability to imagine, and the ability to think, making distinctions and "reaching out for understanding." And these abilities are regarded as of central importance. It is an open question what sorts of accidents or impediments to individuals in these areas will be sufficient for us to judge that the life in question is not really human any longer. But it is safe to say that if we imagine a group of beings whose members totally lack sense-perception, or totally lack imagination, or totally lack reasoning and thinking, we are not in any of these cases imagining a group of human beings, no matter what they look like.

3.1.5. Early Infant Development

All human beings begin as hungry babies, aware of their own helplessness, experiencing their alternating closeness to and distance from that, and those, on whom they depend. This common structure to early life—which is clearly shaped in many different ways by different social arrangements—gives rise to a great deal of overlapping experience that is central in the formation of desires, and of complex emotions such as grief, love, and anger. This, in turn, is a major source of our ability to recognize ourselves in the emotional experiences of those whose lives are very different in other respects from our own. If we encountered a group of apparent humans and then discovered that they never had been in any of these respects the infant experiences of extreme dependency, need, and affection, we would have to conclude that their form of life was sufficiently different from our own that they could not be considered part of the same kind.

3.1.6. Practical Reason

All human beings participate (or try to) in the planning and managing of their own lives, asking and answering questions about what is good and how one should live. Moreover, they wish to enact their thoughts in their lives—to be able to choose and evaluate, and to function accordingly. This general capability has many concrete forms, and is related in complex ways to the other capabilities, emotional, imaginative, and intellectual. But a being who altogether lacked this would not be likely to be regarded as fully human in any society.

3.1.7. Affiliation with Other Human Beings

All human beings recognize and feel some sense of affiliation with other human beings. And this sense of affiliation is based on two sorts of recognition: intimate family and/or personal relations, and social or civic relations. These two sorts of recognition are different, and they do not always overlap. We have to be able to choose and evaluate, and to function accordingly, in order to be regarded as fully human in any society.

3.1.8. Relatedness to Other Species and to Nature

Human beings recognize that they are not the only living things in their world: that they are animals living alongside other animals, and also alongside plants, in a universe that, as a complex interlocking order, both supports and limits them. We are dependent upon that order in countless ways; and we also sense that we owe these dependencies to others. And our response to other species and to nature is central in the formation of desires, and of complex emotions such as grief, love, and anger. If we encountered a group of apparent humans and then discovered that they never had been in any of these respects the experiences of extreme dependency, need, and affection, we would have to conclude that their form of life was sufficiently different from our own that they could not be considered part of the same kind.

3.1.9. Humor and Play

Humor and play provide an entry into the world of others, and they are deeply rooted in human nature. The forms they take are enormously varied—and yet we recognize other humans, across cultural barriers, as the animals who laugh. Laughter and play are frequently among the deepest and also the first modes of our mutual recognition. Inability to play or laugh is taken, correctly, as a sign of deep disturbance in a child; failure to prove permanent we will doubt whether the child is capable of leading a fully human life.
society that lacked this ability would seem to us both terribly strange and terribly frightening.

3.1.10. Separateness

However much we live with and for others, we are, each of us, "one in number," proceeding on a separate path through the world from birth to death. Each person feels only his or her own pain and not anyone else's. Each person dies without entailing the death of anyone else. When one person walks across the room, no other person follows automatically. When we count the number of human beings in a room, we have no difficulty figuring out where one begins and the other ends.

These obvious facts need stating, since they might have been otherwise. We should bear them in mind when we hear talk about the absence of individualism in certain societies. Even the most intense forms of human interaction, for example sexual experience, are experiences of separateness, not of fusion. If fusion is made the goal, the result is bound to be disappointment.

3.1.11. Strong Separateness

Because of separateness, each human life has, so to speak, its own peculiar context and surroundings—objects, places, a history, particular friendships, locations, sexual ties—that are not exactly the same as those of anyone else, and in terms of which the person to some extent identifies herself. Though societies vary a great deal in the degree and type of strong separateness that they permit and foster, there is no life yet known that really does (as Plato wished) fail to use the words "mine" and "not mine" in some personal and nonshared way. What I use, live in, respond to, I use, live in, respond to from my own separate existence. And on the whole, human beings recognize one another as beings who wish to have at least some separateness of context, a little space to move around in some of the experiences of contact. This space is not to be because of some experience of contact. When we meet, and we meet in a personal and contactual way, we are known that the other does (or plans to do) and so forth, and when we meet in a personal and contactual way, we are known that the other does (or plans to do) and so forth, and when we meet in a personal and contactual way, we are known that the other does (or plans to do) and so forth, and when we meet in a personal and contactual way, we are known that the other does (or plans to do) and so forth.
1. Level 2 of the Concept of the Human Being: Basic Human Functional Capabilities

...
2. Being able to have good health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction, and for choice in matters of reproduction; being able to move from place to place.

3. Being able to avoid unnecessary and nonbeneficial pain, so far as possible, and to have pleasurable experiences.

4. Being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to think, and to reason—and to do these things in a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing spiritually enriching materials and events of one's own choice; religious, literary, musical, and so forth. I believe that the protection of this capability requires not only the provision of education, but also legal guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and of freedom of religious exercise.

5. Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing and gratitude. Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development, including longitudinal and generational 'support-systems.'

6. Being able to have a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life. This includes, today, being able to seek employment outside the home and to participate in political life.

7. Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in social interaction; being able to have good health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction, and for choice in matters of reproduction; being able to move from place to place.

8. Being able to live in one's own surroundings and context. This means guarantees of freedom of association, of expression, of conscience, and of religious exercise; and guarantees of freedom from unwarranted search and seizure; it also means a certain sort of protection of personal property, though this guarantee may be limited in those cases where it is clear that a good human life is so far as possible not to be reasonable to make those things a focus for concern; in a manner where it is not.

9. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.

10. Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's. This means having certain guarantees of noninterference with certain choices that are especially personal and definitive of selfhood, such as choices regarding marriage, childbearing, sexual expression, speech, and employment.
The central goal of public policy should be the capabilities of people. The basic claim I wish to make—concerning with Amartya Sen—is that the central goal of public planning should be the capabilities of people. The focus on utility, or even on resources, is inadequate because it fails to capture the full range of human possibilities. We need to go beyond the concept of utility to consider the capabilities of people. The capabilities approach is a framework for understanding and evaluating human development. It focuses on the opportunities that people have to lead lives of dignity and freedom. The capabilities approach is based on the idea that human development should be measured by the opportunities people have, rather than by the goods and services they consume. The capabilities approach recognizes that people have different abilities and opportunities, and that these should be taken into account when measuring development.

The role of the conception in development policy

To understand the role of the capabilities approach in development policy, we need to consider how it can be applied to different contexts. In general, the capabilities approach is useful for measuring development in terms of people's capabilities to lead lives of dignity and freedom. It can be applied to different countries, regions, and communities, and can be used to compare different development outcomes. The capabilities approach can also be used to assess the impact of policies and programs on people's capabilities. It is a valuable tool for understanding and evaluating development, and for making informed decisions about how to promote human development.
The basic intuition from which the capability approach starts, in the human development tradition, for many notions of human rights. I suggest, then, that in thinking of political planning we begin from this notion, thinking of the basic capabilities of human beings as needs for functioning. Thus if functioning” more accurately means “fulfilling the functions in question,” then we may say that the notion of political planning we begin from is the basic functions need, or basic capabilities need. We believe that a child who dies before getting to maturity has a claim on others, and especially, as Aristotle saw, on government. We believe that certain basic and central human endowments have a claim to be assisted in developing, and exerting their associated duties applies. It is a profound and pervasive empirical idea, an idea that underwrites many of our central goals, and has focused particularly on its application to the assessment of women’s quality of life. With his advice, the UN Human Development Report, believing that the best way to work toward a more precise determination is to allow the community of nations to hammer it out after an extended comparative inquiry, of the sort the report makes possible. An interlocking set of capabilities enumerated by that list. Naturally, many people as possible above the second threshold, with respect to the functions, or to perform the central human functions? And, “Have they been put in a position of having human capabilities with respect to economic and political rights that figure on my list, they are fruitless, cut off, in some way but a shadow of themselves. They are like actors who never get to go on the stage of their lives, who never get to go on the political arena, is that human capabilities exert a moral claim that they have a right to leave a small number below and allowing the rest a considerably better quality of life? If functioning never arrives on the scene, they are hardly even what they are. This may sound like a case of premature conclusion and may be an attempt to give rise to correlated political duties. It is the gap between potential humanness and actual capability-testing that goes back at least to the noble lie of Plato’s Republic. Therefore we should, I think, proceed as if ever-disputing capability, these general considerations can in an influential way not only the basic human capabilities of human beings as needs for functioning, which I have elsewhere called “basic capabilities,” but also the political and economic application of this approach is evident.
Arab Emirates has real GNP per capita of $16,753—tenth-highest among the world. Female wage-earning outside the home strongly tied to female health care in Saudi Arabia (7%), Libya (9%), Jordan (10%), Pakistan (11%), Bangladesh (7%), and Afghanistan (8%). Evidence links maternal mortality rate, and only Iraq (6%) ties it, and only Qatar has a maternal mortality rate of 55%, far lower than any of the 60 countries generally below it. (Both Norway and Australia have adult literacy of 99%.) The human development report for 1993 informs us, for example, that the United States is forty-sixth in the world, while Sudan is thirty-sixth in the world. If this is discounted as employment related, we may pursue the other countries in our low external employment comparison class.

The rich and pampered easily become accustomed to their luxury, and we notice the difference in the lives of people in these countries. Preferences are the numbers from which Sen's graphic statistics regarding "missing women" are derived. The number of "missing women" in the world is high, and health status for itself and for the young and old, and nutrition is a major factor in determining the prevalence of diseases. Assessments that use GNP as its sole measure fall to concern itself with the distribution of resources and thus can give high marks to countries with enormous inequalities. Nor does this approach examine other human goods that are not reliably correlated with the presence of resources: infant mortality rates, life expectancy.

The capability approach has clear advantages over other current approaches to quality-of-life assessment. Assessment that uses GNP and life-expectancy.66 And in fact, we find that the ratio of females to males in the United Arab Emirates is the amazing 48:100, lowest in all the world. If this is discounted as employment related, we may pursue the other countries in our low external employment comparison class. "They strongly support Martha Chen's argument that the right to work is a right basic to the lives of women. But women are a special case of this: We do not need to go to Brazil, 43% in China, 47% in Vietnam, 26% in India, and 20% in Nigeria). In fact, in all the world, highest, for example, in Norway or Australia—while the other countries in our low external employment comparison class. We wish to develop ways of getting information about how people are doing that would be more sensitive and informationally adequate. The approach to give an account of poverty as capability failure.64 Indices of resource and thus can give high marks to countries with enormous inequalities. Nor does this approach examine other human goods that are not reliably correlated with the presence of resources: infant mortality rates, life expectancy.

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described in Martha Chen’s *A Quiet Revolution*, they may not even know what it means to have the advantages of education. We may imagine that many women in the countries I have mentioned would not fight, as Saleha Begum did, for participation in the workforce; nor would they be aware of the high correlation between work outside the home and other advantages. As Sen argues, they may have fully internalized the ideas behind the traditional system of discrimination, and may view their deprivation as “natural.” Thus if we rely on utility as our measure of life quality, we most often will get results that support the status quo and oppose radical change.

If these criticisms apply to approaches that focus on utility in general, they apply all the more pointedly to the sort of local-tradition relativism espoused by the Marglins, in which the measure of quality of life will be the satisfaction of a certain group of preferences, namely the traditional ones of a given culture. Indeed, it is illuminating to consider how close, in its renunciation of critical normative argument, the Marglin approach is to the prevailing economic approaches of which it presents itself as a radical critique. A preference-based approach that gives priority to the preferences of traditional culture is likely to be especially subversive of the quality of life of women who have been badly treated by prevailing traditional norms. And one can see this clearly in the Marglins’ own examples. For menstruation taboos impose severe restrictions on women’s power to form a plan of life and to execute the plan they have chosen. They are members of the same family of traditional attitudes about women and the workplace that made it difficult for Saleha Begum to support herself and her family, and that make it impossible for Metha Bai to sustain the basic functions of life. And the Japanese husband who allegedly renounces freedom of choice actually enhances it, in the ways that matter, by asking the woman to look after the boring details of life. One can sympathize with many of the Marglins’ goals—respect for diversity, desire to preserve aspects of traditional life that appear to be rich in spiritual and artistic value—but not with their rejection of the marginal approach to the measurement of quality of life, which is a one-dimensional account of preferences. The same cannot be said for the human-function view, which does not avoid the problems that the Marglins raise.

6. ANSWEING THE OBJECTIONS: HUMAN FUNCTIONING AND PLURALISM

I have commended the human-function view by contrast to its rivals on the development scene. But I must now try to show how it can answer the objections I described earlier.

Concerning neglect of historical and cultural diversity, I can begin by insisting that this normative conception of human capability and functioning is general, and in a sense vague, for precisely this reason. The list claims to have identified in a very general way components that are fundamental to any human life. But it allows in its very design for the possibility of multiple specifications of each of the components. This is so in several different ways. First, the constitutive circumstances of human life, while broadly shared, are themselves realized in different forms in different societies. The fear of death, the love of pleasure, and affiliation with others, even the experience of the bodily appetites, never turn up in simply the vague and general form in which we have introduced them there, but always in some specific and historically rich cultural realization, which can profoundly shape not only the conceptions used by the citizens in these areas, but also their life circumstances and behavior. The creation of a tradition of free expression, the encouragement of the arts, the practice of democracy, the respect for human rights, the provision of education—all these are cases of the distribution of these resources in historically specific ways, in order to make human functioning possible in the areas in question.

Our concern is not with the question of whether a particular resource or capability is available in a given society, but with the question of whether a given level of such resources or capabilities is available to a given group, or whether a given level of such resources or capabilities is available to a given group in a given society. This is a question of how resources are distributed, not a question of whether resources are available at all. The human-function approach to the measurement of quality of life is based on the assumption that the distribution of resources can be used to identify the need for change, and that the distribution of resources can be used to identify the need for action. It is not concerned with the question of whether a given resource or capability is available, but with the question of whether a given resource or capability is available to a given group in a given society. The human-function approach is based on the assumption that the distribution of resources can be used to identify the need for change, and that the distribution of resources can be used to identify the need for action. It is not concerned with the question of whether a given resource or capability is available, but with the question of whether a given resource or capability is available to a given group in a given society.
plurality to become evident. Here the approach wants to retain plurality in respects that flourish in one community may prove impossible to sustain in another. In such cases, the Aristotelian must aim at some general list that suits, and develops out of the local conditions. This will always most reasonably be done in common conversation will permit us to criticize some conceptions of the good. For sometimes what is a good way of promoting education in one part of the world will be completely ineffectual in another. Forms of life that support it, and the material conditions that enable one to live through it, are local conditions. If the local conditions are incompatibly diverse, the approach must aim at a list that suits the local conditions of those who live the ways of life in question. Martha Chen’s Aristotelian needs to consider a different sort of plural specification of the good. This means that in addition to the pluralism I have just described, the approach must consider how the components more concretely, and with much variety, in accordance with all the major capabilities.

Second, the respect for choice that built deeply into the list of the central values on the list are not preordained even when tradition itself. The liberal charges the capability approach with neglect of autonomy, for it allows citizens to choose the form of life they wish to lead after they have been given the capability to do so. And yet this concern with choice is matched by a concern with full human functioning. The capability view insists that choice is not pure spontaneity, but entails respect for the grounding experiences themselves, as at odds with other things. As for local specification: Good public reasoning, I believe and have argued, is always done, when well done, with a rich sensitivity to the local. And sometimes the local conditions are so diverse that what is a good way of promoting education in one part of the world will be completely ineffectual in another. Forms of life that support it, and the material conditions that enable one to live through it, are local conditions. If the local conditions are incompatibly diverse, the approach must aim at a list that suits the local conditions of those who live the ways of life in question. Martha Chen’s Aristotelian needs to consider a different sort of plural specification of the good. This means that in addition to the pluralism I have just described, the approach must consider how the components more concretely, and with much variety, in accordance with all the major capabilities.

But the conceptual distinction remains very important. When we are choosing a conception of good functioning with which to guide our policies, we must take into account the different functions and different sorts of choice that are possible. Sometimes, for example, what is a good way of promoting education in one part of the world will be completely ineffectual in another. Forms of life that support it, and the material conditions that enable one to live through it, are local conditions. If the local conditions are incompatibly diverse, the approach must aim at a list that suits the local conditions of those who live the ways of life in question. Martha Chen’s Aristotelian needs to consider a different sort of plural specification of the good. This means that in addition to the pluralism I have just described, the approach must consider how the components more concretely, and with much variety, in accordance with all the major capabilities.

I turn now to the objection about application; it raises especially the central values on the list are preordained even when tradition itself. The liberal charges the capability approach with neglect of autonomy, for it allows citizens to choose the form of life they wish to lead after they have been given the capability to do so. And yet this concern with choice is matched by a concern with full human functioning. The capability view insists that choice is not pure spontaneity, but entails respect for the grounding experiences themselves, as at odds with other things. As for local specification: Good public reasoning, I believe and have argued, is always done, when well done, with a rich sensitivity to the local. And sometimes the local conditions are so diverse that what is a good way of promoting education in one part of the world will be completely ineffectual in another. Forms of life that support it, and the material conditions that enable one to live through it, are local conditions. If the local conditions are incompatibly diverse, the approach must aim at a list that suits the local conditions of those who live the ways of life in question. Martha Chen’s Aristotelian needs to consider a different sort of plural specification of the good. This means that in addition to the pluralism I have just described, the approach must consider how the components more concretely, and with much variety, in accordance with all the major capabilities.

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In a now well-known remark, which I cite here as an epigraph, the feminist lawyer Catharine MacKinnon claimed that "being a woman is not yet a way of being a human being." This means, I think, that most traditional ways of categorizing and valuing women have not accorded them full membership in the human species, as that species is generally defined. MacKinnon is no doubt thinking in particular of the frequent denials to women of the rational nature that is taken to be a central part of what it is to be human. It is sobering to remind oneself that quite a few leading philosophers, including Aristotle and Rousseau, the "fathers" (certainly not mothers) of my idea, did deny women full membership in human functioning as they understood that notion. If this is so, one might well ask, of what use is it really to identify a set of central human capabilities? For the basic (lower-level) capacity to develop these can always be denied to women, even by those who grant their centrality. Does this problem show that the human function idea is either hopelessly in league with patriarchy or, at best, impotent as a tool for justice?

I believe that it does not. For if we examine the history of these denials we see, I believe, the great power of the conception of the human as a source of moral claims. Acknowledging the other person as a member of the very same kind would have generated a sense of affiliation and a set of moral and educational duties. That is why, to those bent on shoring up their own power, the stratagem of splitting the other off from one's own species seems so urgent and so seductive. But to deny humanness to beings with whom one lives in conversation and interaction is a fragile sort of self-deceptive stratagem, vulnerable to sustained and consistent reflection, and also to experiences that cut through self-deceptive rationalization. Any moral conception can be withheld, out of ambition or hatred or shame. But the conception of the human being, spelled out, as here, in a roughly determinate way, in terms of circumstances of life and functions in these circumstances, seems much harder to withhold than other conceptions that have been made the basis for ethics—"rational being," for example, or (as I have suggested) "person."

To illustrate this point, I now turn to the earliest argument known to me in the Western philosophical tradition that uses a conception of the human being for feminist ends. It is not the first attempt to make use of the human function idea, but it is the first time I know to my knowledge that MacKinnon's phrase has been used in this way. The argument I have in mind is the first argument of the Roman Stoic thinker Lucianus Rufus in his brief treatise "That Women Too Should Do Philosophy," written in the first century AD. This argument is all the more interesting in that it, in effect, uses Aristotelian concepts to correct Aristotle's mistake about women—showing, I think, that an Aristotelian who is both internally consistent and honest about the evidence cannot avoid the egalitarian normative conclusion that women, as much as men, should receive a higher education (for that is the core of the argument).

The argument itself now follows with a truly radical simplicity. The argument begins with a tacit premise. It is that—at least with respect to certain central functions of the human being—the presence in a creature of a basic (untrained, lower-level) capability to perform the functions in question, given suitable support and education, exerts a claim on society that those capabilities should be developed to the point at which the person is fully capable of choosing the functions in question. This premise needed no argument in the philosophical culture of Creco-Roman antiquity since that moral claim is more or less taken to be implicit in the notion of capability itself. I have tried to give it intuitive support in the argument of this paper.

The argument then proceeds with a truly radical simplicity. Its second premise consists of an appeal to the experience of the imaginary recalcitrant male interlocutor. Women, he is asked to concede on the basis of experience, do in fact have the basic capabilities to perform a wide variety of the most important human functions. They have the five senses. They have the same number of bodily parts, implying similar functional possibilities in that sphere. They have the ability to think and reason, just as males do. And, finally, they have responsiveness to ethical distinctions, making (whether well or badly) distinctions between the good and the bad. Some time is then spent establishing a third premise: that "higher education" of the sort offered by the Stoic ideal of liberal education is necessary for the full development of the perceptual, intellectual, and moral capabilities. Conclusion: Women, like men, should have this education.

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8. WOMEN AND MEN: TWO NORMS OR ONE?

The principle that women and men have different, separate spheres of life is a central idea in many non-Western cultures and in the Western tradition. It is reflected in the ways in which we define the roles of women and men, and in how we structure society and the economy. However, the question of whether there is a single norm of human functioning, or whether there are separate norms for men and women, is a complex and controversial one.

One position, which I shall call Position A, assigns to both males and females the same general normative list of functions, but suggests that males and females should exercise these functions in different spheres of life. The second, which I shall call Position B, insists that the list of functions, even at a high level of generality, should be two different standards of human functioning and capability.
which women will be capable of exercising all the major functions, it
who at each stage gave the men of the village reason to believe that
The recognition of this by the US Congress in its recent equalization of
what he can. Much the same is true in Martha Chen's A Quiet Revolu-
looked continuous with traditional female work but were outside the
The result is an acceptable specification of the norm is deeply problematic.
Two philosophers, including Rousseau and some of his contemporary
This point needs particular attention in thinking about divisions
of household there should be a division of labor, even a long-standing
Mystical of Gender repeatedly shows experiments that allegedly show
Even in the fourth century B.C., Plato was able to see that the situation
At the same time, assignment of functions powerfully connected with important
While it is clear that the difference between male and female hunting dogs is small,
But even in that situation, assignment of tasks along traditional gender-divided lines may be suspect, on account of
the domestic sphere cuts them off from the choice to earn a living, a
For very often the traditionally female norm is socially devalued, and
For many philosophers, including Rousseau and some of his contemporary
"Powerful determinants of overall capability status. In short, separate
The recognition of this by the US Congress in its recent equalization of
The recognition of this by the US Congress in its recent equalization of
One might also point to contingent social facts. Societies are already
divided along gender lines. So if we are going to move to a situation in
She does not have the chance to be a citizen and
in Musonius's Rome, a gender-based two-spheres model is accepted as natural
In the fourth century B.C., Plato was able to see that the situation
men and women are making this less and less plausible. And it should be evident to all
her, rather than trying to break it up. This, I think, is what really going
That role simply grants what should long ago have been obvious.
advances in the control of reproduction and the advance of functional differentiation are making this less and less plausible. And it should be evident to all
Advances in the control of reproduction and the advance of functional differentiation are making this less and less plausible. And it should be evident to all
one, with some members gaining greater skills at one task, some at
In Metha Bai's contemporary India, the confinement of women to
She does not have the chance to be a citizen and
the family, it seems perfectly reasonable that in one household, the piano, another the clarinet; for it reinforces stereotypes that
A morally neutral case of functional specialization (like teaching one
Poor philosophical arguments in favor of position A are presented, along with
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We have, on the one hand, males who are "autonomous," capable of inadequate, and fail to give us viable norms of human flourishing. And female functioning characteristically put forward by B are internally that it can also be shown that the differentiated conceptions of male potential for error and abuse in capability testing is so great that we beneath culture reliably enough to get the necessary evidence about basic traditions bequeaths to us? (Rousseau's view is an instructive example.)

should proceed as if every individual has the basic capabilities. I think this supports the conclusion I defended earlier: The means that in the present gender-divided state of things we cannot get be a boy, and "frightened" if the observer believes it to be a girl. This a crying infant tends to be labeled "angry" if the observer believes it to differences were ever to be convincingly established. For it has been shown right now, to do the sort of research that would be required if such dif 0km and Jane Roland Martin. Rousseau, in Ernile, places tremendous of such gender differences in our scheme of things, even had they been threshold, and excellence in some very narrowly defined function (say, perhaps, even to notice those needs. On the other hand, we have frequently treated by parents and other adults, in accordance with the perception that right now, from birth on, babies of the two sexes are differently differences in what I have been calling the central basic capabilities. So the political consequences it would not be a claim about capabilities in our capacious sense; nor, what's alleged is usually a differential statistical distribution of some

practical reasoning, independent and self-sufficient, allegedly good at

with Sophie, things again go badly. Laughter is for others, but

humble.

What do we usually find, in the versions of B that our philosophical

But we can also criticize Position B in a different way: for I believe

Finally, we must also note that it is in principle next to impossible,

It would seem not. The internal tensions in Rousseau's account are

If we speak now the universal language of Rousseau is that of the

with a grave functional loss. They support and enhance our notions against a greater functional loss. They support and encourage
...

In his *New Republic* piece, Sen makes a similar argument about contemporary India: The "Western construction of India as mystical and "other" serves the purposes of the fundamentalist BJE critics of such oppositions have not explained how one can speak coherently without bouncing off one thing against another. I believe that Aristotle was actually making some criticisms of the concept of "person" in feminist argument, and which are frequently put forward as if they undermine all binary oppositions, and the interests served by them.

On the other hand, it is closely related to Kantian approaches using related criticisms of liberal Kantian approaches (on which see also ASD and their political implications). Since Acknowledged, the remark cited by Richard Rorty in "Feminism and Capabilities," *The Foundation of Sen's and Nussbaum's Development Ethics,* ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and A. Sen, eds., *The Quality of Life,* pp. 303–23.

Of course, are relativist only about value, not about what they construe as the domain of scientific "fact." This affinity will later be relevant to my comments on the relationship between the two, and in their interaction in the development of the concept of justice (with my commentary 324–35). In the paper that I am presenting, I will be concerned with the repudiation of both metaphysical realism (to be discussed in the next section) and universalism.
for gender disparity, Japan slips to number 17. Women’s average earnings
nativism,” where Africa is concerned, can be found in Appiah (above n. 7),
and “Topologies of Nativism,” pp. 47—72.

26: “Japan, despite some of the world’s highest levels of human development,

14. The proceedings of this conference are now published as Nussbaum

17. See S. A. Marglin, “Toward the Decolonization” and “Losing Touch.”

18. See S. A. Marglin, “Losing Touch.” I put the term in quotes to indi-

19. See S. A. Marglin, “Toward the Decolonization” and “Losing Touch.”

20. For an account of this sort of normative argument, see Alasdair

21. J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. U. Spivak (Baltimore:Johns Hop-


23. See, for example, G. E. L. Owen, “The Phainomena”, in Logic,

24. See the illuminating discussion in B. K. Matilal, Perception (Oxford:

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interpreted this way, with much plausibility though perhaps insufficient historical agreement with both 0km and Ruth Anna Putnam that it is a mistake to the other hand, F. A. Marglin (here differing, I believe, from S.A. Marglin) also freedom of choice is just a parochial Western value? It would appear not; on conceive of the moral point of view as constituted by the actual voices of all disadvantaged parties; see Okin's "Inequalities between the Sexes in Different Cultural Contexts," pp. 274—97 and Putnam's "Why Not a Feminist Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ElheMany Faces of..." Appiah shows that it is all too often the focus on "otherness" that produces a... "Yoruba Man with Bicycle" that appears on the cover of the book, Appiah... varied, when concretely seen, histories really are. But his argument, like mine, seeks a subtle balance between perception of the particular and recognition of the common. In his essay "The Postcolonial and the Postmodern" (pp. 137—57),... "internal—realist" conception of Hilary Putnam articulated in Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: IVIA: Harvard University Press, 1987), and Realism with a Human... 39. On this emphasis, "No-Brains, Alive"... 38. In order to make the case of a conception of the good, "Hume's ERROR," The Disenchantment of the Enlightenment, reprinted edition (New York: Putnam, 1971), pp. 71—74. 37. This, of course, is not inconsistent with certain conceptions of "the..." and "the..." in contrast, it is there because someone cared for its solidity; it is there... in two 'extended' families divided by several thousand miles and an allegedly..." "Aristotle on Human Nature."" 35. Appiah, In My Father's House, p. viii. 36. In "Aristotle on Human Nature."" 34. Ibid. discusses the treatment of this point in contemporary medi. 33. For further discussion of this point, and examples, see "Aristotle on..." 32. The use of this term does not imply that the functions all involve doing... the claim that the bicycle is the white man's invention—it is not the..." and Development, pp. 199—224. 31. The position of the Theory of Western Philosophy never been more... 30. Can the Marglins consistently make this objection while holding that..." "Aristotle on Human Nature."" I discuss this passage..." (pp. 127—28). 29. In this sense I am thoroughly in agreement with Susan Okin's reply..." "Non-Relative Virtues."" 28. In this category as closely related to my own view, I would place the..." "Non—Relative Virtues."" 27. K. A. Appiah, My Father's House, pp. vii—viii: "If my sisters and I were..." and Development, pp. 199—224. 26. An stotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII.I, 1155a 21—22. I discuss this passage... reflecting, being pleased, are all "activities." (See here Sen, "Capability and Well-Being," in The..." "Non—Relative Virtues."" 25. Human Nature.) In Aristotelian terms, and in mine, being health..." "Non—Relative Virtues."" 24. Something especially "active." (See here..." "Non—Relative Virtues."" 23. It is forced to deal with this sort of experience. But instead of the..." and Development, pp. 199—224. 22. I am satisfied that the metaphor of memory change: and I shall not..." "Non—Relative Virtues."" 21. He insists that the undermining of the rationality of memory change: and I shall not..." "Non—Relative Virtues."" 20. He insists that the undermining of the rationality of memory change: and I shall not..." "Non—Relative Virtues."" 19. He insists that the undermining of the rationality of memory change: and I shall not..." "Non—Relative Virtues."" 18. He insists that the undermining of the rationality of memory change: and I shall not..." "Non—Relative Virtues."" 17. He insists that the undermining of the rationality of memory change: and I shall not..." "Non—Relative Virtues."" 16. He insists that the undermining of the rationality of memory change: and I shall not..." 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jury service, although the law stated that "every person qualified to vote" was eligible. The state Supreme Court wrote: "No intention to include women is manifest in the statute on which the woman based her appeal "is confined to males." Constitution: See my Jefferson epigraph. Although this construal of the term "person" was one that the Founders could have appreciated, it is not one that is consistent with the view that women are people. The omission of the word 'male" (Commonwealth 'a.

In Massachusetts in 1932, women were denied eligibility for jury service. The state Supreme Court held that the word "person" in the statute on which the woman based her appeal did not include women. The state Supreme Court wrote: "No intention to include women is manifest in the statute on which the woman based her appeal "is confined to males." This is consistent with the view that women are people. The omission of the word 'male" (Commonwealth 'a.

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51. There is a growing literature on the importance of shelter for health: e.g., that the provision of adequate housing is the single largest determinant of \nundernutrition," 121—61.

52. I shall not elaborate here on what I think promoting this capability \nrequires, since there is a WIDER project and conference devoted to this topic. \n53. A good example of an education right that I would support is given \nby Albie Sachs, where this is given as an example of a justiciable housing right. \n54. On the emotions as basic human capabilities, see, in addition to my \n"Capabilities and Hiding Human Nature," pp. 360—95, my 1993 Gifford Lectures, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence \nand the Human Species" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and my \n"Emotions and Women's Capabilities," in *Women, Culture and Development, \npp. 332—59, and also his "Gender, Reproduction, and Law" presented at the conference on reproductive \nrights and women's capabilities at WIDER in 1993.

54. "Aristotelian Social Democracy" said that a list of such liberties needed \nthe approval of the people or the governing body. The people or the governing \nbody may also add to the list any other fundamental liberties that they think \nare needed for that country's development, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child development, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear \nfamily. Susan Okin also agrees with the important educational role of the family makes \nwhere "the family" is concerned. On the whole, I am in agreement with Susan \nOkin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child \ndevelopment, but that this need not be the traditional Western nuclear family. It also \nagrees with Okin that some form of intimate family love is of crucial importance in child
who are either well or not well off are "heads of households," usually taken to
an overview, see "Capability and Well-Being" in The Quality of Life, with
ings as in the Human Development Report.

Democracy," "Human Functioning," with references to related arguments of
purposes of the present inquiry. I therefore address them in greater detail. I therefore
as wealth and income. On the other hand, he has repeatedly denied that his
subtle one. Rawls is willing to take a stand on certain items: Thus liberty and
the relationship between Rawls's resourceism and my project, which is a particularly
philosophical form of utilitarianism, which builds in means to filter or correct
preferences. Nonetheless, the human-functioning approach would still object
to the role played by the commensurability of values in utilitarianism, and to
issues include "Should Boys and Girls Have the Same Education?" (answering
issues for women is now in Stephen Halliwell, Plato: Republic, Book V (Cambridge
in "The Discernment of Perception" in Love's Knowledge, and in "The Literary
functions and social justice.

76. Sen has stressed this throughout his writing on the topic. For an
80. The remark was cited by Richard Rorty in "Feminist and Pragmatism,
81. See n. 37 above on Raoul Hilberg's account, in The Destruction of the
82. The most comprehensive and accurate account of the Nazi device of
categorizing Jews as animals or inanimate objects, and the vulnerability of that
mechanism to "breakthroughs," in which the mechanisms of denial were caught off guard.
83. For Musonius's collected works, see the edition by Otto Hense (Leipzig:

In the discussion of economic justice and the New Zealand, in 1906) to give females the vote, a nation as committed to
sex equality as any in the world. We can assume that the situation is
much worse in other parts of the world, where the other end of the economic spectrum is
What is relevant for choice, imagine trade-offs in purely quantitative terms. 

In his recent work, Sen describes a "Quiet Revolution" in which there was a significant improvement in women's education and health.

The gay American military officer who chooses celibacy for fear of losing his
job has not, in the relevant sense, been given a capability of choosing.

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sion, holding that the traditional "liberal studies" are not "liberal" in the right way, that is, do not truly "free" the mind to take charge of its own reasoning. See Seneca, Moral Epistle, p. 88.


86. On the way in which Christianity disrupted the emerging feminist consensus, see C. E. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (London: Duckworth, 1987).

87. See the last section of "That Women Too," where he answers the male interlocutor's imaginary objection that educated women cannot easily view that sphere as equivalent and equal to the male sphere. His view of the worth of male and female public life and capabilities is affected by the specific conditions and constraints of his society and culture.

88. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, Myths of Gender.


90. Is the Nigerian situation depicted in Nzegwu's paper an exception? We can agree with her that the traditional system in Nigeria is compatible with contemporary arguments, for example those of Allan Bloom. See Okin, Justice, ch. 1.

91. On Rousseau, see 0km, Women, and Jane Roland Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

92. On all this, see Fausto-Sterling.

93. Here I am in agreement with the general line of argument in 0km, Women, and Martin, Reclaiming, and with the related arguments in Nancy Chodorow's The Reproduction of Mothering, which I discuss in my other chapter, "Emotions and Women's Capabilities," in Women, Culture and Development, pp. 360—95.

94. I am grateful to all the members of our meeting for valuable comments, and especially to Amartya Sen for valuable discussions and to David Crocker, Jonathan Clover, Cass Sunstein, and Susan Wolf for helpful written comments. I am also grateful to Chris Bobonich, David Estlund, and Henry Richardson for comments on related earlier work.