# IDENTIFYING PASSWORDS ON DISK 

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## Introduction

- Passwords continue to be the primary mean of authenticating
- Sites have developed policies that require more complex passwords
- Recommendations to create unique passwords for different accounts
- Users are increasingly turning to saving their passwords in some manner


## Surveys

## Means for storing passwords

## Which method do you use to store passwords?



## Our Aim

- Investigators are interested to find possible stored passwords on the disk
- Given a disk :

Analyze the files and return a set of strings that are most probably passwords for the investigator

- Examining the disk and retrieve tokens
o Filtering techniques
- Identifying passwords


## Examining the Disk

- Where we look for files on disk:
- Allocated space
- Unallocated space
- Hidden through the operating system
- Using different tools to retrieve files and tokens :
- Tsk_recover
- catdoc, docx2txt, xls2txt, unoconv and xls2txt, Unrtf, odt2txt, pdftotext
- Extract whitespace separated (space, tab, and newline) strings from each file and keep an associated text file with each token written on a single line.


## Initial Filtering

- Non-printing characters: not valid ASCII characters for passwords
- Length: 6 < Password length < 21
- Floating point: xls files contain large number of floating point numbers [-+]? [0-9]* .? [0-9]+ ([eE][-+]?[0-9]+)?
- Repeated tokens: We keep one instance of each token in each file
- Word punctuations: Tokens that seem to be part of a sentence; any alpha string ending with ;:.,!?)\} or starting with ( or \{.


## Specialized Filtering

An extremely prevalent class of tokens is the set of alpha strings

- All-alphas
o Based on password policies most passwords do not contain only alpha characters
- Sentences
o Detect sentences using OpenNLP
- Capitalization
o Filtering only all lowered-case alpha strings
- Dictionary words
o Filtering those strings that appear in a dictionary
- Multiword
o Filtering those strings that are not multiword (passphrases) (ex. iloveyou)


## Identifying Passwords

 How to distinguish passwords from other stringsConstruct a probabilistic context-free grammar* from training on a set of revealed passwords

- Parse every password into base structures and count their frequency.
- Base structures consist of L (alpha sequences), D (digits), S (symbols), M(capitalization)
- Base structure also includes length information


## Password12\% $\mathrm{L}_{8}\left(\mathrm{M}_{8}\right) \mathrm{D}_{2} \mathrm{~S}_{1}$

[^0]
## Probabilistic password attack

## Training

| Training Set |
| :--- |
| tiny99 |
| 1pass! |
| this2! |
| star99 |
| $\cdot$ |
| - |
| tree99 |
| burn1! |
| 1 star! |
| down11 |


| $\mathrm{S} \rightarrow$ | $\mathrm{L}_{4} \mathrm{D}_{2}$ | 0.5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathrm{S} \rightarrow$ | $\mathrm{D}_{1} \mathrm{~L}_{4} \mathrm{~S}_{1}$ | 0.25 |
| $\mathrm{S} \rightarrow$ | $\mathrm{L}_{4} \mathrm{D}_{1} \mathrm{~S}_{1}$ | 0.25 |
| $\mathrm{D}_{2} \rightarrow$ | 99 | 0.7 |
| $\mathrm{D}_{2} \rightarrow$ | 11 | 0.3 |
| $\mathrm{D}_{1} \rightarrow$ | 1 | 0.8 |
| $\mathrm{D}_{1} \rightarrow$ | 2 | 0.2 |
| $\mathrm{S}_{1} \rightarrow$ | ! | 1.0 |
| $\mathrm{L}_{4} \rightarrow$ | alex | 0.1 |
| $\begin{array}{\|l\|l} S \rightarrow^{*} \text { alex2! } \quad \text { With probability } \\ 0.25 \times 0.1 \times 0.2 \times 1.0=0.005 \end{array}$ |  |  |

Note: Alpha sequence probabilities come from dictionaries and are equal to $1 / n_{\mathrm{L}}$, where $n_{L}$ is the number of words in the dictionary of length $L$.

## Probabilistic password attack

## Generating the guesses

| $\mathrm{S} \rightarrow$ | $\mathrm{L}_{4} \mathrm{D}_{2}$ | 0.5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $\mathrm{~S} \rightarrow$ | $\mathrm{D}_{1} \mathrm{~L}_{4} \mathrm{~S}_{1}$ | 0.25 |
| $\mathrm{~S} \rightarrow$ | $\mathrm{~L}_{4} \mathrm{D}_{1} \mathrm{~S}_{1}$ | 0.25 |
| $\mathrm{D}_{2} \rightarrow$ | 99 | 0.7 |
| $\mathrm{D}_{2} \rightarrow$ | 11 | 0.3 |
| $\mathrm{D}_{1} \rightarrow$ | 1 | 0.8 |
| $\mathrm{D}_{1} \rightarrow$ | 2 | 0.2 |
| $\mathrm{~S}_{1} \rightarrow$ | $!$ | 1.0 |
| $\mathrm{~L}_{4} \rightarrow$ | alex | 0.1 |


| alex 99 <br> andy 99 <br> beta 99 <br> $\ldots$ | 0.035 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 1 alex ! <br> 1 andy ! <br> $\ldots$ <br> alex 1 ! <br> andy 1! <br> $\ldots$ | 0.02 |
| alex 11 <br> andy 11 <br> $\ldots$ | 0.015 |
| 2 alex ! <br> 2 andy ! <br> $\ldots$ |  |
| alex 2 ! <br> andy $2!$ <br> $\ldots$ | 0.005 |

## Identifying Passwords

How to distinguish passwords from other strings

- Using a probabilistic context-free grammar trained on a set of real user passwords, we can calculate the probability of any string.



## Ranking algorithms

Outputting the top N tokens as the potential password set

- Top Overall:
o The N highest probability tokens from the whole disk
- Top percent:
o An equal percentage of the highest probability tokens of each file
- Top 1-by-1:

Choose the highest probability token from each file and sort them Choose the second highest probability token from each file and sort


File 1


File 2


File 3


File 4

## Experiment 1

| Data Disk Image Size | \#Files Analyzed | \# Passwords Added |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 GB | 1194 | 1000 |
| 500 MB | 571 | 500 |
| 250 MB | 426 | 250 |
| 100 MB | 143 | 100 |
| 50 MB | 108 | 50 |

- Reveled password sets to choose passwords from: Yahoo (300 thousand)


## Initial Filtering Experiment

Percentage reduction of tokens due to each filter

| Filter | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{5 0} \\ & \text { MB } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 100 \\ & \mathrm{MB} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 250 \\ & \text { MB } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{5 0 0} \\ & \text { MB } \end{aligned}$ | 1 GB |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Non-printing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.0015 | 0 |
| Length | 59.65 | 65.57 | 60.34 | 40.75 | 53.08 |
| Floating point | 1.05 | 0.45 | 20.71 | 46.87 | 28.21 |
| Repeated token | 85.04 | 82.79 | 73.78 | 75.63 | 70.10 |
| Word punctuations | 68.96 | 11.90 | 8.27 | 6.28 | 20.42 |
| All-alphas | 77.89 | 73.11 | 60.66 | 31.95 | 33.71 |

## Initial Filtering Experiment

Reduction of tokens due to all filters

|  | Disk | $\mathbf{5 0}$ <br> $\mathbf{M B}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ <br> $\mathbf{M B}$ | $\mathbf{2 5 0}$ <br> $\mathbf{M B}$ | $\mathbf{5 0 0}$ <br> $\mathbf{M B}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $\mathbf{1 ~ G B}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| \# Before filtering <br> (millions) | 2.45 | 2.16 | 6.76 | 28.84 | 49.41 |
| \# After filtering <br> (millions) | 0.07 | 0.050 | 0.25 | 1.38 | 3.21 |
| Total reduction <br> (percent) | 97.15 | 97.68 | 96.35 | 95.21 | 93.50 |

## Experiment 2: Ranking Algorithms

- Stored 5 and 15 passwords in our disks
- Reveled password sets to choose passwords from:
- CSDN (300 thousand)
- Rockyou (1 million)
- Returned N potential passwords when N =1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000


## Ranking Algorithms

## Storing 5 passwords from CSDN

Average Recall

| 40\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Top overall | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
|  |  | Top percent | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| $\begin{gathered} 56 \% \\ 92 \% \end{gathered}$ | \% | Top 1-by-1 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
|  | - | Top overall | 5 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
|  | \% | Top percent | 5 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
|  | Z | Top 1-by-1 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 |

## Ranking Algorithms

## Storing 15 passwords from CSDN

Average Recall

|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{50} \\ & \mathrm{MB} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 100 \\ & \mathrm{MB} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 250 \\ & \mathrm{MB} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 500 \\ & \mathrm{MB} \end{aligned}$ | 1 GB |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\frac{8}{\frac{8}{Z}}$ | Top overall | 1 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
|  | Top percent | 4 | 10 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
|  | Top 1-by-1 | 11 | 12 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { O} \\ & \text { in } \\ & \text { Z } \end{aligned}$ | Top overall | 1 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
|  | Top percent | 9 | 10 | 2 | 4 | 5 |
|  | Top 1-by-1 | 12 | 14 | 9 | 9 | 11 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & 8 \\ & \vdots \\ & \text { Z } \end{aligned}$ | Top overall | 11 | 10 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
|  | Top percent | 10 | 11 | 3 | 5 | 6 |
|  | Top 1-by-1 | 15 | 15 | 12 | 10 | 12 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & 8 \\ & 0 \\ & \hline 2 \end{aligned}$ | Top overall | 13 | 11 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
|  | Top percent | 11 | 11 | 8 | 5 | 8 |
|  | Top 1-by-1 | 15 | 15 | 13 | 10 | 14 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & \frac{8}{0} \\ & \frac{11}{7} \end{aligned}$ | Top overall | 15 | 14 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
|  | Top percent | 12 | 14 | 9 | 8 | 8 |
|  | Top 1-by-1 | 15 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 14 |

## Experiment 3: Specialized Filtering

## Storing 15 passwords from Rockyou

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\frac{8}{\frac{8}{11}}$ | Top overall | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
|  | Top percent | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|  | Top 1-by-1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 8 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { © } \\ & \text { II } \\ & \text { Z } \end{aligned}$ | Top overall | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
|  | Top percent | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
|  | Top 1-by-1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 10 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { o} \\ & \text { K } \\ & \text { Z } \end{aligned}$ | Top overall | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
|  | Top percent | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
|  | Top 1-by-1 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 10 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { \& } \\ & \text { in } \\ & \text { Z } \end{aligned}$ | Top overall | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
|  | Top percent | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 7 |
|  | Top 1-by-1 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 10 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{8} \\ & \frac{0}{0} \\ & \text { III } \end{aligned}$ | Top overall | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
|  | Top percent | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 7 |
|  | Top 1-by-1 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 8 | $7 \times$ | 10 |

## Specialized Filtering

1-by-1 algorithm (several runs)


## Specialized Filtering



## Example of top 20 potential passwords

| Potential passwords | Probability |
| :--- | :--- |
| charles1 | $6.384 \mathrm{E}-6$ |
| include3 | $1.687 \mathrm{E}-6$ |
| program4 | $1.610 \mathrm{E}-6$ |
| carolina23 | $6.272 \mathrm{E}-7$ |
| light20 | $1.112 \mathrm{E}-7$ |
|  | program97 |
| lyndsay1 | $7.757 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
| decagon1 | $7.739 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
| dogbloo1 | $7.739 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
| example1 | $7.739 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
| pdprog1 | $7.739 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
| report1 | $5.370 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
| cielo123 | $5.370 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
|  | $5.080 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
|  | soldiers1 |
| bluberry 1 | $4.044 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
| listeria1 | $4.044 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
| compendia1 | $4.044 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
| framework1 | $3.110 \mathrm{E}-8$ |
| alpha1s | $3.110 \mathrm{E}-8$ |

## Conclusion

- We can successfully identify most of the passwords on disks with large number of tokens.
- We return a relatively small set of potential passwords to be tried based on the investigator's resources.
- The system can be adapted to work for cellphones and USB drives.


[^0]:    * M. Weir, S. Aggarwal, B. De Medeiros, B. Glodek, Password cracking using probabilistic context free grammars, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2009)

