ELEMENTA

Schriften zur Philosophie und
ihrer Problemgeschichte

herausgegeben von

Rudolph Berlinger und
Wiebke Schrader

BAND XIII - 1980

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THE LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCLUS' ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ AS SYSTEMATIC GROUND OF THE COSMOS

Rodopi
AMSTERDAM 1980

CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek

Lowry, James M.P.:
The logical principles of Proclus' stoicheiosis theologike as systematic ground of the cosmos / James M.P. Lowry. – Amsterdam : Rodopi; Hildesheim : Gerstenberg, 1980.

(Elementa; Bd. 13)
ISBN 3–8067–0867–3

© Editions Rodopi N.V., Amsterdam 1980
Printed in the Netherlands
ISBN: 90–6203–781–X

ABSTRACT

The primary aim of this study is to analyze conceptually and structurally the first 112 propositions of Proclus' Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική. Descriptive analysis in the form of paraphrase and quotation has been used together with a consideration of logical structure as a basis for the explanation of the philosophical implications of the content of these propositions.

The prolegomena serves to indicate the scope and rationale of the method and content of the study while the introduction is designed to give an historical and philosophical background to a logical consideration of the systematic nature of the first 112 propositions of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική.

The first chapter considers the nature of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική as an individual work while the second chapter outlines its general logical structure as system. Chapters three and four are a detailed commentary on the first 112 propositions of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική. In chapter five, the logical tension of these propositions is developed, and in the conclusion this tension is reflected upon with a view to its reconciliation.

An appendix at the end of the study is a consideration of the relation of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική to Proclus' other great philosophic work Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to Professor James Doull for his guidance and encouragement.

οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ' ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμή τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον.

PROLEGOMENA

Before considering the subject matter of this study in an immediate way, it may perhaps be well to delineate with some precision the scope, nature, and rationale of the subject matter itself. This study was undertaken for the purpose of considering the internal logical structure and relation of the ontological principles of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική. In order to fulfill this purpose, the primary focus has been to consider that part of the work which is the detailed working out and development of these principles (i.e. Prop. 1-112). By confining the argument to this topic, I have sought to bring out as clearly as possible the logical structure of the cosmos as Proclus thought of it within the compass of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική.

The nature of the focus of this study is such that the interest of it is not primarily an historical one. Rather it is to investigate Proclus' Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική from his own standpoint and to see whether in terms of his own argument he has a position which is philosophically tenable and true. I undertake this approach realizing that it is not entirely possible to look at a work unhistorically, but also trying to put myself in the position of a philosopher who did not himself look at philosophy historically.[1] In this regard, it seems to me that Proclus and other Neoplatonists including Plotinus perhaps especially, have much to teach us.

It is, therefore, because I want to see how this somewhat unhistorical approach might bear fruit that I have written an introductory chapter from a rather weighted, though I hope not necessarily narrow, point of view. The intention of the chapter is to try to understand why Proclus would have tried to write a systematic treatise. Certainly there are historical reasons and circumstances for this. He was, for example, no doubt influenced by his

1. For a detailed consideration of the difficulties and assumptions which are involved in trying to treat philosophy historically see my forthcoming article, 'Aristotle and Modern Historical Criticism', in *Laval théologique et philosophique*.

predecessors, perhaps especially, his master Syrianus. And in addition, he most certainly was the heir of a tradition[2] that was enamoured of tradition and wished to retain all of it for himself. But these considerations do not, it seems to me, fully explain Proclus' Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική or even the Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας. In these works Proclus does put philosophy, as it was passed down to him, into a systematic form. Why he does so has to be to some degree a matter of speculation. My own opinion is that Proclus' desire for system had to do with a philosophical problem which faces any metaphysical philosopher: namely, how do we know the cosmos totally in principle without being self-contradictory or inconsistent. Now, of course, it is one thing to ask such a question and another to answer it. My own supposition is that Proclus thought he could answer this question in the form of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική.

It is on the basis of this supposition that I have attempted to consider the history of Greek philosophy synoptically with special reference to the relation of Proclus and Iamblichus to Plotinus in so far as there seems to be some disagreement between them. Such a synoptic and cursory view cannot be either definitive or exhaustive, but is simply meant as an aid to understanding how Proclus came to systematize things the way he did. As such an aid the argument of the chapter is only one way of ordering the phenomena of Greek philosophical history. The defect of such an ordering is that it may all too easily overlook inconsistencies and ambiguities in order to make things fit a preconceived intellectual framework.[3] On the positive side, such an ordering can sometimes

2. For an interesting and clear consideration of the concept "tradition" in a Neoplatonic context see Armstrong, A. H., "Tradition, Reason and Experience in the Thought of Plotinus", *Academia Nazionale dei Lincei*, Rome, 1974, pp. 171-194.

3. Professor Armstrong catches perfectly the imaginativeness of this kind of argumentation in explaining how a traditionalist may be determined to reconcile tradition with reason in the following: "... when confronted with a piece of apparent nonsense in the tradition, they do not accept it as higher sense, or ineffably superior to sense. They, so to speak, take hold of it by the scruff of the neck and shake it till it makes sense." *Ibid.*, p. 173.

bring out clearly the difficulties and inconsistencies of philosophical views, and has the advantage of showing, as Neoplatonists and especially Proclus are wont to show, that different philosophies really only appear to be different. Behind such a desire for agreement is the perhaps somewhat euphoric conviction that truth cannot be contradictory and that philosophy is by its nature reasonable.

Such an euphoria not only may be overly systematic to the detriment of what is systematized but has the tendency to regard thought as the ultimate measure. Such a regard creates a problem especially for any Neoplatonic philosopher who does not, as Proclus does not, regard Reason as the highest principle. It is on account of this problem that in the conclusion of this study I discuss the relation of Proclus' principle to his system. In doing so I have hoped to relate the rationale of this study to itself and to provide a ballast for the introductory chapter.

It is, as I have stated, not the purpose of this study to deal with Proclus or the Στοιχείωσις Θεολονική historically except to indicate how he may have come to write the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική as he did. For this reason, it has not been my intention to argue for Proclus' originality in an exhaustive way.[4] Such an argument lies outside the range of this study because it is tied up with the question of where or from whom Proclus got his ideas. Only by answering this question would it be possible to determinc how many or what ideas Proclus can be said to have contributed himself. In so far as Proclus' originality can be based on the systematization of ideas the study as a whole can be said to indicate his ability in this regard.

Finally, it may be helpful to consider the scope of this study in relation to Proclus' work as a whole. It is, of course, neither the aim nor the intention of the writer to compare all of Proclus' thoughts with one another. Such an enterprize would be of great value both historically and philosophically. Some such work has already been undertaken by such scholars as Beierwaltes and Trouillard. There are immense technical problems in doing

4. For a short consideration of Proclus as an original philosopher see below pp. 31-34.

such a work because the state of the Procline corpus is not easily accessible or definitively edited in all cases. Nevertheless, although the relation of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική to other Procline works is neither a peculiarly historical problem nor crucial to the internal study of the work itself, some readers might find it helpful to consider whether the logical structure of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική is for Proclus crucial or rather an attempt at systematization that he then abandoned. This question can, I think, be regarded as filling out the rationale of the argument of this study and can perhaps best be considered in relation to the Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας, since the latter is the only other work of Proclus which is not a commentary and deals with the same cosmological schema as the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική. I have, therefore, to effect a consideration of this question, which is in some ways peripheral to the argument of this study, added an appendix at the end in which I have noted the main relations between the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική and the Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας.

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INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of Proclus is at present not well-known. Yet this has not always been the case. In fact his obscurity is a rather modern phenomenon.[1] Proclus' philosophy was known in the Byzantine world from the time of its origin, although it was neither developed nor studied because the eastern Christians considered some of its teaching, such as the eternity of the world,[2] to be heretical. Beginning in the eleventh century under the Comneni revival there was a reawakening of interest in Platonism.[3] Since that time various translations of some of Proclus' works into Syriac, Arabic, Armenian, and Georgian have been made.[4] In the Latin West Proclus' philosophy has had a different and more influential history than in the Greek East because it was disguised as apostolic teaching, and had, therefore, to be considered as a priori unheretical. Pseudo-Dionysius, as he is now called, used Proclus' philosophy as the basis for his treatises. He not only did not mention his pagan teacher but he also claimed to be a contemporary of St. Paul the Apostle, thereby assuring for himself

1. On Proclus' influence generally see L. J. Rosán, *The Philosophy of Proclus*, New York, 1949, pp. 221-226 and E. R. Dodds, *The Elements of Theology*, Oxford, 1963, pp. xxvi-xxxiii.

2. See Joannes Philoponus, *De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum*, ed. H. Rabe, Leipzig, 1899, reprinted 1963.

3. See *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 473-491; and E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, p. xxviii. The Byzantine philosopher Michael Psellus (1038-78 or 1096) is the most important proponent of Proclus during the Comneni revival. We are indebted to him for various abstracts taken from Proclus' Commentary on the Chaldean Oracles. For Psellus' philosophy generally see C. Zervos, *Un philosophe néoplatonicien du XI^e siècle, Michel Psellos*, Paris, 1919. For Psellus' career see the article on "Psellos" in *RE, Supplementband* XI, Stuttgart, 1968, pp. 1124-1182. For Psellus' reception of Proclus see L.G. Westerink, "Proclus, Procopius, Psellus", *Mnemosyne*, vol. 10, 1942, pp. 275-280.

4. See E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, pp. xxviii-xxix.

and for Proclus' ideas a sympathetic and tolerant hearing.[5] In the eleventh century, a Latin translation from an Arabic translation of parts of the *Elements of Theology* began to be studied as a work of Aristotle under the title *Liber de causis*.[6] Finally in the thirteenth century Latin translations were made of the *Elements of Physics*, the *Elements of Theology*, and parts of the *Commentary on the Timaeus*, the *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, the *De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis ad Theodorum mechanicum*, the *De malorum subsistentia*, and the *Commentary*

5. The dependence of Pseudo-Dionysius on Proclus has been well established by H. Koch, in: "Proklos als Quelle des Dionysius Areopagita in der Lehre vom Bösen", *Philologus*, vol. 39, 1895, pp. 438-454, and in "Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen", *Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur und Dogmengeschichte*, vol. 1, no. 2-3, Mainz, 1900. The most recent dissenting view is that of I. P. Sheldon–Williams in: "The Ps.-Dionysius and the Holy Hieotheus", *Studia Patristica*, vol. 8, 1966, pp. 108-17. This article does not, however, consider the overwhelming textual evidence of Koch nor does it explain how the teaching of Pseudo-Dionysius on evil follows that of Proclus rather than his predecessors. See also Sheldon–Williams' chapter "Pseudo-Dionysius", in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, op. cit.*, pp. 457-472, expecially p. 457. Again the work of Koch is not definitely considered. For views of other writers who support Koch see: R. F. Hathaway, *Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius*, The Hague, 1969, pp. 13-20; and René Roques, *Structures théologiques de la gnose à Richard de Saint-Victor*, Paris, 1962, p. 70 and especially p. 89 where Roques argues that the views of Koch and Stiglmayer on the dating of Pseudo-Dionysius at the end of the fifth century have never been seriously challenged. In addition, see Roques' *L'univers dionysien*, Paris, 1954, especially pp. 90-91. See also Klaus Kremer, *Die Neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin*, Leiden, 1966, p. 327, note 159 on the relation between Plotinus, Proclus, and Pseudo-Dionysius re: the triad Sein, Leben, Geist (ὄν, ζωή, νοῦς).

6. See E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, pp. xxix-xxx; E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, New York, 1955, pp. 235-237 and p. 137, note 3; *Liber de Causis, Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift über das reine Gute bekannt unter den Namen Liber de causis*, ed. O. Bardenhewer, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1882; and *Sancti Thomae de Aquino super librum de causis expositio*, ed. H.-O. Saffrey, Fribourg, 1954, pp. xvi-xxv (for historical comments) and pp. xxx-xxxiii (for doctrinal comments).

on the Parmenides.[7] These works were in fact current before the *Enneads* of Plotinus and the majority of the Platonic dialogues were even known.[8] With the resurgence of the study of the ancients in early Renaissance times there came also a revival of Platonism. During this revival much of the Procline corpus was vigorously studied and commented upon.[9] After the Renaissance Proclus ceased to be a major influence, although his work was studied during the early nineteenth century, especially with the appearance of various editions of his extant works in Germany, France, and England.[10]

The philosophy of Proclus covers a wide expanse. He wrote commentaries on Plato and Plotinus; on Homer and Hesiod; on the Orphics, Chaldeans, and Pythagoreans; and on Euclid. He wrote natural treatises, theological treatises, religious works, and numerous hymns.[11] His work is vast, and, because it is so, many different philosophers have been differently and profoundly influenced by him: such as Scotus Eriugena,[12] Thomas Aquinas,[13]

7. See E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, p. xxxi.

8. *Ibid.*

9. See L. J. Rosán, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-225; and F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Volume 3, Part II, Westminister, 1953, Chapter Thirteen: "The Revival of Platonism".

10. For a consideration of Proclus' relation to German Idealism see W. Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus*, Frankfurt am Main, 1972. For an informative and interesting account of the effort to revive the work of Proclus by Thomas Taylor see Raine, K. and Harper, G. M., *Thomas Taylor the Platonist, Selected Writings*, Princeton, 1969.

11. For a complete survey of the total Procline corpus see L. J. Rosán, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-62.

12. Proclus' influence on Eriugena was through the latter's translation of Pseudo-Dionysius. For a brief discussion of Eriugena's development and relation to Pseudo-Dionysius see: Johannis Scotti Eriugenae, *Periphyseon*, ed. I. P. Sheldon–Williams, Liber Primus, Dublin, 1968, pp. 1-5, and *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, op. cit.*, pp. 518-522.

13. Thomas wrote commentaries on *Liber de causis (In librum de causis)* and on Pseudo-Dionysius *(In Dionysium De divinibus nominibus)*. In the *Summa Theologiae* one can see a Neoplatonic influence in the tripartite

Meister Eckhard,[14] and Nicholaus of Cusa.[15] Today Proclus no longer enjoys the reputation that he had in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance as, in Tauler's words, "the great pagan master."[16] And yet I wonder if such an epithet is not justified. Today Proclus' reputation is surely not that which he enjoyed in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Certainly, he is not as highly regarded by most Neoplatonic scholars as is Plotinus, and is consequently not studied as thoroughly, if at all.[17] Dodds in his edition of the

movement of the work mirroring the μονή, πρόοδος, and ἐπιστροφή of the Neoplatonic world-view (that is, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars Q. 1-1-44 on God; Q. 45-119 on creation and created beings; and the second and third parts which deal with questions which concern the ground and means of return or salvation), and in various particular questions as e. g., Prima Pars Q. 13. For recent literature and comment see: E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, p. xxxi; W. Beierwaltes, "Der Kommentar zum 'liber de causis' als neu-platonisches Element in der Philosophie des Thomas von Aquin", *PhR*, vol. 11, 1963, pp. 192-215; and Klaus Kremer, *op. cit.*, especially Vierter Teil: "Die neuplatonische Seinsauffassung in der Philosophie des Thomas von Aquin", pp. 352-469, see especially pp. 356, 357, 361, 374.

14. See E.. Krebs, *Meister Dietrich*, Münster, 1906, pp. 126 ff. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 438-442. For Eckhardt's exposition of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the One beyond Being see: *Quaestiones Parisiensis*, ed. A. Dondaine, Vol. 3, Magistri Eckhardi Opera latina, auspiciis Instituti Sanctae Sabinae ad codicum fidem edita, Leipzig, 1936, pp. 1-19.

15. E. Vansteenberge, *Le cardinal Nicolas de Cues*, Paris, 1920, pp. 436-438. According to Dodds, the writings of Meister Eckhardt and the *Platonic Theology* and *Parmenides Commentary* of Proclus were Nicolaus' "favourite reading". (Dodds, E.R., *op. cit.*, p. xxii). For remarks on Nicolaus' library and his annotations of Proclus' works see: *Das Werk des Nicolaus Cusanus*, G. Heinz–Mohr, and W. P. Eckert, Köln, 1963, esp. pp. 149-150. See in addition W. Beierwaltes "Deus oppositio oppositorum" (Cusanus de vis. dei XIII) *Salzbg. Jb. Phil.*, vol. 8, 1964, pp. 175-185; R. Klibansky, "Ein Proklos-Fund und seine Bedeutung", *SBH*, Abh. 5, Heidelberg, 1929; and Nikolaus von Kues, De docta Ignorantia, ed. P. Wilpert and H. G. Senger, Hamburg, 1970, Buch I, p. 119 (n. 32), p. 124 (n. 73); Buch II, p. 129 (n. 119), p. 120 (n. 42), p. 121 (n. 29), and p. 122 (n. 54).

16. Quoted by Dodds, E.R., *op. cit.*, p. xxvi. See also W. Beierwaltes, "Der Begriff des 'unum in nobis' bei Proklus", *Miscellanea Medievalia*, vol. 2, "Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter", Berlin, 1963, pp. 265-266.

17. It is not only necessary to look at what writers say about Proclus to

Elements of Theology seems to regard Proclus as a kind of scholastic footnote to Plotinus, as a rather long-winded, uncreative, unoriginal philosopher who spent his life commenting on other people's ideas, as the last great pagan Greek philosopher, who carefully dusted the beautiful, limpid figures of the Old Greek gods and the living philosophies of his predecessors from Plato to Syrianus only to reshelve them for the last time.[18] Dodds' view is

gather the state of his present importance and reputation to scholars and students of Greek philosophy. One needs also to consider how much space he is given in anthologies and histories of Greek philosophy. Three good examples are: (a) *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* wherein an entire chapter of some seventy-seven pages is devoted to Plotinus while Proclus takes his place in a chapter on later Neoplatonists in which perhaps ten pages are dovoted to Proclus himself; (b) C. J. de Vogel, in her source book in *Greek Philosophy*, vol. III, "The Hellenistic-Roman Period", devotes 105 pages to Plotinus and only 25 to Proclus; and (c) R. T. Wallis in his recently published survey book, entitled *Neoplatonism*, devotes a chapter of 43 pages to Plotinus while including Proclus in a chapter of 22 pages on the "Athenian School".

A further indication of the modern lack of interest in the Procline philosophy is that there have been only a few monographs of major length on Proclus' philosophy – all of recent date. The three most important are: W. Beierwaltes, *Proklos*, 1965; L. J. Rosán, *The Philosophy of Proclus*, 1949; J. Trouillard, *L' un et l'âme selon Proclus*, 1972. Before 1965 the only book published since Berger's *Proclus* in 1840, devoted to Proclus' philosophy as a whole, was that of Rosán, and it is of the nature of a compendium devoted to gathering together a collection of what Proclus wrote, to commenting on what translations are available, to translating Marinus' *Life*, and to making some descriptive comments about Proclus' philosophy.

18. E. R. Dodds' remarks in his edition of the *Elements of Theology* are variously to this effect. To wit: "For the student, and expecially for one who is grappling for the first time with this complicated body of thought, its systematic character lends it an importance second only to that of the *Enneads* of Plotinus. The *Enneads*, though they stand on an incomparably higher philosophical level than any subsequent product of the school, are in form a collection of occasional essays or lectures." (p. ix) "It was reserved for the dialectical genius of Plotinus to translate into achievement the ideal of philosophic unity, and for his mystical genius to transfer the 'return of the soul' from the domain of astral myth to that of inner experience. Though Plotinus is commonly treated as the founder of Neoplatonism, in the wider movement we are con-

perhaps more typical of the English-speaking world than of the German and French, but there too there are at best mixed views of Proclus. Trouillard in his edition of the *Elements of Theology* indicates that Proclus has not been much studied in France[19] but seems himself to have a high regard for Proclus.[20] Beierwaltes in Germany also has a high opinion of Proclus as a thinker,[21] though Beutler, who wrote the article on "Proklus" in Pauly-Wissowa, is of a less charitible view.[22]

What we may perhaps term the "modern neglect" of Proclus does not seem to me to be justified by either the history of Greek philosophy, the subsequent influence of Proclus on the Christian

sidering he stands not at the point of origin but at the culminating crest of the wave. Formally, the later Neoplatonic school owes more to him than to any other individual thinker save Plato; yet spiritually he stands alone". (p. xix) "After making deductions of all theorems directly derived from Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, and also of such as we have positive grounds for attributing to Iamblichus or other fourth-century writers, there is still in the *Elements* a substantial residue of *ἀδέσποτα*. But it must not be assumed that this residue represents the personal contribution of Proclus". (xxiii) "Proclus, then, is not a creative thinker even in the degree of Iamblichus, but a systematizer who carried to its utmost limits the ideal of the one comprehensive philosophy that should embrace all the garnered wisdom of the ancient world" (xxv). "But the doctrine of henads afforded the most convenient means of giving the gods that assured place in the Plotinian world-order which Plotinus had neglected to provide. Unfortunately, this *ἐπιστημονικὴ θεολογία* resulted in depriving the gods of all personality and even of all identity: for the principle of continuity in the vertical procession involved the splitting of each god into a series of gradually weakening forces, so that Zeus, for example, appears as five different gods each of whom symbolizes the 'jovial' principle on a different place of reality (*in. Tim.* III. 190. 19 ff.). That Homer's Olympians, the most vividly conceived anthropomorphic beings in all literature, should have ended their career on the dusty shelves of this museum of metaphysical abstractions is one of time's strangest ironies." (p. 260, note to Prop. 112).

19. J. Troullard, *Elements de théologie*, Paris, 1965, p. 10.

20. J; Trouillard, *L'un et l'âme selon Proclus*, Paris, 1973, Introduction, especially p. 3.

21. W. Beierwaltes, *Proklos*, Frankfurt am Main, 1965, pp. 12, 21.

22. R. Beutler, "Proklus", *RE*, 23, pt. 1, Stuttgart, 1957, p. 246.

West, or the philosophic work of Proclus himself. Proclus' influence on Christian and post-Christian philosophy must rely, in so far as it is a profoundly philosophical influence, on the merits of his own philosophical work. Those merits can be best appreciated by first considering his place in Greek philosophy and then his own teaching.

Greek philosophy begins by tradition with Thales. It ends with Proclus.[23] Between those two thinkers is a philosophical history of nearly a thousand years: an history that is longer than that greatest of great empires of ancient culture founded by Romulus and Remus. What immediately strikes one who is looking at Greek philosophy simply as philosophic phenomena is the extraordinary variety of schools and philosophies. One can find everything from the uncompromising materialism of Democritus to the equally uncompromising idealism of Plato; from the certainty of Plotinus in a perfect principle of Good to the total skepticism of Pyrrho. Looking at these extreme positions and at their many manifestations among the post-Aristotelians, Stoics, Epicureans, and various Neoplatonic schools as simply unconnected positions hides their interrelation to one another and makes any judgment as to the validity of the positions *vis à vis* one another impossible. One can assume the view that they are all equally interesting and so give up the idea that philosophy can discover truth. Or one can say that a philosophy's interest rests in those of the person studying it – which again lends an arbitrariness the truth of which can be equally arbitrarily countered. Or one can say a judgment as to a philosophy's truth must come from a measure outside of the philosophy in question, which presupposes a philosophy which is a measure of judgment. Or one can approach a philosophy from the standpoint of its relations to other philosophies and see if there is any necessary connection between them. For if one philosophy grows out of the internal difficulties of a preceding one and solves those difficulties without creating new problems which the first did not have, it, the latter philosophy, can be said to be more complete and adequate than the preceding. This would seem the only way to critically study a particular philosophy occurring in historical time if one would wish to avoid an uncritical denial of truth, a personal dogmatism, or an historical approach which would on its own ground have to be the end of any possible historical philosophical development.

23. I mean this remark in the same sense as Beierwaltes when he writes at the beginning of his work on Proclus (*Proklos*, 1965, p. 1):"'Fürwahr, ich hätte geschlossen, wenn du nicht gekommen wärest.' Dieser Satz [Marinus, Proclus sive de felicitate c. 10; 20, 15: ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ ἦλθες, ἔκλειον. (Beierwaltes' note)] den der Türhüter der Akropolis zu Proklos spricht, als er nach Athen kommt, kann als symbolische Aussage über den Ort des Proklos innerhalb der Geschichte des Denkens begriffen werden. In Proklos nämlich hat die griechische Philosophie ihre spekulative Vollendung gefunden." See also Saffrey and Westerink, *Théologie platonicienne,* vol. 1, Budé, p. lxxxix: "Tout ce qui précède a montré, croyons-nous, que c'est à cette suite ininterrompue de travaux sur les hypothèses du *Parménide* de Platon que nous devans ce traité théologique de Proclus. Il est venu à son heure cette seconde moitié du v^{e} siècle, et peut-être devons-nous le saluer comme l'ultime fruit authentiquement hellène de la pensée grecque tout entière!" See also Dodds, *op. cit.*, p. xviii: "The body of thought whose structure is anatomized for us in the *Elements of Theology* is not the creation of one individual or one age; it represents the last result of a speculative movement extending over some five centuries."

The earliest Greek philosophers were skeptical of sense perception. This skepticism of what they saw was matched by a skepticism of their traditional religion – the religion of Homer and Hesiod and of the Orphics. The origin of this skepticism of sense and of fancy is that of reflection, of conscious thought demanding that it, not sense or fancy, be the pathway and judge of the true and abiding. With the Presocratic philosophers this demand takes the form of the attempt to establish universal objective principles operative as nature. With the Sophists this objectivity is asserted as subjective ignorance in which the true is whatever is thought as true. In Plato and Aristotle there is a determined effort to bring the two sides together by reducing the particular, the sensible, the moving, to a stable and absolutely primary first principle. For Plato this becomes the Good, for Aristotle the νοῦς. For both the starting point is nature. With the Stoic and Epicurean schools, which succeed the fragmentation of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies, the universal comes

under a natural or finite form. This manifests itself with the Stoics and Epicureans in opposing natural viewpoints which are asserted as true. For one Nature is a rational animal harmoniously revolving to its self-appointed end and beginning; for the other determinate Nature is a matter of chance occurrence which as infinite atomism is stable and unchanging. To both positions the Skeptics pose a resolute attack on dogmatism by dogmatically asserting its arbitrariness or by insisting that all finite views are finite.

Neoplatonism is an answer to the Stpics, Epicureans, and Skeptics in that it combines the world-views of all three. The Stoic and Epicurean totality and revolution one finds as the ever recurring procession and return of the first principle into itself – a principle which is beyond matter as it is beyond thought. The Skeptic's denial of truth is subsumed in the radical dependence of the finite on its principle and the resulting phenomenality or appearance of that finitude. The Neoplatonists were conscious of being followers of Plato and Aristotle. They saw the Aristotelian philosophy as a prolegomenon to Plato but not as contradictory to it. In fact it is out of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies that the Neoplatonists fashioned the philosophic weapons with which to combat the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. But their great difference from their predecessors is that their starting point is radically different from that of Plato and Aristotle. Plato and Aristotle had started with Nature and reduced it to a primary principle. The Neoplatonists seek to begin with the primary principle and produce the world from it.[24] On this view

24. I do not mean here to imply that the Neoplatonic speculation does not as does the Platonic and Aristotelian have as its starting-point personal experience of the world. In some sense every philosophy has as its starting-point Nature. What I wish to point out is that the systematic writing down of the philosophy begins at the beginning with the Neoplatonic One rather than at the end as with the Platonic Cave and with the senses as in *Metaphysics A* of Aristotle. The logical point to keep in mind is that, while experience might subjectively be an universal starting-point, it is not necessarily logically first if one is looking at the world from the stand-point of creation. Or in Neoplatonic terms, the production is prior to the return. For a discussion of

the whole history of the development of Neoplatonism could be regarded as an attempt to ground the productivity of the first principle in its transcendence.

At the end of the Neoplatonic development, for the first time in the history of philosophy, philosophy is systematic; for it is this characteristic which separates Proclus from his predecessors. The Presocratics and Sophists wrote special treatises which either dealt with separate problems or were internally disconnected. The Platonic philosophy is formally unsystematic in the sense that each dialogue has a special topic of interest, although a dialogue like the *Republic* may take in a wide variety of discussion. Plato's whole doctrine is to be found rather in a comparison of dialogues with one another than in any one dialogue by itself. With Aristotle there is for the first time a clear distinction between the theoretical and practical sciences, and with him the theoretical is divided into Physics, Mathematics, and Theology or First Philosophy. Yet Aristotle's philosophy is comprised in all his works – each one of which deals with a specific area of knowledge. The *Metaphysics* is the only Aristotelian treatise which can be said to deal with the different subjects from a single point of view. But even it can only be called systematic on the basis of the logic of its arguments. Formally, such a unity cannot be determined. And the unity that is to be found there as logical does not take an explicit circular form; that is, nature is reduced to a total dependence on a divine first principle, but there is not an explicit circularity of divine production and return. With both the Stoics and Epicureans there is a viewpoint which is expressed in the separation of Logic, Physics, and Ethics in the case of the Stoics and Canonic, Physics, and Ethics in the case of the Epicureans. The Skeptics, while not dividing their philosophy into divisions, find their unity in the negation of the Stoics and Epicureans and so reflect the dividedness of their opponents.

Neoplatonism in its reaction against the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics and in its syncretism of Plato and Aristotle sought to

the difficulty of how to order the exposition of Plotinus' philosophy (that is, whether to begin with the One) see Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 1972, pp. 47-48.

develop a total cosmic world-view. This world-view, which first appears with Plotinus, does not take a directly systematic form. The *Enneads* are really only individual essays which do not have a particularly determinate order.[25] Thus it is that they may be indifferently classed according to subject or chronology.[26] With

25. Cf. J. N. Deck, *Nature, Contemplation, and the One*, Toronto, 1967, pp. viii and ix.

26. As with Prophyry or Harder (see *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, op. cit.*, pp. 217-218). According to Prof. Armstrong Plotinus' philosophy is a system even though the *Enneads* are "an unsystematic presentation of a systematic philosophy." (Plotinus, *Enneads*, Loeb Classical Library, trans. A. H. Armstrong, London, 1966, vol. I, p. xv). However, Prof. Armstrong admits that there is at least a suggestion of an ultimate dualism in Plotinus' philosophy between the Good and Matter as evil. (*Ibid.*, p. xiv). He goes on to state: "There are, too, perhaps other fluctuations and tensions besides this major one. There are elements in his experience which do not fit into his [Plotinus'] system, elements in the tradition he inherited which are not fully assimilated and lines of thought suggested which if they had been followed up might have led to a radical revision of his philosophy – the same, after all, might be said of almost any great philosopher. But his thought cannot be resolved into a mere jumble of conflicting elements. Tension is not the same thing as incoherence, as anyone can see who turns from reading the *Enneads* to read the *Hermetica*." (*Ibid.*, pp. xiv-xv). There are two very difficult problems involved in what Prof. Armstrong says. The first is what the relation can be between the "presentation" of a philosophy and the philosophy itself. The second is what can constitute a "radical revision" of a philosophy. The later history of Neoplatonism is an attempt to unify the tensions found in Plotinus. But to effect this unification the philosophy had itself to be revised. What should be noted in this development is that unification and revision coincide with presentation and system. What a disjunctive presentation by its very form can hide is lack of unity of doctrine. An unified presentation cannot hide such doctrinal disunity because disunity as such is endemic to it. The problem in Plotinus from this point of view is that he did not enuncitate a "systematic" philosophy. It is because of this that the presentation of it is unsystematic. And it is perhaps this insight that led Iamblichus to "revision" of doctrine and finally Proclus to systematic "presentation". These criticisms are, of course, to some extent a matter of interpretation as, I think, is most valuably shown in an article by Prof. Armstrong entitled, "Elements in the Thought of Plotinus at Variance with Classical Intellectualism". (*JHS*, vol. 43, 1973,

later Neoplatonism, especially under the influence of Iamblichus, there was a demand to unite every phase of the cosmos. This demanded the synthesis of the Greek religion with Greek philosophy. Iamblichus himself seems not to have effected this unity in a single treatise but he most certainly advocated it as true doctrine.[27] Finally Proclus did indeed effect a total synthesis of the spirituality of the ancient world in his *Platonic Theology* and in his *Elements of Theology* where he has attempted to weave together in discursive form the totality of the cosmos from the First Principle to the last stage of being or matter.[28] The *Platonic Theology* is a very prolix work which fills out the doctrine of the *Elements of Theology* in relation to Plato and to Greek mythology.[29] But the *Elements of Theology* is unique in that it neither appeals to the authority of any philosopher or to that of any religious teaching. In addition it is formally constructed in propositional form in which the succeeding propositions are meant to follow on the basis of the preceding propositions. Thus, *formally* the treatise is rigorously systematic. It must in fact be admitted that we do not see anything like it in ancient philosophy.

The importance of Proclus' philosophy cannot rest simply on the idea that either it is the last in a long line of Greek philosophical speculation nor in that it is uniquely systematic. What must be asked and considered is whether it is indeed the culmination of the development of ancient Greek philosophy rather than a merely syncretic product of a dying age. Perhaps the best way to approach this question is to consider whether Proclus' philosophy

pp. 11-22). It can be said that it is Plotinus' merit that he did not adopt a kind of pure rationalism. But I would suppose that to Iamblichus and Proclus any deviations from the rationalist tradition would be either avoided or put into another, perhaps religious, context.

27. See Praechter, Karl, "Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus", *Genethliakon*, Carl Robert zum 8. März 1910, Berlin, 1910, p. 113.

28. See Prop. 59 of the *Elements of Theology* and below Chapter IV, p. 61, and note 17. See also *Th. Pl.* III, (vi) pp. 172-9 (Portus); *in. Tim.* I. 386. 25 ff; 437. 2 ff.

29. See below, Appendix: "Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική and Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας".

is a necessary development within Neoplatonism. It is generally considered today that Plotinus is the philosopher of Neoplatonism *par excellence.*[30] If one wished to argue that Proclus' philosophy is not a descent from Plotinian speculation but its completion, it would have to be shown that the Plotinian philosophy had tensions and difficulties within it which gave rise to the historical development of subsequent Neoplatonic speculation, and that this subsequent speculation did indeed cure these inward problems at least better than Plotinus did.

The movement of Neoplatonic development can perhaps best be explicated in relation to, what seem to me, to be the two leading motifs in Neoplatonic thought. The first is that the One is beyond knowledge. The second is that the One produces a world which returns to it. Both of these motifs are basic to the one overriding subjective impulse of Neoplatonic philosophizing – union of the individual soul with its source. Because this source is beyond knowing, unity with it must be mystical. Yet, if it is beyond knowing how can rational thought be integral to its own return to what is beyond it? That is, what is the relation between thought and non-thought? This is to consider the mystical union from the side of the soul seeking its source: the subjective side. From the objective side – the side of the One's production of the world – the problem is how the soul can be at one time in the principle, separated from it, and then reunited to it. In Plotinus, if rationality in the sense of non-contradiction and consistency is regarded as the measure of philosophical adequacy, both these problems are to be found in forms that are philosophically untenable. The two problems outlined, namely, the mystical union of the soul with its source, and the relation of soul to temporality in procession and return, have to do with the religious or mystical side of Neoplatonism. The Plotinian philosophy is often lauded because it is said to be free from any hint of magic, divination, or what was called in the late Roman empire theurgy.[31] This freedom

30. See above notes 17 and 18.

31. See A. H. Armstrong, "Was Plotinus a Magician?"*Phronesis*, 1955 vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 73-79, and Clemens Zintzen, "Mystik und Magie in der

from religious taint is supposed to show that Plotinus was truly philosophical in the sense of rational. Thus it is considered that later approval of theurgical practices by Iamblichus and Proclus is a degeneration. Such an argument is, however, contradictory, if one considers the question from the point of view of system.

Iamblichus and Proclus simply worked out a side of Plotinian thought that in Plotinus was only implicit. Plotinus is said to have had mystical union with the One on more than one occasion.[32] But how is this mystical union possible? What is it about an individual man that makes mystical union with the first principle possible? Plotinus argues that the soul purifies itself to the point that this experience can take place.[33] This is the philosophical problem. What makes the problem "philosophical" is that one is trying to understand what principles in the universe are operative in order for certain experiences to take place. Plotinus undoubtedly did have a highly personal mystical experience of union with the One. But he was a man and hence was able to do so on the presupposition that his humanity was in principle capable of such experience. The "philosophical" question is "what principles are involved"? In Plotinus the problem which arises in regard to this question is inherent in his concept of the soul as dual in nature.[34] There is a lower and a higher self. The higher self is mystically united to the One because it never has been corrupted.[35] But then how is it united to the lower self? If the soul is dual how can it be one soul or the individual even be one? Why should there be any need for philosophy or religion if the higher self is already as undescended blessed? The most weighty problem of all is just what constitutes the idea of descent and ascent or of unical production and return of the divided and multiple to a principle beyond dividedness and multiplicity? It might be argued that the

neuplatonischen Philosophie", *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, 1965, vol. 108, pp. 72-83.

32. Prophyry, *Life,* paragraph # 23.

33. See *Enneads*, I, 6, 9; V, 3, 17; VI, 9, 9-11.

34. See *Enneads*, I, 1; II, 9, 2; III, 6, 1-5; IV, 8, 3, 8; V, 1, 10: V, 3, 3.

35. See *Enneads,* II, 9, 2; III, 4, 3; VI, 4, 14-16.

duality of soul is just a kind of inconsistency in Plotinus which is not philosophically crucial. But Iamblichus and Proclus thought the question of duality in soul to be, from a systematic, rational standpoint which aimed at consistency and non-contradiction, crucial enough to disagree specifically and unequivocally with Plotinus.[36] What they wished to do was what Plotinus did not do

36. See Stob., *Ecl.* I, p. 365, Wachsmuth. This is an excerpt from Iamblichus' ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ in which Iamblichus indicates that Plotinus' concept of the soul is peculiar to him. He cites Amelius and Porphyry as uncertain followers of Plotinus: Amelius as uncertain himself; Porphyry as wavering between his misapprehension of Plotinus' teaching and his desire to transmit that teaching. Iamblichus then cites Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, and all the ancients as agreeing with him against Plotinus. Also see Proclus, *in. Tim.*, III, 165-7; here Proclus takes up the idea that the human soul is separated from the One by intermediates. These intermediates are various gods and daemons. Proclus in explaining this nature cites Iamblichus as confuting those who refer to the gods mentioned by Plato as fables, fathers of cities, guardian powers, ethical explanations, and souls. Also see *in. Tim.*, 244 ff.: here Proclus asserts that the human soul is to be distinguished essentially from the soul of the universe and other divine souls. He expressly disagrees with Theodorus of Asine who tended to agree with Plotinus' conception of soul. Also see *in. Tim.*, 333, 28 ff. This is a most significant passage. Here Proclus agrees with Iamblichus against Plotinus and Theodorus. He raises many objections, all of which revolve around the necessity of the soul-body relation in man: "*εἰ δὲ ὅταν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν κράτιστον τέλειον ᾖ, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἡμῶν εὐδαιμον, τί κωλύει καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι ἀνθρώπους ἅπαντας, εἰ τὸ ἀκρότατον ἡμῶν ἀεὶ νοεῖ καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τοῖς θείοις ἐστίν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τοῦτο, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν· εἰ δὲ μόριον ψυχῆς, εὐδαίμων καὶ ἡ λοιπή. τίς δὲ ὁ ἡνίοχος τῆς ψυχῆς; ἆρ' οὐ τὸ χαριέστατον ἡμῶν καὶ ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις κεφαλαιωδέστατον; καὶ πῶς οὐ τοῦτο ῥητέον, εἴπερ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ πᾶσαν ἡμῶν διακυβερνῶν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ κεφαλῇ τὸν ὑπερουράνιον τόπον ὁρῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν ἡγεμόνα τῶν θεῶν ὁμοιούμενος, ἅρμα πτηνὸν ἐλαύνοντα καὶ πρῶτον ἡνίοχον ἐν οὐρανῷ πορευόμενον; εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀκρότατον ὁ ἡνίοχος, οὗτος δέ, ὡς ἐν Φαίδρῳ* [248 a ss.; also see *Alcibiades Comm.* 227-228] *λέγεται, ποτὲ μὲν μετέωρος φέρεται <καὶ> αἴρει τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον, ποτὲ δὲ δύνει καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χωλείας καὶ πτερορρυήσεως..., δῆλον τὸ ἐκ τούτων συμβαίνον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἀκρότατον ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον.*" [*in. Tim.*, III, 334, 10-27] [For further comment see J. M. Dillon, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis*, Leiden, 1973, commentary on his Frag. 87]. Also see *Parmenides Comm.* 948, 12-33. Here Proclus expressly dis-

and, from a systematic point of view, should have done. They wished to *show* the necessity of philosophy[37] and to show how it is that the union of the cosmos with its principle is at the same time beyond thought. That these philosophers did not balk at the contradiction between mystical union and explanation of it is hardly a defect in their thought. The defective side rather lies with not seeing the contradiction clearly enough to overcome it.[38]

Iamblichus seems to have been the first philosopher after Plotinus to recognize the difficulty of reconciling Plotinian mysticism with Plotinian philosophy. He tried to solve the problem by virtually triplicating the Plotinian world by the triadic development of the Plotinian hypostases.[39] It does not seem to me that

agrees with Plotinus' idea of a higher self on the grounds that it goes against the teaching of Plato in the *Timaeus*, and that it is not properly differentiated from the divine souls. Also see *Elements of Theology*, Props. 184, 194-195, 202, and 211. See Dodds' notes in his edition of the *Elements of Theology* on Props. 194-195 and on 211. Prop. 211 is especially explicit in his rejection of Plotinus' idea of a higher self which is always undescended: "*Πᾶσα μερικὴ ψυχὴ κατιοῦσα εἰς γένεσιν ὅλη κάτεισι, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἄνω μένει, τὸ δὲ κάτεισιν.*" Also, see *in. Alc.*, ed. Westerink, pp. 104-105.

37. Plotinus seems aware of this difficulty in the opening line of III, 6, 5: "*Τί οὖν χρὴ ζητεῖν ἀπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ποιεῖν μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν πάσχουσαν;...*" But he does not really solve the *ἀπορία* of the question. His implicit answer seems to be that the lower self could be raised by philosophy. But this is to beg the question re: the higher self.

38. See below, chapter VI, Conclusion, pp. 81-86.

39. Iamblichus apparently doubled the first principle (see *de Mys.* VIII, 2 and Damascius *Dub. et Sol.*, chs. 43-44, 51. Also see J. M. Dillon, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-32, for a discussion of Iamblichus' concept of the One). This idea is implied in Plotinus (*Enn.* II, 3; 17-18; V, 9, 3) but Plotinus never worked the idea out. Because he did not, one finds in his thought a seemingly insuperable gap between the One and the phenomenal world. Iamblichus worked out the dialectic concept which can overcome this problem; namely, a triplicity concept. This is what one finds in the triads of the unparticipated (*τὸ ἀμέθεκτον*), participated (*τὸ μετεχόμενον*), and participating (*τὸ μετέχον*) [See below note 42], and of *μονή*, *πρόοδος*, and *ἐπιστροφή* [See below note 43]. But if this dialectic is the case then why just double the first hypostasis. It ought really to be triplicated in some way. It seems impossible to know if

Iamblichus did this arbitrarily, but with the intention of explicating a logical principle which would make explicit the nature of procession and return – namely, the principle of mean terms. Between every two oppositions comes a median which links them.[40] In this way Iamblichus can link oppositions without

Iamblichus himself explicitly did this. It certainly seems as if he should have, and as if he was fully aware of the necessity of triplicity in the hypostases. He did triplicate the *νοῦς* (see Damascius, *Dub. et. Sol.*, ch. 54) and the *ψυχή* (see Proclus, *in. Tim.* II, p. 240). The answer can be solved by considering how the triplicity of the One is worked out by Proclus. He makes the second one of Iamblichus into the henads and then he has the monads of the lower orders participate the henads. These monads form the third unical movement (see Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, Props. 162-5 and Dodds' notes on the same). This development by Proclus is certainly consonant with Iamblichus' general triadic logic. It, therefore, seems that the Procline systematization might be able to be said at the very least to go back to Iamblichus.

40. See Proclus *in. Tim.*, II, 313, 15 ff. This passage indicates how Iamblichus applied the principle of mean terms to the relation of *νοῦς* and *ψυχή*: "Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ τὸν νοῦν τούτον πρεσβύτερον ἀκούει τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄνωθεν αὐτὴν συνέχοντα καὶ τελειοῦντα, καὶ διαγωνίζεται πρὸς τοὺς ἢ αὐτόθι τῷ παντελεῖ νῷ συνάπτοντας τὴν ψυχήν (δεῖν γὰρ μὴ ἀθρόαν γνέσθαι τὴν μετάβασιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξηρημένων ἐπὶ τὰ μετέχοντα, ἀλλὰ μέσας εἶναι τὰς συντεταγμένας τοῖς μετέχουσιν οὐσίας) ἢ τὸν νοῦν ἔξω ὑποτιθεμένους τῆς ψυχῆς (δεῖν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ὂν πρὸ τοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄντος)." (*in. Tim.* II, 313, 15-23). Also, see Iamblichus *de Mys.*, I, Bd. 7. Here Iamblichus considers the concepts of the extremes which comprehend the media. The media he says are known from the extremes (*de Mys.*, I, 6, 20, l. 17). [refs. to *de Mys.* are to the Budé edition of des Places]. Already in Iamblichus we have the series of the One, Intellect, souls and bodies. Gods are also to be found, though it is not clear if they are between the One and Intellect, though this seems to be the case. (On this question specifically in relation to the henads see J. M. Dillon, *op. cit.*, Appendix B, "Iamblichus and the Origin of the Doctrine of Henads", pp. 412-416.) Iamblichus begins his description of the extremes as follows: "Τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἄκρον καὶ ὑπερέχον καὶ ὁλοτελές, τό δὲ τελευταῖον καὶ ἀπολειπόμενον καὶ ἀτελέστερον·..." (*de Mys.*, I, 7, 21, ll. 1-2). On the relation of Intellect to the Gods he says: "Νοῦς τοίνυν ἡγεμὼν καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν ὄντων τέχνη τε δημιουργική τοῦ παντὸς τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ πάρεστι τελέως καὶ ἀναρκῶς καὶ ἀνενδεῶς,..." (*de Mys.*, I, 7,22, ll. 1-3). At the beginning of *de Mys.* I, 6 Iamblichus makes at least an inference as to

destroying their particularity. By considering the structure of the cosmos as triadic variations Iamblichus is able to introduce a systematic scheme which can incorporate basic ideas of his predecessors which had as yet not been systematically related:[41] these are the Platonic idea of participation, the Plotinian idea of procession and return, and the Middle Platonic doctrine of universal sympathy or the idea that everything is in everything else, each according to its particularity. With regard to participation Iamblichus introduces the concepts unparticipated, participated, and participating[42]; with regard to procession and return he develops the schema *μονή*, *πρόοδος*, *ἐπιστροφή*[43] as cosmic structure and as internal structure of cosmic parts; and with regard to sympathy[44] he introduces the systematic exposition of

the necessity of media between extremes; that is he indicates clearly that they complete the extremes – one might say rather they unite the extremes: "... *συμπληροῖ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἄκρων τὴν ἀλληλουχίαν ἀδιαίρετον*..." (*de Mys.*, I, 6, 19, ll. 10-11). It should be emphasized that what we have here in the *de Mysteriis* is a *use* of the principles of media connections which one finds expressed *philosophically* (that is, qua philosophical principle) in Proclus. This is the case in regard to the *de Mysteriis* simply because it is an answer to Porphyry's epistle to Anebo wherein various doubts are raised concerning the gods: their relation to each other, to the genera of the universe, and to man. In this reply philosophical principles are assumed rather than propounded. Unfortunately, we do not have the majority of Iamblichus' philosophical works. For further comments see below note 41 and following.

41. In discussing Iamblichus' contributions to the development of Neoplatonic philosophy, it is well to consider that most of what we can attribute to him must be based on comments by other later philosophers, notably Proclus, as the notes which follow will show.

42. See Proclus, *in. Tim.*, I, 425-6; II, 105, 16-28; II, 240; II, 313, 19-24. Also see Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, Props. 23, 24, 25, and 28. In Props. 23 & 24, the concept of participation is considered. It forms the link in the treatise to the idea of procession and return (Prop. 25). For the logical nature of participation see Prop. 28.

43. See Proclus, *in. Tim.*, II, 215, 5-29 (see *in Tim.*, III, 173, 1 ff.). Also see *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 35 and Dodds' note on it.

44. See Proclus, *in. Tim.*, I, 425-6. Also see *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 103 and Dodds' note on it wherein he considers the history of the idea of universal sympathy.

theurgy[45] or the immanent relation of all to all.

What these Iamblichan teachings do is to render mediated what Plotinus wished to have as immediate. What is lost in Plotinian terms is immediate union with the One. With Iamblichus this unity is not immediate. But with Iamblichus neither is the soul divided and the individual destroyed nor is the opposition between the One and its production lost. Thus he is able with his concept of the mean term to unite oppositions on the one hand, and on the other to keep them opposed. Although Iamblichus seems to have first formulated the principle of the mean between extremes and its relation to participation, procession and return, and universal sympathy, he seems to have developed its religious implications rather more fully than its philosophical ones.[46]

45. The most interesting and full consideration of the history and meaning of the term "theurgy" [*Θεουργία*] is to be found in H. Lewy, *Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy*, Le Caire, 1956, esp. Excursus IV, pp. 461-6. Iamblichus' exposition of theurgy is to be found in his *de Mysteriis*, ed. G. Parthey, Berlin, 1857, and des Places, Paris, 1966.

46. According to Zeller (*Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, dritter Teil, zweite Abteilung, 5th ed., Leipzig 1923, p. 773), Iamblichus turned the philosophical teaching of Neoplatonism into a theological doctrine. That is, he emphasized the religious aspects of the teaching and, according to Zeller, subordinated philosophy to religion. Praechter in his article, "Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus", (*op. cit.*, p. 114) has challenged this view on the grounds that Iamblichus' religious views are based on metaphysical principles. Certainly, the basic dialectical principles which Iamblichus developed (see above) were a philosophical response to Plotinian difficulties. That Iamblichus was not simply superceding philosophy with religion can also be at least inferred by the works that are ascribed to him. He wrote a treatise on the Pythagorean Philosophy in ten books: (1) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΙΚΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ, (2) ΛΟΓΟΣ ΠΡΟΤΡΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ ΕΠΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΝ, (3) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΚΟΙΝΣ ΜΑΘΗΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΣ, (4) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΟΥ ΑΡΙΘΜΗΤΙΚΗΣ, (5) Physics (lost), (6) Ethics (lost), (7) ΤΑ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΟΥΜΕΝΑ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΙΘΜΗΤΙΚΗΣ, (8) Theory of Music (lost), (9) Geometry (lost), (10) Introduction to Astronomy (lost). Iamblichus also wrote the following treatises: ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΕΛΕΙΟΤΑΤΗΣ ΧΑΛΔΑΙΚΗΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ; ΠΕΡΙ ΘΕΩΝ; ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ; ΠΕΡΙ ΑΓΑΛΜΑΤΩΝ. In addition he wrote commentaries on Plato's dialogues and on different works of Aristotle, and possibly a commentary on the Orphic writings. And he wrote the *de Mysteriis*. All that is left to us is the *de Mysteriis* and the five books of the treatise on the Pythagorean philosophy as indicated. (For detailed comment on Iamblichus' works see the article on Iamblichus in *RE*, neunter Band, Stuttgart, 1916, pp. 645-651, and J. M. Dillon, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-25). What the above outline of Iamblichus' work indicates is that Iamblichus' overriding interest was to unify Hellenic philosophy and religion (as we would term them) in a coherent theology (using the term "theology" here as with Plato and Aristotle as first philosophy or divine speculation).

And this is entirely reasonable. What Plotinus regarded as the culmination of his philosophizing was his mystical experience. What Iamblichus did was to develop this mystical side of Plotinus more systematically than Plotinus himself had done. Iamblichus might be thought, therefore, to have abandoned philosophy for religion. Some critics seem to think that this is the case[47] and regard Iamblichus as rendering philosophy a very secondary place to religion. It is not, however, necessary to interpret Iamblichus' work in this way. Rather, it could be argued that Iamblichus, in trying to make sense out of Plotinus, developed philosophical principles which make possible mystical unity with the divine. By doing this he could then be said to have showed that this unity was not primarily philosophical. This should perhaps be the position that any Neoplatonist, especially Plotinus, should have made explicit. There does not seem, to me at least, to be any point in belaboring Iamblichus for being less philosophical than Plotinus. He simply carried the obvious Plotinian philosophical standpoint to its limits and tried to validate it. And that standpoint is that philosophy as intellectual is discursive and as such divided, and so incapable of the highest possibility – union with the undivided. Anyone who takes this Plotinian position seriously would be unable to place philosophy above religion. He should perhaps accept the idea that philosophy is as secondary as Intellect. What this position would fundamentally mean is that unity between the One and anything else is firstly beyond the capacity of reason and is secondly mediated. All Iamblichus seems to have

47. As, e. g., Zeller, see above note (36).

done was to show how these two aspects to unity between the principle and what it is the principle of works.[48] Firstly, if unity were immediate the two things unified would no longer be two. If they remained two then they could not be unified. The only way out of this is to posit a mean term which is both.[49] In terms of the human soul it means that unity with the One is through the mediation of divinities. This can be effected by intellectual beings by intellectual theurgical activity as Iamblichus admits.[50] But the

48. Thus it is that Iamblichus says in an endlessly quoted passage in the *de Mysteriis*: "Ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ ἀπάτη πλημμέλεια καὶ ἀσέβεια, οὐ μὴν διὰ τοῦτο ψευδῆ ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ οἰκείως τοῖς θεοῖς προσφερόμενα καὶ τὰ θεῖα ἔργα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἔννοια συνάπτει τοῖς θεοῖς τοὺς θεουργούς· ἐπεὶ τί ἐκώλυε τοὺς θεωρητικῶς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἔχειν τὴν θεουργικὴν ἕνωσιν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς; νῦν δ' οὐχ ἔχει τό γε ἀληθὲς οὕτως·..." (*de Mys.*, II, 11, 96, ll. 11-17). The point of this passage is, it seems to me, the whole point of Neoplatonism in general. Union with God is *not* philosophical. This is as much a Plotinian position as an Iamblichean one. Philosophy may prepare one for mystical union but it does not effect it itself because thought is itself divided. The sense of Iamblichus' statement here is that the providence of God permeates everything (see *de Mys.*, I, 8, 23, ll. 5-9) and that everything as so permeated, as divine, can attain unity because the two sides in so far as they are unified are *both* divine. But this bothness as oneness is for intellection a stumbling block. It is inexplicable. Hence, the superiority of theurgy over intellection is contained in the common Neoplatonic principle that the gods are beyond thought. Thus, a union with them cannot be by intellection. The synthemata or inexplicable theurgic signs or symbols can impart this union qua "inexplicable". Thus the whole rationale of Iamblichus' position is not a deviation from Plato. Rather it is the fundamental position of Platonists and Thomists and all who place the totality of the divine principle beyond thought. If it is argued that Platonists and Thomists and others maintain that thought is a suitable prolegomena to divine union, Iamblichus would agree. Only he would also agree with the Christian idea that a saint does not necessarily have to be a philosopher.

49. This is what Proclus explicitly did with his henads. See below Chapter, esp. p. 45.

50. See *de Mys.*, V, 14-20. Here Iamblichus considers theurgy as immaterial in relation to the immaterial gods; that is, he is considering the necessity and efficacy of prayer. But he does not confine himself to what is ordinarily considered theurgical: for example he says: "Ὀλίγοι δέ τινες ὑπερφυεῖ δή τινι δυνάμει τοῦ νοῦ χρώμενοι, τῆς φύσεως μὲν ἀφιστάνονται,

human as a soul-body being in which the soul in its entirety is related to a body in its entirety must use the practices of theurgy (in its material and/or immaterial forms)[51] to effect a union with divinity. This is possible because there is a sympathy between material things and their providential causes.[52] Iamblichus does indicate that theurgy (as intellectual and non-intellectual activity) is the only way for a human being to achieve unity with divinity. No doubt such a position naturally leads to the objection that Iamblichus did indeed place theurgy above philosophy. Certainly, this is the case in the same way that Christians, for example, do the same. Christianity teaches traditionally that it is through the Sacraments that the divine union between Christ and man takes place. This is a mystical unity.[53] Philosophy may be a preparation,

πρὸς δὲ τὸν χωριστὸν καὶ ἀμιγῆ νοῦν περιάγονται, οἵτινες ἅμα καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων γίγονται κρείττονες." (V, 18, 223, ll. 16-224, l. 2).

51. In *de Mysteriis*, V, 15-18, Iamblichus indicates that some people may be able to practice theurgy purely intellectually, while others will practice it corporeally and incorporeally, and still others only corporeally.

52. See *de Mysteriis*, I, 8; I, 15; III, 16-17; V, 7.

53. For example, see: *The Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom*, London, 6th ed., 1969, pp. 24, 47, 54, 56, 58. One of the best examples of the emphasis put on the mystery of Eucharistic union in this liturgy is the following secret prayer of the priest: "Πάλιν καὶ πολλάκις σοὶ προσπίπτομεν, καὶ σοῦ δεόμεθα, ἀγαθὲ καὶ φιλάνθρωπε, ὅπως ἐπιβλέψας ἐπὶ τὴν δέησιν ἡμῶν, καθαρίσῃς ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ τὰ σώματα ἀπὸ παντὸς μολυσμοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος· καὶ δῴης ἡμῖν ἀνένοχον καὶ ἀκατάκριτον τὴν παράστασιν τοῦ ἁγίου σου θυσιαστηρίου. Χάρισαι δὲ, ὁ θεὸς, καὶ τοῖς συνευχόμενοις ἡμῖν προκοπὴν βίου καὶ πίστεως καὶ συνέσεως πνευματικῆς· δὸς αὐτοῖς πάντοτε μετὰ φόβου καὶ ἀγάπης λατρεύειν σοι ἀνενόχως καὶ ἀκατακρίτως μετέχειν τῶν ἁγίων σου Μυστηρίων, καὶ τῆς ἐπουρανίου σου βασιλείας ἀξιωθῆναι. (p. 24). Also see: *Missale Romanum*, 5th ed., Boston, 1944, pp. 344, 356, 358, 360, 361, 369, 381, 384, 388, 399, 401, 404, 417, 436, 439. A good example of idea of the Eucharist as a mystery is the following postcommunion prayer: "Vivificet nos, quaesumus, Domine, hujus participatio sancta mysterii, et pariter nobis expiationem tribuat, et munimen. Per Dominum." (p. 417). Also see; *The Book of Common prayer, 1959 Canada*, the Prayer of Thanksgiving, p. 85, "Almighty and everliving God, we most heartily thank thee that thou dost graciously feed us, in these holy mysteries, with the spiritual food of the most precious Body and Blood

a prolegomena, but it is not in itself adequate. This is simply the Neoplatonic position as well. One cannot have it both ways. One cannot argue that God is beyond knowledge and thought and then say that thought is an adequate avenue of reaching God. Just as in the Christian Eucharist various material elements effect a magical union with Christ so in theurgy is the same principle implied.[54] That in the ancient rites of Iamblichus' time, there was a greater plethora of means[55] for observing the principle of material sympathy with divine providence and creation in no way changes the fact that the principle upon which Iamblichus' theurgy and Christian Eucharistic practice is based is the same. And what this means is that mystical unity between Creator and Creation is beyond thought. What one finds, therefore, in Iamblichus is a concentration on the religious side of Plotinian teaching in which the principles of this higher mysticism are more fully worked out. The other side of Plotinus, the philosophical side, although it is made more explicit by Iamblichus' development of principles with which to cope with an explication of Plotinian mysticism, does not seem, on the basis of extant works, to have been systematically worked out by Iamblichus into a philosophical teaching. Proclus, on the other hand, did work out such a systematic teaching. And in so doing, he sought to bring into perfect harmony

of thy Son our Saviour Jesus Christ; assuring us thereby of thy favour and goodness towards us; and that we are living members of his mystical body, which is the blessed company of all faithful people; and are also heirs through hope of thy everlasting kingdom ...."

54. It is important to consider, in addition, that the efficacy of the words and motions when the Body and Blood is sacrificed does not depend on the personality or beliefs of the priest (at least in pre-Reformation Christianity). The same principle of efficacy is inherent in, for example, the laying-on-of-hands during confirmation; in the necessity for a proper rite to be performed for the ordering of priests; and in the idea that only a priest can perform the Sacrifice of the Mass.

55. Actually with regard to Christianity this "greater plethora" became the basis for the iconoclastic controversy. For a discussion of icon worship in relation to philosophy see *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, Chapter 33, "The Philosophy of Icons", pp. 506-517.

ancient Greek religion and thought; an harmony which is not found in Plotinus and which Iamblichus asserted but did not fully develop.

Proclus like Plotinus is a man dedicated to pure philosophy and yet like Iamblichus he is fully versed in theurgy.[56] For Proclus unlike either Plotinus or Iamblichus there is no tension between his philosophy and his religion. This can be seen most clearly in his two master works: The *Platonic Theology* and the *Elements of Theology*. In the *Platonic Theology* one finds Proclus developing the schema of the Parmenides which he had inherited from Plutarch both philosophically and in relation to the Greek religion. In this work, all of the various divine beings are named and woven into the cosmology of divine μονή, πρόοδος, and ἐπιστροφή. The work of predecessors is appealed to and special emphasis is placed on exposition of Platonic doctrine. From looking simply at this work one might suppose that Proclus did not feel that he could put his teaching into explicit philosophic form free from any appeals to extra-philosophical sources either in the form of religion or of the authority (apart from the argument) of Plato and his successors. But one only need turn to the *Elements of Theology* to find a work which is as free from mysticism and appeal to authority as is Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The entire cosmos is in this work laid out in systematic form. It is purely philosophical and it is intended to be total and complete.

In this work Proclus considers the One, the henads, the intelligences, and the souls; he considers the logic of procession and return, participation, and universal sympathy in relation to the doctrine of mean terms; he considers matter and time, and motion, and infinity. There is no major idea in the whole of Greek philosophy which cannot be found in this small treatise. It is elementary but only in the sense that no element of a total view of the cosmos and its principle is lacking to it. What one finds here is the mysticism and philosophy of Plotinus in a logical systematic form – a form which is not less creative than Plotinus'

56. See Rosán, L. J., *op. cit.*, p. 32, note 23 and Marinus, *Life*, XXVIII.

heterogeneous treatises, but original and imaginative in the only way that philosophy can be originative and imaginative; that is, in making explicit the totality of logic and reality which is already implicitly contained in unintelligent nature. Imaginative language is only accidental in philosophy and inconsistency is simply destructive. From a systematic point of view, it is logical form as phenomenal form, and this as totally united and totally containing, that is the end of philosophy. Such a form as philosophical is the *Elements of Theology*.

Chapter I

The ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ as Philosophical Speculation

I. The ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ as Philosophical Speculation

All philosophical problems in so far as they are known as problems presuppose that there is something underlying them which is knowable and upon which their problematic nature is grounded. But how is this base known as unproblematic, as stable, and, if it is known as such, and it is upon this knowledge that a problem is known for what it is – namely, some kind of elenchus which demands in so far as it is knowable a solution which is known as such, that is, as unproblematic – how is it possible for one to know the not-known? Such a question arises when it is thought that there can be knowledge of what lies outside knowledge or conversely that there is a subjective awareness of an objectivity which lies outside of this awareness. This kind of unknowing knowing is thought possible when thinking is not thought upon or is unreflective. The result is that the content and form of thinking is seen to rest either wholly in the subject or wholly in the object and there is either an unresolved identity or an unbridged contradiction. The problem of this result is only apparent when the immediacy of this abstract identity or contradiction is seen as immediate and as an unrealized ground for thinking itself. When this immediate is simply thought on it moves of itself to a state of reciprocity with its other possibility. When this reciprocity takes place a relation is pondered which no longer accepts something as outside the ponderable. This reciprocal pondering as thinking which leaves nothing outside itself is formally a logic which seeks system; that is, an order which is a totality. Such a totality as logical relation may take itself as totality as such, in which case it falls back into that abstract identity from which it derived itself. But in so far as it does fall back it thinks this falling and seeks to give itself content by the same reciprocal process from which it was itself extracted. The nature of this reciprocity is logic as relation to phenomena. But what is the nature of this relation? If logic is a formal totality, is phenomena which brings logic out of itself a totality? And is this reciprocity of the two a

total one which leaves nothing out? In other words is the structure of thinking and the structure of the cosmos a common one?

Proclus in his philosophical writings wishes, it seems to me, to answer these questions affirmatively. He does not appear to feel uneasy in attempting to comprehend the total cosmos in a philosophical system. For him, the totality of the cosmos as existing, living, and thinking process is a perfect and harmonious unity, which unity, because it is indeed unity, that is, a whole, is comprehensible only as system and only because it is logical. It is thus that his system of philosophy is structurally the mirror of this phenomenal unity. The logical relations in it are also phenomenal relations. Thus, the measure of the truth of the system is immanent. The question of the adequacy of the relation of the measure to be measured will then take the following form. Is the phenomenal content of the system fully comprehensive of and fully comprehended by its formal structure? Are the logical and phenomenal relations within the system fully reciprocal?

The answer to this question, because it is internal, because it lies within Proclus' philosophy, can only be answered by an examination of that philosophy as it itself presents itself. The best way to approach such an undertaking is to study systematically the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική. This is the only work wherein Proclus is entirely systematic and entirely philosophical. He nowhere in the work appeals to anything other than pure thinking. There are no myths and no appeals to authority. This is his philosophy in a pure state. If it is argued that one cannot fully grasp Proclus' philosophy by simply concentrating on the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική, on what basis can this be said? Is it because something is left out of the work? If so, how is it still a system? And if it is not a total system, should not this be apparent by an internal examination of the work itself? And if it is not so apparent, then is an outside measure being used which by escaping system is a measure? Yet if this is the case, how can there be a relation of the measured to the measure? Are they both together system or are they exclusive of one another? The latter cannot be the case if one side can be a measure, and, if both the measure and the measured partake of system, system becomes the measure of

both. A concentration on the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική as system is thus not only reasonable but to do otherwise and to bring in external criteria presupposes an answer to the very question which underlies the rationale for taking up the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική in the first place.

It might at this point be well to consider how in this context one ought to regard Proclus as an original philosopher. How one judges Proclus' originality depends on how one defines "original." If by original is meant new and different ideas, then it would be hard to ascribe originality to any philosopher except the very earliest ones. One might say, for example, with Whitehead that later philosophies are all footnotes to Plato.[1] And in a sense that is true. On the other hand, it is also true that philosophers do coin new words such as Aristotle did with "ἐντελέχεια,"[2] and consider old topics in original ways, as for example, Martin Heidegger does with the idea of time in the sections of *Sein und Zeit* on "zeitlichkeit." Further, it must be considered: (a) whether a new word is not still part of an old explanation in the sense of, for example, the nature of God and so within the context not simply new; and (b) whether an old idea in a new context is not rendered into a new idea. These questions ought, I think, to be brought up in any discussion of originality, because, by bringing them up and carefully defining what is meant by originality, such discussion will tend to be less subjective than is perhaps otherwise possible.[3]

With regard to Proclus as a particular case the most varied views are held. Some commentators regard Proclus as highly original, others as a mere scholastic.[4] Most generally, however, there is

1. A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, Cambridge, 1929, p.63.

2. See Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon,* 9th ed., p. 575. Also see W. D. Ross, *Aristotle, De Anima*, Oxford, 1961, pp. 10 - 11 list, and p. 166.

3. For a discussion of the need to differentiate between a philosopher (in this case Plotinus) being the result of previous "literary forces" and being able to develop a "fresh, personal, grasp of reality", see J. N. Deck, *op. cit.*, p. IX.

4. See Dodds, *op. cit.*, pp. xx-xxi.

agreement that Proclus was a great systematizer. Now this attribute can hardly be denied if one reads even cursorily the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική or the Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας. What is less easy to judge is whether this systematization contains any new ideas and whether it is itself original in its presentation.

If we look at what might be considered three of the main ground principles of the Procline system as it is developed in the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική we may perhaps have an indication of how we may regard Proclus' originality. I shall confine my remarks here to the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική because it is the work with which this study is primarily concerned. To confine the argument to this one work of an author as prolific as Proclus is, of course, to limit the argument to a kind of preliminary consideration. On the other hand such a consideration is not, I think, without value, because three of the main ground principles to be found in the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική can be found elsewhere in Proclus and are generally agreed by critics to be fundamental. These three ground principles which I propose to consider are: μονή, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή; τὸ ἀμέθεκτον, τὸ μετεχόμενον, τὸ μετέχον; and the ἑνάδες.

The first two ground principles are the triads μονή, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή, and τὸ ἀμέθεκτον, τὸ μετεχόμενον, τὸ μετέχον. In the case of the first triad, which is most certainly fundamental to the Procline system,[5] its actual origin is uncertain. Beierwaltes devotes a section of his book, *Proklos: Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik*, to a discussion of this question under the title, "Zur problemgeschichtlichen Herkunft der Trias." Beierwaltes' conclusion is that, while the foundation of the triad can be found (a) in Plotinus and Iamblichus[6] and (b) as a "Grundstruktur" in the Metaphysics-Commentary of Syrianus, it does not reach its full speculative development until Proclus: "Obwohl gleich mit dem Ursprung des Neuplatonismus (Plotin) die Begriffe Verharren, Hervorgang und

5. See below, Chapter III: "The One as First Principle: μονή" and Chapter IV: "The One as Production and as End: πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή".

6. See above, Introduction, notes 41 and 43.

Rückkehr als gegenseitig sich bestimmende, notwendig aufeinander bezogene, sich einander sinnvermittelnde gedacht wurden, so wurden sie doch erst von Proklos systematisch als in sich seiende Bewegungs-Einheit begriffen, indem sie unter die Gesetzlichkeit der Trias gebracht wurden. Dies aber heißt: Verharren, Hervorgang und Rückkehr sind eine in sich zwar unterschiedene, aber nicht zu scheidende Einheit, in der jedes Glied in jedem anderen ist, auf je eigentümliche Weise. Dadurch wird jedes Glied nicht abstrakt in sich belassen, sondern als je Ganzes zwar, aber doch als Moment im Ganzen der triadischen Einheit bestimmt. In diesem distinktiven und zugleich unificativen, d.i. im triadischen Denken übertrifft Proklos die vor ihm sich zeigenden Ansätze. Insgleichen darin, daß er die Trias Verharren-Hervorgang-Rückkehr als den Grund des gesamten Systems von Seiendem denkt und jede Dimension nach dem Gesetz dieser Bewegung ihr Wesen vollziehen läßt. So ist das in sich Verharrende, aus allem Sein herausgehobene Eine allumfassender Grund von Sein und zugleich das Ziel des aus ihm Entsprungenen, das ihm ähnlich, eingestaltig zu werden versucht. In der Bewegung der Trias μονή – πρόοδος – ἐπιστροφή begreift sich das vielgestaltige Sein als Geist oder die Dimension des Geistes ergreift sich in ihr selbst. Sie ist der intelligible Kreis der Selbsterkenntnis oder des Selbstbewußtseins des absoluten und in Zeit wirkenden Geistes. Sie ist ferner die Weise, wie der Kosmos sich aus dem Demiurgen entfaltet und wieder in seinen Ursprung, sich vollkommend, zurückgeht. Daher kann gesagt werden: sie ist die Trias der Triaden als Strukturprinzip von Trias überhaupt."[7] Beierwaltes' praise is high praise indeed and is, I think, on the basis of my own investigations into the internal structure of the logical principles of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική substantially correct.

In the case of the second triad, that of τὸ ἀμέθεκτον, τὸ μετεχόμενον, τὸ μετέχον, we again encounter a situation similar to that of the triad μονή, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή. The basis of the triad can be found in Plotinus[8] and in Iamblichus[9], but its full

7. Beierwaltes, W., *Proklus*, pp. 162-163.

8. See Dodds, *Elements of Theology, op. cit.*, p. 211.

9. See above, Introduction, notes 41 and 42.

logical development occurs with Proclus in the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική in the sense that he in this work uses the triad in strict conjunction with that of μονή, πρόοδος, and ἐπιστροφή as the principle of mediation which makes possible causal motion in relation to a first principle at once unmediated and at rest.[10]

With the henads, in contrast to the two triads mentioned, it is not really clear whether or not they originate with Proclus. Dodds thinks that they not only have a long history as "metaphysical entities" but that they go back to Syrianus even if only their identification with the gods is considered.[11] But Dodds himself admits that others such as Zeller, Überweg–Praechter, Wittaker, and Taylor regard them as "the invention of Proclus."[12] Dillon in his recently published *Iamblichi Chalcidensis* argues in his "Appendix B" that the henads should be attributed to Iamblichus. But, again, whether or not the henads are Proclus' invention, he developed them to their fullest extent.

On the basis of the above consideration, I think it is evident that Proclus would have to at least be credited with integrating more fully than any of his predecessors the two triads (μονή, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή and τὸ ἀμέθεκτον, τὸ μετεχόμενον, τὸ μετέχον) with the henads. I, of course, make this judgment on the basis of the written material that has come down to us from Neoplatonic times. One can speculate that Iamblichus or Syrianus in some unknown and lost work achieved this integration before Proclus. It seems to me unlikely, but it is possible. But on the basis of the texts we have, Proclus has, I think, to be judged, if only provisionally. On this basis, if one regards the Στοιχείωσις Θεολοχική as really developing a coherent and great speculative system with these three principles as fundamental to it, it seems to me that he would have to be regarded as a great speculative and original thinker.

10. See below, Chapter IV: "The One as Production and as End: πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή," especially pp. 54-56.
11. See Dodds, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-258.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 257.

Chapter II

The Logic of the ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ as System.

II. The Logic[1] of the ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ as System.

The structure of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική seems at first glance to be a kind of Euclidean deduction wherein from the more complete proposition there follows the less complete. Taken in this way, the work can be considered as a kind of cosmological geometry. But unlike geometry the content of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική cannot allow there to be any ungrounded premise. Somehow any hypothesis must be ultimately unhypothetical. If the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική had merely the logical structure of a geometry text it would be a self-preclusion of its intention: namely, to give a complete account of the ground and nature of phenomena and of the cause of those *phenomena* or of the nature of that ground. As deductive the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική is hierarchical. It begins with the One (τὸ ἕν) as highest and continues with an ordered descension through the henads (ἑνάδες), intelligences (νόες), and souls (ψυχαί). As simply hierarchical the structure of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική is linear. It is two-dimensional. There is the One and the descending procession of its productivity. There is the theorem and then the inherent working out of its possibilities. The strictly hierarchical aspects of the logical deductions of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική are worked out with the greatest precision. There is the doctrine that every effect participates most directly its immediate cause and most indirectly its least immediate cause, the degree of its participation in what is higher being correspondent to the immediacy of that higher being as cause (Prop. 23, 24, 31). Throughout the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική this doctrine is applied to every deductive declension.

1. Logic is here used in the Greek sense of λόγος as rational – phenomenal structure. The term itself can and has been variously used to denote formal mathematical system or the relations of words to one another without relation to their correspondence with reality or objectivity. In this study, the concept will be used in its widest sense, a sense which is the basis of all Greek metaphysics – namely, the dovetailing of the modern distinction of ontological from logical.

One might raise the question whether such a linear hierarchy is structurally capable of cosmological totality, of total system. It is no doubt a kind of system as geometry is system, but it is not self-complete system. It is not metaphysical, unhypothetical system. And indeed the form of hierarchy as total system cannot be simply linear, simply one-sided movement. If it is, the end of the linear movement may be seen as effect as dependently related, but the beginning of the linearity is as independent as before the deduced effect was effected. The reciprocity involved is only one-sided movement. In the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική linearity as system is only partial system and thus only partial logic. For what proceeds, what is productively effected, returns; it reciprocates its initial movement by reverse deduction. What proceeds must return. Throughout the linearity of hierarchy is circularity (Prop. 33). What is produced from the One returns to the One. And the way of return is the way of procession reversed. The *πρόοδος* and the *ἐπιστροφή* are a double process, a linearity which bends back on itself.[2] But a further question may here arise as to why one should call a double linear movement circular. Why is it not simply pulsating linearity? This would be so if the finality of the *πρόοδος* was simply to be the farthest point from the linear beginning. But in the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική it is the line bent into a circle. For it is nearest to the One. Its *ἐπιστροφή* is immediate (Prop. 57, 58, 59). It is the line joining itself to itself. It is linearity as circular, hierarchy as total system.

Thus the logic of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική is a twofold logic. It is a logic of *μονή*, *πρόοδος*, and *ἐπιστροφή*. It is an hierarchical system as well as a circular system. Thus, its formal structure seeks to be a totality, to be self-complete, to be fully comprehensive of all phenomenal possibility as effect and of all ground of phenomena as cause. Whether or not this sought-for uni-

2. It should also be noted that within the totality of the *μονή*, *πρόοδος*, and *ἐπιστροφή* of the One there is also a series of lesser totalities which mirror it; namely, the henads, the intelligences, and souls. Thus, the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική is a number of total geometries within one unhypothetical total geometry.

versality as unfolding particularity holds its content in circularity and hierarchy depends on how far the twofold logic is truly reciprocal both within itself and in relation to its content. Our consideration must, therefore, if it is to be internal to the demands of its subject, consider the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική on the basis of the One as *μονή*, as *πρόοδος*, and as *ἐπιστροφή*. How is the One first principle? How as such does it produce the world? And how is it the desired end of its production?

Proclus develops the principle of the One as cause and end in his development of the logical or ground principles of the cosmos in the first 112 propositions of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική.[3] The remaining 99 propositions of the work concern existents which are the embodiments of these principles as ontologically manifest: the henads, intteligences, and souls.[4] What makes these *γένη* of being, as we may call them, possible is their *λόγοι* – or the logic of being itself. This study has as its fundamental topic the logical principles of the cosmos as set forth in Proclus' Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική, and so will be confined to a thorough exposition of the logic of the development of the work's logical propositions. For it is these logical principles as ground which according to the argument of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική, are the *λόγοι* of the phenomena which as total constitute the cosmos. In so far as the *γένη* of being are involved as logical entities Proclus brings them into the argument of the work in the first 112 propositions.[5] As such they will be discussed in the argument of this study.

3. Trouillard calls these propositions "les lois de constitution du reel." See his edition of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική, Paris, 1965, p. 46.

4. For a discussion of the structural divisions of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική see below pp. 71-72 and note 1 to Chapter IV, pp. 49-50.

5. See for example, Propositions 6, 20, 21, 57, 62, 63, 72, and 111.

Chapter III

The One as First Principle: μονή

III. The One as First Principle: μονή

For Proclus the One qua One is above or beyond (ὑπέρ) phenomena. It is αὐτοέν. It is in no way πλῆθος. It itself as αὐτοέν does not proceed, nor does it return. Nor even is it, for it is beyond Being; nor does it think for it is beyond thought; nor does it live for it is beyond life. The One is simply αὐτοέν, and as αὐτοέν it is μονή. Proclus develops the absolute self-subsistence and inwardness of the One as concept in the first six propositions of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική.

These first propositions have a definite order or logic. They begin with the One as μονή and with the One as phenomena; that is, they begin from the standpoint of the unity of the totality of the cosmos as simple undividedness and end with it as simple dividedness whose division is taken up into the One in the sense that its dividedness is grounded in its unity. More specifically, the first proposition considers the Already One; the second, the Becoming One; the third, Participation or the Relation; the fourth and fifth, the One as Prior or the grounded as participating; and sixth, the ἑνάδες as ἕν and πλῆθος.

The first proposition takes its ground from the idea that pure quantity has no opposition or dividedness. If it is divided so as in no way to participate unity there is nothing to divide. Or its manifoldness is infinitely discrete with the result that there is no subject of the discretion. Thus the subject of the manifold as pure division is the nothing. Whence if there is a manifold subject that is a dividedness which is not nothing it participates unity.

The second proposition begins with the conclusion of the first; namely, that πᾶν τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἕν ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ἕν. Thus, the manifold is not only seen as divided but as division absolutely or as division itself. And as such it participates or is the grounded rather than the ground; that is, πέπονθε τὸ ἓν κατὰ τὴν μέθεξιν καὶ ὑπέμεινεν ἓν γενέσθαι. This inward division of the divided is the point of externality in the participating subject. It is not αὐτοέν but in some way οὐχ ἕν.

The third proposition begins with the instability of the divided as the becoming or as that in which rest is not its self-principle. The ἓν καὶ οὐχ ἕν is not αὐτοέν or μονή but it is τὸ γινόμενον. As τὸ γινόμενον the unstable subject is neither purely in motion nor purely at rest. It is both. Its nature is to be undivided and at rest, as ἕν and to be divided or in motion as οὐχ ἕν. And yet as οὐχ ἕν, it is not an it or it is nothing. Thus as οὐχ ἕν it must in some way be or it must participate unity (μετέχει τοῦ ἑνός); that is, its unity makes it as divided a something.

The fourth proposition considers this something in its dividedness or as the other than the One (ἕτερον τοῦ αὐτοενός). It is ἕν but also οὐχ ἕν. The One is αὐτοέν or simply the unnegated ἕν. Its unity is undivided or pure unity whereas its participant is divided unity. If it, the αὐτοέν, was divided it would be οὐχ ἕν or a division of itself or its own contradiction and would either have to be grounded in another αὐτοέν or be a nothing. But if this other αὐτοέν was also οὐχ ἕν it could never be grounded; which would reduce it in turn to nothing and so to a subject without unity, or a subject which is not αὐτοέν. The αὐτοέν must be as αὐτοέν self-grounded as subject or the ground of the ἓν καὶ οὐχ ἕν. But it is as ground not the grounded and so not identical but other.

The fifth proposition considers the ground of otherness itself or assumes otherness as ground of the subjects of otherness. Thus, it takes the ἓν καὶ οὐχ ἕν as ground because it as divided is self-developed or otherness as internal principle. The manifold as first must be participated by the αὐτοέν. But as first, it does not participate its posterior the αὐτοέν. But its relation is ἕν; that is, it is the unity of a dividedness whose sides are ἕν and its negation. But as ἓν καὶ οὐχ ἕν it is something; that is, it is grounded by ἕν. ἓν καὶ οὐχ ἕν. If the τὸ γινόμενον is not prior, there are two other possibilities; namely, that it is coexistent or posterior. If the αὐτοέν and the ἓν καὶ οὐχ ἕν are coexistent than the manifold is not τὸ γινόμενον; that is, its otherness as οὐχ ἕν will be the ground of its self-subsistence. But as οὐχ ἕν it is dividedness or the nothing. But as ἓ ν καὶ οὐχ ἕν it is something; that is, it is grounded by ἕν. But suppose this ἕν as relation is the ground of the ἀυτοέν and the

ἓν καὶ οὐχ ἕν. Then it is prior to both. If there is no ἕν as relation then the self-relation of the αὐτοέν and the ἓν καὶ οὐχ ἕν dissolves their opposition. But this is true only on the supposition that the self-relation is a coexistent one – which has been shown as impossible. If the relation of a third, what is to distinguish it as ἕν from the αὐτοέν excepting that it be in some way πλῆθος. Thus, if the ἕν is itself it is so as αὐτοέν. The αὐτοέν is thus prior and the ἓν καὶ οὐχ ἕν as posterior is derivative from it.

The sixth proposition begins with the derived as a πλῆθος and considers what form it must take as participating unity or as being in some way a ἓν καὶ οὐχ ἕν. The most pure form of this πλῆθος is that in which the division is not internal but numerical; that is, the first plurality, that directly participating the αὐτοέν, is a ἡνωμένον composed of ἑνάδες, a unified group consisting of units. Each unit is as such a ἕν but as plural; that is, as one among many, as divided, it also is in some way οὐχ ἕν. But the ἑνάδες are not as units divided. If they were then they would each be unified groups, whose numbers would in turn be so divided, and so on with the result that the posterior to the One would be a pure nothing or pure plurality. Proclus is here concerned to link the undivided and the divided. He has shown that they cannot be complete opposition, but he has also shown that the αὐτοέν qua αὐτοέν cannot be the relation between the One and the Many. What he seeks in the doctrine of the henads is a one-many which while derived has sufficient independence to be a ground for the internally divided. In this way the One can in Proclus' view sustain its independence of division and yet be a ground for multiplicity. The doctrine of the henads is thus the point in Proclus' philosophy wherein the One as μονή becomes the One as πρόοδος.

The basic logical principle which Proclus uses in the above propositions is that of the impossibility of an infinite regress. This ground takes the form of a reduction of multiplicity as such to a self-negation. What one is left with is the alternative to such a self-negation or that in which there is no negation; namely, the αὐτοέν. The problem arises at this point as to what necessitates that there be a One. The absence of phenomena does not necessarily mean that the premise of its existence is necessary unless one

already knows that phenomena exists. But due to the nature of the phenomena as such, that is, as undivided, we do not know it as existent. The infinite regress principle thus does not take the form of a positive proof. Thus the grounding of the One on it does not premise the One as already existent but as existing if anything exists. This point must be kept in mind as it forms the basis of Proclus' development of his system. Whether this starting-point as developed becomes affirmative constitutes the content of the circularity or comprehension of the system.

Chapter IV

The One as Production and as End: πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή

IV. The One as Production and as End: πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή

The concept of the One as undivided ἀρχή is the ground of the cosmos. The form that this cosmos takes is phenomenal. It is the divine self-appearance which is at the same time a divine self-othering and a divine self-return or identity. The principle of the One qua One is simply its primary simple singularity. In phenomena this singularity in its otherness and identity takes various forms. Proclus is led, therefore, to consider what the logical structure of these forms can be. In propositions 1-6, he has developed the simplicity of the primary ἀρχή as ἀρχή. In relation to phenomena this ἀρχή is also primary αἰτία. It is the ground of πρόοδος. At the same time and in the same relation, it is primary ἀγαθόν. It is the ground of ἐπιστροφή. From proposition 7 to proposition 112 Proclus develops the logic of this divine rest or self-negating phenomenal motion.

It is a matter of some interest and importance why Proclus does not simply continue his elemental development with proposition 113. Why does he not simply go on naturally from a consideration of the unitary structure of the One to a similar consideration of the divine ones or ἑνάδες? Proclus does not adopt such an order for his treatise because he does not simply see the cosmic order as consisting of το ἕν, ἑνάδες, νόες, ψυχαί, and σώματα.[1]

1. The question of how the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική should be divided or sectioned should not simply be taken up on the basis of either convenience or an external consideration of the text. Dodds' textually excellent edition of the work is a case in point. The Greek text is not at all divided. This is in a way an aid because it leaves the nature of the propositional connections in an assumed state; that is, that they naturally follow one another. Dodds in his English rendition has divided the propositions into various sections. The difficulty with his divisions, which at first may seem appropriate enough, is that they give a false impression of the overall work. This false impression takes two forms. The first is that the natural overall logic of the work is not seen. The second is that the individual sections by being without a larger context are not seen in relation to one another. With regard to the first point, Dodds nowhere explains that the work might be

Rather he sees it as being τὸ ἓν and τὰ ὄντα. The whole cosmic order has its structure in unity and being. Being is the self-negation of the One, the self-diremption into otherness or division. Being is thus the unity which negates itself and then is self-negated. It is division which is yet limited. It is the unity of the infinite and the finite or of limit and unlimit. How this negative self-negation takes phenomenal form is the subject which Proclus quite naturally considers after developing the One as μονή. For the phenomenal form understood as grounded in the One as μονή is nothing else than the μονή as πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή. When Proclus has considered this logical self-development he can then turn to the phenomenal forms themselves in the last propositions (113-211).

The section on phenomenal logic (7-112) has as its basis πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή just as that on the logic of the One (1-6) had as its basis μονή. Proclus sets himself as a first task to consider how from the One as μονή there can be phenomena; that is, how can the One be cause or ground of being (7-13). The form which Proclus' argument takes is that of Good as concept of dual reciprocity. As first cause, the One must be all cause; that is, it must be formal, efficient, final, and material.[2] Here Proclus considers

taken as being divided according to the concepts of unity and being, a division entirely natural to Proclus. In such a division one would have section one as propositions 1-6 and section two as propositions 7-211. Further, there is a natural division between propositions 7-112 and propositions 113-211. Propositions 7-112 deal with the internal conceptual structure of the hypostases qua hypostases and propositions 113-211 deal with the hypostases themselves. With regard to the second point, Dodds' section K which he labels miscellaneously as "supplementary" is anything but a kind of ill-fitting smorgasbord. Seen in the larger context outlined above, it is the culmination of the second general section (7-112) or of Proclus' phenomenal logic. At the same time, Dodds' individual divisions as such do not seem to be out of place in that they do demarcate adequately the propositions as atomistically as possible. Where convenient we will use these divisions in relation to the larger ones outlined above.

2. The idea of the One as material cause has not, I think, been sufficiently understood, although Proclus is the first philosopher to explicate unambiguously the necessity that it be so. Here in the early propositions about cause (7-13) Proclus is dealing with cause from the side of cause or in

how the One as Good simply (8) is both final cause and efficient cause (11). It is formal cause in that all effects are somehow One (2). In his argument Proclus intends to reduce all multiplicity to the necessity of the One. Two principles which he develops through this argument are that a) the producer is always greater than the produced (7), and b) that no predicate can be attributed to the One without destroying its simplicity (8, 9, 10). It leads from these principles that the Good and the One must be identical (13). This is a very important consideration because it illustrates a procedure in Proclus which must be very carefully observed if his thought is to be faithfully apprehended. The Good for him has a double usage.[3]. It is the ground of production and it is also the cause of return. Seen from the side of the One it is infinite δύναμις or ἔλλαμψις. Seen from the side of the produced phenomena, it is desired end. The duality of the concept centres on that of desire. As end the Good qua Good is the willed τέλος of the phenomena. It is the point at which the Good of the phenomena and the Good qua Good unite. But from the side of the Good qua Good or One the ἐπιστροφή cannot be mediated by production. This mediation is only from the side of the produced. Proclus' intention is that in relation to the One πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή are unmediated. There is no disjunction or division in the process in the One as ground. The disjunction is from the side of the disjointed. Now for Proclus desire is a concept of division. It is the result of a self-separation of the subject from itself, or the disjuncture of the τέλος from its content. Desire in this sense is the mediation of end and ended. Because mediation is median of extremes it is from the side of the One negated. The One has no desire because it is self-immediate. There is no self-diremption,

the Aristotelian language which he later adopts ἐνέργεια. Later when he comes to consider the effect as reciprocal to the cause he develops the idea of potency. It is when considering this concept that he shows how the One is pure potency or material cause. See below pp. 61-67.

3. This same procedure can be more explicitly seen in Proclus' determination of δύναμις as twofold potency — as pure ποιητικός and pure παθητικός. See below note 22.

no immanent mediation. Proclus, therefore, in proposition 7 carefully uses the words τὸ παρακτικόν (7, l.1) instead of the more familiar τὸ ποιητικόν. He does this because ποιεῖν is associated with πάσχειν or with the reciprocal relation between making and being made. Proclus wishes to avoid this reciprocity with respect to the One because it would indicate a division. Thus, the Good qua Good is the One because it is just itself or as Proclus says: "τὸ πρώτος ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὃ μηδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο ἢ ἀγαθόν." (8, ll. 29-30). This is another way of saying that the Good and One are primal immediates. The One as Good is then the ground of πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή. The process itself, however, is what is grounded in the One – the phenomena. The phenomena proceed. This procession is also separation from source and thus its gain as existent is also its loss. The loss is redeemed by negating the separation and returning to the source. The gain becomes then a loss as reduction to source or self-annihilation in the simple undivided One. But this loss and gain is phenomenal loss and gain. It is the process of the finite as finite. From the side of the One there is neither loss nor gain because there is no separation. Good as τέλος and Good as δύναμις are never separated: "τἀγαθὸν τῷ ἑνὶ ταὐτόν." (13, l. 25).

Having established the One qua Good as the primal παρακτικόν Proclus develops a discussion of conceptual relation in what is other than the One qua One. The One as μονή is at rest. But the produced is not the One and it is not at rest qua rest. It is, in all its varieties, in some way in motion; that is to say in some way all that is not the One can have a relation to motion even if it is the negative relation of non-motion or unmovement. What is subject to the categories of rest and motion is existence in the most comprehensive sense or πᾶν τὸ ὄν (14), for what is not one is being. This πᾶν τὸ ὄν as cosmic dividedness is hypostatical; that is, πᾶν τὸ ὄν differentiates into γένη. These γένη have each the same structure as the cosmos as a whole. The One immediates them as monads. They as monads produce their hierarchical lessers (21). It is an universe of mirrors in which the images are identical and different. This imaging is a process. It is a movement which as articulate has principles or concepts operative throughout the

entire relational system as κόσμος. As movement qua movement there is the unmoved and moved (14). The unmoved is prior to the moved and within the latter distinction self-movement is primary (14). Proclus thus brings in the concepts of self-reversion (τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικόν) (15, l. 30; 15-17) and primitive inherence of a bestowed character in the bestower (18-19). At the same time, he links self-movement with self-reversion and the latter with incorporeality. What Proclus intends is embodied in proposition 20 where for the first time he brings in the monadic concepts as differential explicates. The One is beyond motion, the νοῦς is unmoved but divided in the immanent self-otherness of thought, ψυχή is disembodied self-movement, while the σώματα are simply moved extrinsically. Here Proclus outlines the cosmic order as monadic. The six propositions prior to 20 are general in nature. They deal with πᾶν τὸ ὄν as single concept but with proposition 20 the singularity is made genetic.[4] What relates to movement, what is outside the undividedness of the One, finds itself both other and identical as analogue of its ground. The form of this analogy is immediately the movement of monad to manifold (21) or the structural form of procession and return. These monads are the One as primitive bestower, νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα. Their manifolds are the henads, intelligences, souls, and bodies (21, Cor.).[5]

4. Proclus does not mention the hypostatical γένη again in the body of the phenomenal logic except as corollaries (21, 22, 34, 57, 62, 63, 64) until he gets to proposition 109. The reason for this is that the phenomenal logic must develop concepts which are common to these γένη before they can be singularly developed. They are discussed in proposition 20 in relation to movement and in relation to the One as superior to any of them severally. In the corollaries, they may be considered more individually because the corollaries serve only as examples. They are not integral to the argument in the sense of not being expendable for the continuity of the propositional interrelations. In proposition 109 Proclus can again bring in the hypostatical γένη because he has by then developed the logic by which they are existential being.

5. It is interesting that Proclus brings in the henads in a corollary in proposition 21 and does not mention them in proposition 20. This is because

As primitive bestowers the monads are in relation to their manifolds unique and undivided (22)[6]. At the same time, they are bestowers or they have an interrelation to their manifolds. This relation as general is movement in the context of any monad to its manifold as immanent content. But the monad as genus, as being separate from other monads, has a particular relation to its manifold. The procession and return of it to itself has a particular content as well as an universal form. It is just in order to express this particularity as also universal that Proclus introduces in propositions 23 and 24 the concept of participation;[7] for participation allows him to express the same universality as movement while at the same time preserving the content of this movement as unique. The terms of *τὸ μετέχον*, *τὸ μετεχόμενον*, and *τὸ ἀμέθεκτον* are parallel to *τὸ ἑτεροκίνητον*, *τὸ αὐτοκίνητον*, and *τὸ ἀκίνητον*.[8] At the same time the concept participation is both more universal and more particular than that of motion. It is more universal in

he does not see the henads, as being, in the same sense as *νόες*, *ψυχαί*, and *σώματα* due to their form as pure simple unity. Thus, his universe in the context of monadic content considers the henads as analogous to the manifolds of the orders corresponding to the *νοῦς*, *ψυχή*, and *φύσις* as monads.

6. The corollary to proposition 22 is interesting here in that it is the first time Proclus has introduced primal being or *τὸ πρώτως ὄν*. Here he considers it in relation to primal *νοῦς*, *ψυχή*, and *εἴδη*.

7. Proclus uses the term *μετέχον* in proposition 13 as relation of unical cause to its effect. He does not there develop the concept because he is concerned in proposition 13 to consider the One as above relation; that is, as One qua One.

8. It is important to consider here that *ἀμέθεκτον* and *ἀκίνητον* can be used by Proclus at different levels. For example, the primal *νοῦς* is both *ἀμέθεκτον* and *ἀκίνητον*. The primal *ψυχή* is *ἀμέθεκτον* but *αὐτοκίνητον* (20). Movement in this context is thus a wider term than participation in that it can be attributed to only one subject (the primal One is strictly speaking above movement) because it denotes the most general hypostatic relation. Participation denotes this relation but also every particular relation in which a lesser participates in a higher. In another sense, it could be argued that participation is the wider term as it is used to express the structural relation of the One to the henads (116); a relation wherein, according to Proclus, there is no movement – that is, unity is above movement (20).

that it denotes the relation of the One to the henads as well as that of the soul to bodies. It is more particular in that it makes possible the inclusion of all qualities in the relation including that of movement.

Up to proposition 24 Proclus has considered the One as first principle and its analogues or monads. In differentiating initially the monads among themselves he brings in the concepts of motion and rest. These concepts are most universally both the immanent content of each monad in itself and also the basis of their relation to one another. The problem then arises as to how this analogical relation is further mirrored in that of the monads to the manifold. It is at this point in the argument that Proclus introduces the concept of participation. It is this concept which gives form to the movement as productive and as reciprocal or as procession and return. In the following fourteen propositions Proclus considers this reciprocity and brings in the concepts of identity and difference as expressive of the particularity of content between participant and participated which at the same time is also effect and cause as circular movement.

Proclus begins his determination of phenomenal procession by relating it to the primitive production. Phenomenal procession is phenomenal production just as primitive procession is primitive production (7, 13, 25). As such it is also production as function of Goodness. In proposition 7 Goodness and Oneness are identical or total completeness. In proposition 25, the phenomenally complete, as unical, is also good.[9] And as good it is productive of what "*δύναται παράγειν*". Proclus begins with the general principle[10] of production as spontaneous activity of the Good and

9. In the corollary to proposition 25, Proclus considers how the monadic goodness is transmitted throughout the *κόσμος* down to the most remote cause (*τὸ πορρώτατον τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν πάντων*) which is sterile (*ἄγονον*) and cause of nothing. It is important to relate this most remote principle to Proclus' concept of potency as in one sense the nothing. See below pp. 64-66.

10. It is necessary in order to grasp what Proclus intends in these propositions to realize that he is considering the logical content of the phenomenal as such. He is not specifying the monads in their particularity. Rather, he is developing the logical basis for their peculiarity, as specific *γένη*.

relates it to the motional characteristic of the same process which is content of the producer; that is, the producer as *μένον* or steadfast (26). The two characters of goodness and *μένον* are brought together as "*τελειότητα καὶ δυνάμεως περιουσίαν*" (27).

It is at this point that Proclus brings in the concepts of *ὅμοια* and *ἀνόμοια* (28). He has previously stated that "*πᾶν τὸ ἀμέθεκτον ὑφίστησιν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὰ μετεχόμενα, καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ μετεχόμεναι ὑποστάσεις εἰς ἀμεθέκτους ὑπάρξεις ἀνατείνονται*" (23, ll 22-24), but he has not yet developed the conceptual content of those "*ὑπάρξεις*". That there are *ὑπάρξεις* presupposes that there is a division. But the division is on the side of the participating which as participating is not complete. This division of the participating in turn as incomplete presupposes a cause more complete than itself or the process of production. Now this production as process contains both the producer as *μένον* and the produced as participant. The first is simply self-identity, the second is identity and difference. How this opposition can be understood as universal containment in cosmic process[11] is answered by Proclus in propositions 28, 29, and 30. Like is prior to unlike: "*μᾶλλον ἥνωται τοῖς παράγουσι τὰ παραγόμενα ἢ διακέκριται ἀπ' αὐτῶν.*" (28, ll. 32-33). As such it is the basis of production (29, 18). Proclus' language at this point is of consequence because he wishes to show that identity is twofold always whereas the difference is not. The effect is as effect both in itself and in the cause qua *μένον* (30). The cause does not relinquish the effect. The latter is from the side of cause simply superfluity. Just as likeness is the ground of procession so it is also ground of reversion (31, 32). Difference is effectual recognition of causal likeness and reversion is simply the processional manifestation of this recognition in the form of movement as appetition for lost completeness or for likeness in the prior state of *μένον* qua cause. The Good as unical completeness, as extrinsic to effect, is difference; as effectual end it is identity.

As total process the reciprocal relation of identity and difference from the side of the effect is procession and return or

11. This is the problem of proposition 2 recurring in the context of phenomenal logic per se rather than as simple difference from the One.

circular movement (33). This movement as circular is undimished circle; that is, "*πᾶν τὸ αἰτιατὸν καὶ μένει ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ αἰτίᾳ καὶ πρόεισιν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς αὐτήν.*"(35, ll. 9-10). If the circle is not to lapse into a point, simple identity and simple difference must both be maintained. If the effect remains simply, identity is asserted as absolute. If it reverts simply, identity is also asserted. If it proceeds simply, difference is asserted. If the effect combines extreme terms there is no effect. If it combines a mean and an extreme there is either simply remaining – identity, or simply procession – difference. If it combines all three there is asserted both principles at once. It is here that the effect is somehow unity in difference. Considered in terms of the first two propositions, the phenomenal world as such is just such an effect. As divided or as many effects each mirrors itself qua effect. Effect qua effect is imperfect or caused. In the phenomena as total effect division takes the form of many effects in which each effect is also cuase of its inferiors. Thus, there is an hierarchical order of causes to effects from first to last (36, 28, 7) and vice versa (37, 33, 34, 36) in which there can be no skipping of terms (33, 39). What proceeds reverts in like manner because the two are mirror images. The process qua process is circular reciprocity. It is the dynamic side of the static continuity of the *κόσμος*. The concepts of procession and reversion are related to identity and difference because their conceptual reciprocity is phenomenally a circularity which is eternal or the necessary form of the relation of cause and effect. Thus, procession and return is the causal relation as relation and as such is endemic to the whole of reality both in its particularity as parts and in its universality as phenomenal whole. Process as structure is universal. It is also ground of that through which it is structure.

So far Proclus has been considering in its widest context phenomenal process as procession and return or reciprocal relation of cause and effect. In this process, there are really three levels of causal relation. The first is that between the One and the Many (1-6). The second is the causal interrelation of the hypostases (20). And the third is the relation between the hypostases as existential *γένη* and their particular manifolds (21). To develop the dis-

tinctions within these three causal relations follows naturally from a discussion of their commonality in principle. Thus, in propositions 40-51 the argument considers the primary or monadic constituents of πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή and the concepts by which they are linked to their manifolds or the content of participation in its particular forms. The primary producers are self-constituted, ἐπιστρεπτικόν[12], complete, self-produced, imperishable, without parts and simple, and measured by time only in activity and not in existence. These are all monadic characteristics as general and so can apply to the hypostases as a whole. By not limiting them but keeping them as universal, the whole totality is unified. The movement of the argument is thus from the primary charachteristics of self-sufficiency (αὐταρκες) and self-constitution (αὐθυπόστατον) and those characteristics which are inherent in them to the point where the monads are linked through a common but disparate principle (time) to their dependents.[13]

Proclus' use of the concept time in propositions 49, 50, and 51 is of the highest importance as it forms the logical transition from the monads to their manifolds. It is in this concept that those of identity and difference as developed in their reciprocal

12. Proclus has used this term before (15 ff.) but in the context of its implications regarding movement. At that point movement was considered in the context of setting forth the orders of reality as static. There the process within which they relate to movement is considered and the question of their content as self-sufficient producers arises. It is in the context of the concept of production or dynamic relation that the term ἐπιστρεπτικόν now appears.

13. The first fifty-one propositions thus form a primary division within the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική. In these Proclus has been dealing essentially with the One and the hypostases in their monadic form as primal. In propositions 1-13 we have the One and its necessity both as first and as cause. In propositions 14-51 we have the structure and the constituents of that structure in their primary forms: ἑνάδες, νοῦς, ψυχή. This threefold division is only implicit as these forms have not per se in their individuality been taken up. Proclus is laying the groundwork for this – namely, the logical principle and categories of the κόσμος as effect of the One. The logic of the first propositions (1-6) must be developed via the principle of likeness before the existential forms can follow.

relations in the previous propositions take existential shape. The self-constituted as monadic is perpetual (49). As such it must transcend time but it is in some sense temporal in that it is perpetual. That is, time as concept seems to include all that proceeds. In order to develop this problem into clearer form Proclus considers the relation between Eternity and Time as concepts (52-55).[14] Time is a measure of coming-to-be (50). What is perpetual does not come-to-be. It always is. It is beyond temporal measure. Yet it is the measure by which time is measure. What Proclus intends in this argument is to show how there can be an essential relation between the eternal and perishable or between monad and manifold. Somehow there must be a connection if the previous principles of causation are to be operative in the purely temporal. The argument moves from the concepts as pure or as considered as measure to what has them as characteristic or as measured (54). Proclus links the idea of measure and measured with that of unmoved and moved. If time is simply process, then there is only the dyadic or divided, the coming-to-be. But the coming-to-be cannot be its own ground. There must be something which comes to be. Time, therefore, as a concept is a divided unity in which the being is not always itself as now but a not-being as past and future. Eternity is then the more comprehensive term for Proclus because it is a now without past or future. Time has the aspect of dividedness and separation into parts as well as wholeness, while Eternity has the aspect of an undivided wholeness. The self-constituted is then for Proclus beyond Time (51).[15]

14. It would seem that Proclus is hypostasizing Time and Eternity (53) but they are certainly not to be seen as on a level with the henads, intelligences, and souls. It is these which have these characteristics. In the context of the propositions so far they are really like the term "self-constituted"; that is, name attributable to the substances. For a further discussion of the problem of hypostasization see below, p. 75 ff.

15. Proposition 51 is the result of the connected argument of propositions 40-50. It is actually the answer to a problem raised in proposition 44. Dodds in his commentary (p. 223) says that proposition 44 is "not logically in place." Actually proposition 44 is related to proposition 41. Propositions 42 and 43 treat of activity. Proclus must tie propositions 41, 42 and 43 together. Then the question of whether the converse of proposition 44 is true

It is in this context of wholeness and division and rest and motion that Proclus regards Eternity and Time as essentially related aspects of the overall relation of whole and part, of unmoved and moved. The unmoved is eternal but above time, the perpetually moved is eternal but in time, and the perishable is moved and in time (54, 55).

Having now developed the interrelation of phenomenal levels by way of temporal concept or static self-relation, Proclus considers the dynamic side of the division or causality. The argument here is thus precisely parallel to that of the early propositions (1-13) wherein the One was first considered as defined existent (1-6) and then as cause (7-13). So Proclus is concerned in propositions 56-65 to consider the kinds of existents as cause. The formation of the argument of these propositions mirrors what has previously been set forth[16] and leads into a consideration of substantial relation. The different grades of reality are already developed (14-24, 55). In propositions 56-65 cause and effect is first considered with regard to extension (25-39; 56-57); secondly, with regard to unity and division as hierarchical power (40-51; 59-62); thirdly, with regard to the form of this extension as threefold participation which mirrors threefold temporality (52-55, 63); and finally with regard to the substantial relation of this threefold causal procession (64-65).

In this section (56-65) Proclus develops two principles which are basic to his system. The first is that causal power in relation

can arise. Proposition 51 shows that this converse is false. But the question of its truth or falsity is a natural one as propositions 42 and 43 were conversive. "Self-constitutive" is still not fully defined. Propositions 45-50 consist of a development of the ground for proposition 51 which is the problem raised by proposition 44. That this development is necessary can be seen by the need to find a link between the primal monads and what they are the monads of.

16. The way in which Proclus' later propositions include all their predecessors is not only very extraordinary but is of the highest necessity. The propositions in the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική are not loosely organized but fully coherent. And it is fundamental to any interpretation to show this coherence or lack of it because it is just upon this one issue that the Procline system stands or falls.

to effectual power as inferior cause is prior, more unitary, and more extensive: "*ἅπαν ἄρα αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ μετ' αὐτὸ ἄλλα ὑφίστησιν.*" (57, ll. 5-7). This principle of extensive causal superiority forms the basis for total circularity or comprehensiveness in Proclus' system. The One as first principle is also the immediate cause of the most remote principle: "*διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὄντων ἁπλούστατον, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι ἀπὸ μόνου πρόεισι τοῦ πρώτου· ἀλλ' ἡ ἁπλότης ἡ μὲν κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττόν ἐστι πάσης συνθέσεως, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ χεῖρον.*" (59, ll. 36-37).[17] The result in terms of the system is that it comprehends every possible existence. The second fundamental principle annunciated by Proclus in conjunction with the above is that substantial relation is threefold. In its threefoldness, it mirrors participation which is simply the substantial in its aspect of cause. There are three orders of participation: the unparticipated and the two orders to which as cause it gives rise — the contingent (*ποτὲ*) and the enduring (*ἀεὶ καὶ συμφυῶς*) (63). These terms are substantially or as individual existents *ἀρχικὴ μονάς*, *αἱ ἐλλάμφεις*, and *αἱ αὐτοτέλεις ὑποστάσεις* (64). Their triple relation is as similarly threefold according to *αἰτία ἀρχοειδῶς*, *μέθεξις εἰκονικῶς*, and *ὕπαρξις* (65). This principle of threefold relation makes possible the comprehended system as phenomenal; that is, the distinctions which arise phenomenally or as intermediate between the first and last principles have a definite distinctness which is at the same time their conjunctivity as relation and their independence as threefold. To put it another way their substantiality as both always simultaneously cause and effect allows them both independence and existence.[18]

Proclus, having considered how the temporally linked is causal relation as extension of substances, now considers the interval

17. This principle is of course the fundamental basis for Proclus' concept of matter — for which see corollary, proposition 72, and below note 21 and pp. 63-66.

18. This principle is the fundamental basis for Proclus' final development of the phenomenal logic in proposition 103 — for which see below pp. 69-70.

form which such extension must categorically take. He thus introduces the concepts of whole and part and identity and difference (66-74)[19]. The latter two are used to demonstrate the impossibility of not distinguishing the former two (66). The argument moves from a triadic consideration of whole as cause, existence, and participation where Being is of a medial nature (67) to a consideration of whole as it appears finitely or in the world of time; that is, posterior to *τὸ ἕν* (68-69). Proclus' development of wholeness takes a very dialectical form because he intends it to relate comprehensively to the cosmic structure as *μονή*, *πρόοδος*, and *ἐπιστροφή*. He thus categorizes *ὅλον* as *πρὸ τῶν μερῶν*, *ἐκ τῶν μερῶν*, and *ἐν τῷ μέρει*. The first as cause is *μονή*, the second as existence is *πρόοδος*, and the third as whole by participation is *ἐπιστροφή*. The latter two distinctions fall within the first just as *πρόοδος* and *ἐπιστροφή* fall within their cause as *μονή*. The term *τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὅλον*[20] is used by Proclus in

19. This introduction could be called a "reintroduction" in the sense that Proclus has certainly used the terms whole and part, identity and difference. But he has not considered them as internal self-relation. He considered identity and difference in relation to procession and return (28-29) and wholeness in relation to temporality (52 ff.).

20. According to Dodds (commentary pp. 236-37) Proclus invented this term. Whether he did so or not it is most certainly necessary for the argument to be comprehensively dialectical. According to Dodds (*Elements*, pp. 236-37) "it is difficult to acquit Proclus of a certain looseness in his application of these formulae." Dodds argues firstly that in the *Platonic Theology* Proclus treats the relation whole-before-the-parts and whole-of parts as that of genus and species and then carries through the analogy in his Timaeus commentary to that between the intelligible and sensible world. Dodds does not see how the sensible world can be a species of the intelligible but gives no reason. Actually such a relational analogy would be completely natural to a Platonist thinking of the sensible as the mirroring participation of the intelligible. Proclus' intention is to show that any genus-species relation is abstract unless necessary relation. Here in the *Elements of Theology* he develops whole and part dialectically for precisely this purpose! That Dodds has misconstrued this dialectic is shown by his next comments.

Dodds thinks apparently that there is a loose distinction in proposition 67 where wholes-of-parts are unities of two kinds, organic and mechanical,

order to show how the distinctions of *ὅλον* as finite form are complete and comprehensive of *πᾶσα ὁλότης* (67) in the world of beings (*πάντα τὰ ὄντα* (66)). *τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὅλον* is medial to *τὸ πρὸ τῶν μερῶν* and *τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει* (67). If there were simply the whole qua whole there would be no parts. If the whole was simply a whole-in-the-part, then whole and part would be identical on the supposition that whole excludes parts. Thus, to argue that there is either a whole-before-the-parts or a whole-in-the-part would dissolve the distinction of whole and part. What Proclus wishes to determine in propositions 68 and 69 is that the reciprocity of whole and part as distinguished in the concepts whole-before-the-part and whole-in-the-part can only be maintained by a concept in which their mutual exclusion comes together. This coming together is the concept whole-of-parts in which the parts are neither infinitely divisible nor non-particular. On the basis of *ὅλον* as exhaustive threefold concept of phenomenal distinction Proclus takes up its aspect as universal character in the cause (70). Here wholeness as finite is seen as posterior to Being which as comprehending both whole and part or identity and difference is superior (71-72).[21] Whole becomes finitely the mediation between Being and Form (*εἶδος*) which latter mediates

though again, he gives no argument. This criticism, if it be such, is easily refuted. Proclus does not indicate in proposition 67 that whole-of-parts is of two kinds. Rather, it is the concept which brings together the concepts of whole and part into their true relation of mutually necessary unity. He uses the three terms whole-before-the-part, whole-of-parts, and whole-in-the-part precisely so that he will not slip into the very error that Dodds' own presuppositions lead him to; namely, that whole and part can be understood apart from their interrelation. That is, Dodds is working with two concepts, whole and part; Proclus with three – that is, his *precise* formulae or whole and part *and* their relation.

21. Proclus' determination of the concept Matter in the corollary of proposition 72 is very consequential in that it can be seen to be that most remote principle which is at the same time immediate to the One, (see above p. 61 and note 17) which as such is *ὑποκείμενον* for Being, or what allows the dyadic nature of Being, or that Being can contain whole and part and identity and difference.

whole and individual (73-74). The principle which is involved here is that of proposition 59 in which the priority of cause is in proportion to the numbers of its effects. Being is thus prior to wholeness because not every existent is a whole although every whole is an existent. In like manner, whole is prior to Form because not every whole is a form but every form is a whole.

Proclus has discussed causal relation in two previous sections. He first considered it in relation to the One as primal cause (7-13) and then in relation to the gradation of causes qua causes or secondary causality (56-65). Although time and eternity as temporal concepts bring to light monadic and manifold relation as general they do not lead immediately to this relation as reciprocal. Temporality as twofold is a measure but as such is one-sided; that is, what is measured is not really qua measurement a result of measure. Thus, the argument of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική leads from temporality to its substantial extension from the aspect of cause or measure. The reciprocal relation or the movement from the side of effect cannot be developed until the internality of the effect can be seen as categorically like that of cause. This is implicit in causal gradation but its explication can only be by a development of the categories inherent in that implicitness. Such are the categories of whole and part as identity and difference. Once these have been developed the argument must again take up causality; but this time it is taken up as explicit reciprocity. Thus, in propositions 75-86[22] Proclus develops the argument on the basis of *ἐνέργεια* and *δύναμις*.[23] These distinctions are the ground of unity and division as extended causality or the

22. It is significant that Proclus is here combining the chief Aristotelian categories with those of Plato. That he does so is entirely consonant with his view that the Aristotelian categories are finite or confined to phenomena. This is clear from his concept of *νοῦς* in propositions 20, 76, and 103. Proclus develops the Platonic categories first because their reciprocity is more abstract than those of Aristotle. *Ἐνέργεια* properly understood is for Proclus a kind of *δύναμις*. For him *δύναμις* is a twofold concept which is both ground of production and ground of return. It is overflowing power and unformed passivity.

23. Dodds finds the relation of propositions 74 and 75 difficult and

ground of cause and effect as finite movement. This movement as dynamic process is categorically *δύναμις* as twofold. Cause transcends effect (75) and yet effect is like its cause (76)[24]. The reason or ground of this transcendent yet immanent relation is the identity relation of *ἐνέργεια* and *δύναμις* universally and particularly. *Ἐνέργεια* is prior to *δύναμις* but as relation they are parallel (77). This relation Proclus further defines in propositions 78 and 79. In these propositions, he wishes to show how *ἐνέργεια* is really *δύναμις* as cause while *δύναμις* as posterior to *ἐνέργεια* is ground of *συναίτιον* or effect before it is cause. That is, before effect is cause or *ἐνέργεια* it is merely possible. It is not. When it is it is not just *δύναμις* as potential being but *δύναμις* as actual being or *ἐνέργεια*. These propositions are absolutely fundamental to the Procline system. The principles that "*πᾶσα δύναμις ἢ τελεία ἐστὶν ἢ ἀτελής*" (78), and "*πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ τῆς διττῆς γίνεται δυνάμεως*" (79) underlie the *κόσμος* as complete, ordered, necessary totality. The One and pure matter are just perfect potency or pure *ἐνέργεια* and imperfect potency or pure *δύναμις* as pure possibility. The One produces the phenomena. The matter is the ground of this production. Both sides of the *δύναμις* are unified in the One. As pure unity the One is above *δύναμις* because it is above division or the duality of aspect in a concept. But the One as only the source of phenomena, that is, from the side of the phenomena, the phenomena itself, is source of the duality of *δύναμις*. Of special interest with regard to this duality is Proclus' discussion of the relation of body to matter. This is important because it is with *ψυχή* and *σῶμα* that

thinks Proclus might have introduced the concept *συναίτιον* (p. 240) at an earlier time. Actually the proposition as such that "*πᾶν τὸ κυρίως αἴτιον λεγόμενον ἐξήρηται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος*" (75) leads directly from proposition 74 and determines universally what is said in proposition 74 about the relation of *ὅλον* and *εἶδος*. To have brought the distinction in earlier would have been premature because the threefold finite distinctions of whole and part would not have formed the ground for *συναίτιον*. The internal structure of effect is necessary as well as that of cause before the effect as *συναίτιον* can be understood.

24. See propositions 27 and 28.

one and division combine organically. The orders above σῶμα are incorporeal but it itself is corporeal. The concept of δύναμις as twofold makes possible their unity. Bodies per se are acted upon and incorporeals (ἀσώματα) per se are actives, but through association (διὰ κοινωνίαν) the former act and the latter are acted upon (80). The body per se is divisible, the incorporeal simple. The combination to be real must be reciprocal. In proposition 72, Proclus considers body as proceeding from a cause superior to, prior to ψυχή; that is, Being.[25] Thus body is per se ἄποιον and ἀδύναμον.[26] It must be caused or associated with its ἐνέργεια or the dividedness which in its own character as ἐνέργεια becomes its own dissolution as δύναμις in its aspect of possibility.

In the next five propositions (81-85), Proclus relates the concepts characteristic of what is ἐνέργεια to δύναμις. Thus we see a reindication of the terms incorporeal, self-complete, self-constituted, self-reversive, and self-knowing in the context of their unity in a single subject. These propositions take up previous parts of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική[27] and form the content of proposition 86 in which potency is seen as the ground or unity of Being as beings. Here all true Being (πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὄν) is said to be "ἄπειρόν ἐστιν οὔτε κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος οὔτε κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν μόνην." (86, ll. 19-20). On the side of division qua division being would turn out to be simply nothing or matter: the pure δύναμις as possibility. On the side of unity qua unity being would turn out to be everything simply or

25. "τὰ δὲ τῶν προϋποκειμένων ἄλλοις ὑποστατικὰ πλειόνων αἰτιά ἐστιν, ὑφιστάντα καὶ τὰς ἐπιτηδειότητας πρὸ τῆς τῶν εἰδῶν παρουσίας." (72, ll. 20-22).

26. The term ψυχή is not mentioned in proposition 80 but is in proposition 72 where the text reads: "τὸ δὲ σῶμα καθ' αὐτό, εἰ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος μετέσχε, ψυχῆς ἀμέτοχόν ἐστιν." (72. ll. 25-26).

27. Proposition 81 relates especially to propositions 15, 16, 22, 23, 24, 63, 64.
Proposition 82 relates especially to propositions 37, 42, 43.
Proposition 83 relates especially to propositions 20 and 44 ff.
Proposition 84 relates especially to propositions 45-49.
Proposition 85 relates especially to propositions 50 and 55.

the One: the pure δύναμις as ἐνέργεια. Accordingly, Being can be neither the one nor the other but is the procession and return of the One.

Being as procession and return is total phenomena as process. The process qua process has the form of cause and effect as reciprocity whose ground is the duality of δύναμις as passive and active. The process itself Proclus has developed. The subject of this process has, however, been assumed. Proclus begins with the One and proceeds to consider it in itself and then as cause of otherness. All else is said to be one and not-one (2). The different categorical distinctions of this divisiveness in the posterior to the One manifest themselves from the point of view of distinction qua distinction. While it is assumed that there is existential or substantial ground wherein these distinctions are distinguished it cannot be known as ground until it is determined what it determines. In propositions 87-96, Proclus seeks precisely to bring together the various phenomenal distinctions he has considered – both those of internal definition and those of process relation – in the concept of Being. There is the One and there are various beings or existences dependent on it. What does not exist is not. What is not is not phenomenal. It is not a subject and so has no predicates. It is the undistinguished or the simple nothing.[28] The nothing is not possibility because it is not a possible it. Being as existing subject is comprehensive of all existences both eternal and timed (87-88). But it is below the One. It is not unity as simple. It is unity as subject. It is the unity of distinctions or the subject which holds together the divided. Thus "πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὄν ἐκ πέρατός ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον." (89). All true being is a μικτόν. But what is mixed is itself not the mixture. Thus, the limit qua limit cannot be the unlimit nor the unlimit qua unlimit the limit. Qua themselves they each exclude the other. What brings them together is a third. But this third from the point of view of what is brought together is posterior. It is a whole which is a whole of parts. The

28. The Nothing is not Matter as pure side of δύναμις. It is simply not, because it is not ground or possibility of countenance of predicates. It is not an it. It is the Parmenidean unspeakable.

parts are prior. If one said that the whole as a *μικτόν* preceded the parts then one would have to argue that division precedes unity. The One would become a posterior principle and cease to be the ground of Being (90-96). Being as substantial, as *ἐνέργεια*, is in all its manifestations a *μικτόν*. And as a *μικτόν* it is posterior to limit and unlimit. These two concepts precede Being because they precede *μικτόν*. As such they are categories which can comprehend all Being because what is common to beings as being is their dyadic unity. From the dyadic side purely they are *ἄπειρον*. These two sides taken together are the content of any existential manifestation which as distinguished has further determinate predicates.

The final propositions of the logical part of the *Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική* (97-112) link the abstract delineation of the various categories to the actual orders of the cosmos.[29] Like Being as subject these orders have been so far assumed. They are the determinate manifestations of Being as *μικτόν* and as determinate have definite relations both as self-relation and interrelation. We thus have introduced for the first time life and thought as concepts.[30] In propositions 97-100 Proclus seeks to tie together the concepts of cause and effect with participation and with the subject of these as monad and series. He has previously considered all of these relations separately but it is important to see them together as forming the basis of phenomenality in its particularity or individuated beingness. In proposition 97 the distinctive character of a being is considered. Already the common structure of beings as *μικτόν* has been developed. But their difference must be shown to be within the same totality as their commonality. Thus, the same process by which one being remits existence to another universally also remits the particularity of its existent to its progeny.

29. Dodds calls these propositions "supplementary" and "miscellaneous" (Commentary, p. 250). But they are neither. They are really the culmination of the whole previous argument and form a basis upon which to move from logic to a consideration of the subjects of this logic; namely, the henads, the intelligences, and the souls.

30. Previously Proclus has used the terms *νοῦς* and *ζωή* (20, 39). But he has not considered them as concepts. Rather he has considered them as existences or as beings. Here he is considering them in relation to Being itself.

This particularity is internal distinction. As remitted it is also external and so in proposition 98 the separation as opposed to the unity of the remission process is stressed. These two propositions bring together the concepts of monad and series and cause and effect. The ground of this relation is participation and unparticipation. Propositions 99 and 100 develop this side of the relation of cause as monad and series as effect. In proposition 100 Proclus gives the whole causal series of effects, monads, and the One as cosmic system which is totality of commonality (97), separation (98), and containing process (99).

Having developed the structural character of cosmological system universally Proclus considers the definite distinctions within the system. These distinctions are most comprehensively the concepts *ὄν*, *ζωή*, and *νοῦς*. Thus in proposition 101 Proclus considers unparticipated *ὄν*, *ζωή*, and *νοῦς* and their participating series. He orders them in terms of priority according to comprehension, that is, what has existence does not necessarily have life and thought, what has life has existence but not necessarily thought, and what has thought has existence and life. Thus, "*πλειόνων αἴτιον τὸ ὄν, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἡ ζωή, καὶ ἔτι ἐλαττόνων ὁ νοῦς*" with the result that "*πρώτιστον τὸ ὄν, εἶτα ζωή, εἶτα νοῦς*" (101, ll. 30-31). Proposition 102 further explicates the serial distinctions. Being has been shown to consist primally of limit and unlimit. This is its special character. Life besides being Being has in addition self-movement. And Thought besides being Being and Life has in addition knowledge. Proclus now considers the triad hierarchically. Being as primal is first cause. Life as second is substantial predicate, and *νοῦς* as third is participation. Proclus considers in this hierarchical triadic sense the whole cosmic content of existential phenomena in its logical form and interconnection. This content as logical form is the great Neoplatonic principle "*πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ*" (103, l. 14) which Proclus has only brought into light on the basis of the determinate nature of the "*πάντα*" as developed thoroughout the first 102 propositions. The content of this proposition (103) is the determinate form of the phenomenal existence. What holds them together is their common logical structure as expressed in

the various categories heretofore developed. What holds them apart are these same categories taken as reciprocal.

Proposition 104 brings together the concepts of limit and unlimit under the categories of temporality, existence, and actuality. The limit is *οὐσία*, the unlimit *δύναμις* as active. Proclus is structuring the argument in the usual path of moving from the monad to the whole series. Previously (52-55) time was used to link the eternal and perishable. Here the more concrete eternals, or eternity as determinate, *ὄν*, *ζωή*, and *νοῦς* are to be linked with their participants. Proposition 105 further develops the temporal in terms of the greater scope of *ὄν vis à vis ζωή*. Proposition 106 further extends the temporal relation of proposition 105 to the series participating the monads. The division of temporality into wholly external existence and activity, eternal existence and measured or temporal activity, and measured existence and activity is the division of proposition 55 but the contextual difference is that in proposition 55 only the temporal principles qua principles were considered. In proposition 106, Proclus is concerned with their application in the various hypostatical series. Proposition 107 further explicates the intermediate term in proposition 106 and thereby shows how the two extremes are linked together. The eternal is being, the temporal is becoming. As simply principles, they are exclusive. Being has become. Becoming never is. What joins them makes possible the negative extreme or becoming.[31] Proposition 107 forms a connection between propositions 100-106 and propositions 108-112. In propositions 100-106, Proclus develops the cosmological hierarchy as content and connection of content. In proposition 107 he considers the principle of intermediacy in terms of being as *γένεσις*. This principle in turn forms the basis of the various hierarchical relations qua hierarchy which form the content of propositions 108-112. In these propositions the relation of series to monads are developed. This is possible on the basis of having developed what

31. This proposition makes logically possible Proclus' doctrine of the soul-body relation in propositions 191 and 192 wherein the body is animated by the soul.

the content of these monads and series is. Thus in proposition 108 Proclus considers the relation not only of monad to its series but of the series to its own monad and other monads. Participation of a supra-jacent monad is either through the monad of the series' own rank or through an analogous term of a supra-jacent rank. Proposition 109 considers this hierarchical interrelation in terms of the cosmic beings: the henads, intelligences, souls, and bodies. Proposition 110 is a further explication of the doctrine of analogical participation which follows naturally from proposition 109. If the lower series have more members than the higher series then how can there be one higher analogue for each lower member. Proclus' argument in proposition 110 is that the lower members of a lower series do not have analogous participation in the lower members of a higher series because they are too remote. Thus, some members of the lower series have both kinds of participation while others have only participation through their own monads. Proposition 111 gives the hierarchical interrelation of proposition 110 in terms of the cosmic beings.[32] Proposition 112 brings together the content of propositions 108-111 in the concept of the continuity of monad and series: "*πάσης τάξεως τὰ πρώτιστα μορφὴν ἔχει τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν.*" That is, what makes possible the analogous relation of monad to series and series to one another, is the unity of the subjects of the relation. This unity takes the form of likeness. What is important for Proclus' system is that the highest classes be not simply like their monad but like their supra-jacents in their above order. This is an application of the basic principle of proposition 56 which is fundamental to the system; namely, that prior cause extends to more effects than succeeding cause. Thus the continuity of the universe is not merely linear but circular.[33] If there were simple linearity, then the first monad of a lesser order would receive its

32. Proposition 111 is thus structurally like proposition 109. Proposition 109 forms the same function in relation to proposition 108 as proposition 111 to proposition 110.

33. It is this principle of proposition 56 which makes possible Proclus' doctrine of providence. See proposition 120.

monadic nature from the last member of the higher order. But this would be impossible because the least member of any order is most remote from its monad and as such from the principle of simplicity. Remoteness is concommitant with dividedness. Thus, to have simple linearity would be to mix like and unlike and to make procession impossible. Pure circularity would result in an equally abstract relation between principle and phenomena because it would mean that analogy would be reduced to identity.[34] There would be more highest terms than lower because there would have to be one highest term for each lower. Such would mean that divisibility would be more characteristic of the primitive than of the secondary. If one argued that there could be many lowers participating the same higher, then the lowers would be reduced to identity and so self-dissolve. By bringing both linearity and circularity together Proclus is able to maintain both circularity and discontinuity or likeness and unlikeness. Logically this is done by the doctrine of intermediacy which processively takes the form of procession. This is the linear side of the system. Reversion is the circular side of linearity devolving on itself. Thus the total argument of the first 112 propositions in the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική is that the primal principle of the One pervades the universe. Being is the one as unity of limit and unlimit. The various orders of the cosmos are genetic determinations of this divided unity. The last 99 propositions are an explanation of these determinate orders on the basis of the logic of linear-circularity which is their phenomenal ground.

34. Pure circularity unlike pure linearity is not self-contradictory. It cannot be self-contradictory because as pure circle each moment of its content is identical. It cannot in itself account for distinction and so is not adequate as concept comprehensive of principle *and* phenomena. If it would be adequate it should be self-contradictory. But if it was it would be self-dissolved. Its self-contradiction must thus be its unity with simple linearity whose self-contradiction is, unlike that of simple circularity, the negation of contradiction.

Chapter V

Linear and Circular Tension in the ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ

V. Linear and Circular Tension in the ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ

The total structure of the *Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική* is that of *μονή*, *πρόοδος*, and *ἐπιστροφή*. This total structure is developed within the logical framework of one and many. One as principle is infinite and its structure as *μονή* is *as conceived* an infinite logic. Many as principle is finite and its structure as *πρόοδος* and *ἐπιστροφή* is *as conceived* finite or phenomenal logic. Thus, the movement of the total work is triadic while the principles of this totality are dual. The interrelation of this movement as form with its content as enformed brings to light a tension in the *Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική* between its principles and what is principled.

The development of this tension lies within the hypostatical nature of Proclus' system. This hypostatical nature can only be itself developed by determining what concepts are truly hypostases and when so determined what is their order. The question of their order brings up the further question of what constitutes the principle upon which they are hierarchically organized. Behind all of these questions is that of how hierarchy as linear can also be hierarchy as circular. As linear they are primarily separate or have for their principle division. As circular they revert into one another and are primarily undivided or have as their principle unity. If either principle is neglected the hierarchy collapses. Either a world is produced from no principle or a principle produces no world. In both cases, the result to the Procline *κόσμος* is on the one hand ungrounded abstract phenomena or on the other hand, a One which as unproduction is merely abstract ineffection.

The total hypostatical structure of the *Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική* seems at first glance to be simple enough. There is the One and the Many, which latter are differentiated into henads, inttelligences, souls, and bodies. The One and its logic is developed in propositions 1-13. The Many is logically considered in propositions 13-112 and is hypostatically considered in propositions 113-211. However, Proclus seems to hypostasize other concepts such as

Being[1], Time and Eternity[2], Wholeness[3], various Forms[4], Limit and Unlimit[5], and Life and Thought[6]. What seems difficult is that Proclus is putting attributes and subjects of attributes on the same level. While in certain contexts he seems to do this it must be firmly realized that in terms of the overall structure of the propositions attributes and subjects are differentiated. The propositional structure is that of the One, the henads, the intelligences, and the souls. That some of them are temporal or whole or have formal attributes is part of their nature as distinct members of an order. The relation of Being, Life, and Thought to the hypostases is less transparent as is the relation of limit and unlimit to Being. It may firstly be objected that Being is what immediately succeeds the One, not the henads. Proclus certainly says this.[7] But whether Being is to be taken as simply one of the hypostases which succeeds the One is the real question at issue. It is very clear that on the argument that Being succeeds immediately the One, Being should so appear in the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική. But it does not. The henads appear where according to such an argument Being should appear. The reason for this seeming discrepancy is only made clear by considering the total argument of Proclus in the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική. The answer is to be found in the structural framework. Being does succeed the One immediately but not hypostatically.[8] It is the principle of the Many. There is only One and Many or One and Being. Being is the principle of multiplicity. As such, it is the composite of limit and unlimit (89). It is the principle of all that is not *the* One. It is the not-Ones undifferentiated. As differentiated Being is all the hypostases subsequent

1. See propositions 22 cor., 86, 89-90, 103, 138.
2. See proposition 53.
3. See proposition 73 cor.
4. See propositions 22 cor., 63, 74 cor.
5. See propositions 89-90.
6. See propositions 101-103.
7. See propositions 86 and 138.
8. What makes Proclus' language here difficult is that he will sometimes use being as an attribute and sometimes as a subject (see propositions 22 cor., 71-72, 86, 138).

to the One. They are γένη of Being. Such is the true form of Proclus' argument. The henads take what seems to be the place of Being because they are the first γένος or the aspect of Being which is most immediate to the One and to those orders which are less immediate to it. The henads are thus first beings as ones and are also immediate to their successors or are as divine providential.

The hierarchical orders of the γένη of Being are the henads, intelligences, souls, and bodies. All of them are existent. But life and thought are what determine the further differences. It would seem naturally that since all four orders have existence the attributive hierarchy would be unity, thinking, life, and being. But Proclus does not allow this attributive hierarchy. He rather maintains that while unity is first, being is second, life third, and thought fourth. The relation of the latter three attributes can be clearly seen in proposition 103. Proclus' argument is that being is the more extensive principle and, therefore, prior. Things may exist which are neither alive nor thinking. So also life is next most extensive as what is alive may not think although what thinks is necessarily both existent and alive. In like manner, thought is seen as dependent on being and life. The problem here is that one would then think that after the henads bodies should come first, then souls, and then intelligences. In proposition 20, Proclus argues against this by developing the hypostases in relation to motion. There he argues that while the One is prior to intelligence since intelligence assumes a subject – object division, so the intelligence is prior to soul because it is unmoved while the soul is self-moved. So also body is posterior to soul because it is externally moved.

The tension between propositions 20 and 103 is the tension between Proclus' logic and the content of that logic. His logic is essentially that of the principle of quantity. All is primally One. One is the principle of all. The henads are primally one but are not one in that they are numerical; that is, their difference or not-being is their numerical multiplicity. This multiplicity is, however, external to them as they are all ones. Substantially, they do not differ – to one another they are indifferent. What then is it in

their immanent principle which divides them? This question looked at from another side is the question of wherein lies the productivity of the One. Each order is said to have a novelty of some kind. Primal being as henadic has numerical difference, intelligence has thought, soul has life, body has being. The productive principle is that of an overflowing, an infinite or complete potency, δύναμις as actual.[9] Yet wherein lies the mediation of the movement from novelty to novelty? Qua movement the hierarchy takes one form. Qua novelty as attribute the hierarchy takes another. The reason for this is that Proclus' logic is inadequate to its content. The logic of quantity when reducing non-quantitative content to quantitative forms cannot feel at home.[10] It loses what it seeks to grasp. What happens to the system is that it retains its logic and loses its systematic nature or reduces its content to abstract rather than concrete forms. Such a result can be seen in the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική by Proclus' insistence that Limit and Unlimit precede Being because they as separate are not composite,

9. See below, Chapter IV, pp. 50 - 52, and propositions 7 -13; and pp. 64 - 68 and propositions 75 - 86.

10. This is especially evident with the henads. They are primally one. They are, however, a "they", a plurality, a multiplicity. But this multiplicity does not unindividualize them. They are in themselves units. Their division is a quantitative indifference to each other. They are independent ones. Because they are independent ones, they are the highest γένος of Being. And because they are the highest of the γένη of Being, they are providential, for, as highest γένος, they can extend their power to the lowest γένος (see above Chap. IV, p. 60 ff., p. 69, and prop. 56). They are no less than the old Greek gods of the poets and seers who in their activity rule the world and bind it to the command of the divine will. The problem that herein arises is how Proclus can fully relate the henads to their providential role. These divinities with all their qualities of beauty and intelligence and life seem to lose their individuality just when they become indifferent units whose individuality is only atomic irreducibility. Of course, Proclus wants to suggest that there is more in providence than can be stated in terms of life and thought because for him these concepts are finite and inadequate to the infinite power which envelopes them. Nevertheless, it would seem that their inadequacy to be infinite is no less than that of indifferent quantity to be finite. In this ἀπορία lies a basic Procline dilemma.

whereas together they are compositely Being. Thus, Being as hypostatical ground is reduced below that which it comprehends.[11] In like manner, life and thought are also reduced below that which they comprehend or to abstractions.[12] As concrete, as actual, thought is life and being. Being on the other hand, is potentially life and thought. Thus, Proclus has reduced his system on the side of content to potentiality. This is simply the result of insisting that all come under quantitative form.[13] Thus, Being is implicit in the One. The One is potentially Being. As such it finds its differentiation as well as its reunion immediately. Procession and return are at rest. The content is not exhausted by its form because its formality is it as immediate or potential.

11. To understand the difficulty which lies behind these statements, it is necessary to recognize the dual concept of Being, which occurs somewhat unobstrusively in the propositional argument of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική. In the phenomenal logic, that is, propositions 7-113, Being is considered as unhypostatical being. Being as primal is mixture of Limit and Unlimit and passes this dividedness on to all things ("... δῆλον δὴ ὅτι καὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ πρώτιστον μεταδίδωσι πᾶσι πέρατος ἅμα καὶ ἀπειρίας, μικτὸν ὑπάρχον ἐκ τούτων πρώτος....", prop. 102). As such composite it is posterior to Limit and Unlimit. But there is another sense in which Being is prior to Limit and Unlimit. This is Being as primal ground or dyad. For even Limit and Unlimit *are*. Without Being they are nothing. Their relation to one another as opposites which *can* come together is Being. This Being as being prior to composition is hypostatical Being. Proclus does not speak of hypostatical Being as such. It can be found in the henads which are pure limit as unit and pure unlimit as indifferent atomic division. These henads are however above Being, Life, and Thought because "πᾶς θεὸς ὑπερούσιός ἐστι καὶ ὑπέρζωος καὶ ὑπέρνους." (Prop. 115). The tension between Being as hypostatical and being as unhypostatical is just that of how quantitative content can supercede qualitative, or how the henads as ones are living divinities. On this point see note 10 above and Chapter VI, note 2 below.

12. The reason for this reduction is the quantitative principle of causal extension (see props. 56-65, 103).

13. It is of great importance to grasp that such a result is not endemic to non-numerical categories. It simply does not exhaust them as logical form of their content.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

VI. Conclusion

It is Proclus' great merit that there is a tension between the logic and content of his system. Because the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική is so thorough he was unable to choose another framework. Given the principles of his logic, the ordered structure of the frame could be no different. At the same time, he was intent on including within the framework all phenomena. He did not simply reduce one concept to another. On the contrary, he is most insistent on including all forms of phenomena. Such inclusion is the basis for his bringing in as culmination to his phenomenal logic the concepts of life and thought. It is a great mistake to judge Proclus' thought from an historical standpoint: that is, to argue that one finds some principle or concept in his work because he felt it should be included as part of the tradition. Such argument is highly superficial because it is entirely external to the logical and systematic nature of the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική. If a discrepancy is felt recourse to an argument that explains it as the result of Proclus' slavery to tradition does not show the discrepancy as discrepancy. Before a discrepancy can be explained as a discrepancy, it must be shown to be in fact a discrepancy. To do such is to show that there are contradictions in the work. To show such contradictions is to have as a measure what is not contradictory or an idea of the discreptive system as systematic. But it is precisely this assumption which "historical" arguments assume.[1] The henads are a case in point. They cannot be found historically so they must be a development by Proclus to overcome discrepancy. Or also their historical origin is either lost or has its beginning with Iamblichus. But even if Iamblichus did first formulate the idea of henads one could still argue that Proclus could treat them in such a way as was not that of Iamblichus but rather a way appropriate to the logic of Proclus' own system. Or finally if the henads cannot be understood as a

1. See above Prolegomena, note 1.

logically necessary concept for the maintenance of a systematic whole, then Proclus must have added them to save the old Greek gods from oblivion.

It is Proclus' great superiority over such interpretation that the henads are both logically necessary and as such divinely providential.[2] They were introduced, I think, for no external reason, but as part of a system. If they are not logically necessary it is because the whole logic of which they are a part lacks necessity. What must be held to definitely is that the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική is an organic work. It is not a patchwork of bits and pieces. It is not a philosophical smorgasbord. Certainly Proclus used concepts that came down to him from Plato and Aristotle and his Neoplatonic predecessors. But he took them up and sought to unify them. In so doing, he was being neither a slave to tradition nor to a preconceived system. He simply recognized that the comprehension of reality is a logical comprehension in which the unity of logic and reality, if comprehensive, takes of necessity the form of system. A logic which is not system is dessicated and abstract. A system without logic is chaotic and incomplete. Only the two together provide a κόσμος in which the multitude of phenomena is phenomenal or the appearance of the truly real as divine manifestation in finite form. If Proclus does not fully succeed it is not because he did not develop his principles to their full extent. In so far as he did not succeed his principles were unable to provide success. This is the deepest fruit of his philosophy. It carried itself to its fullest extent. To go further is not to neglect his principles but to make them more adequate to their task – to comprehend

2. What makes the henads *logically* necessary is the need for an adequate transition between first principle and phenomena. The henads as pure ones are like The ONE as Good. The henads as plural or many are not-ones. They are pure limit and unlimit as secondary. That is, the One as dual δύναμις (see above Chap. IV, pp. 64 - 66 and props. 75 - 86) as pure ground of power and power-ful-ness is pure limit and unlimit as primary or as above limit and unlimit. The henads just *because* of the logical necessity of mediation within the system can be providential. They extend to the outer limits of Being as unhypothetical or of potential δύναμις as first impurity. And this extension is their devine activity. (See also above Chap. V, notes 10 and 11).

them more fully in more adequate principles in which they are not cast aside but exhaustively included.

In order to effect this more adequate comprehension the tension between the logic and the content of the Procline philosophic system must be removed. This tension is the result of a determination to think a first principle which is beyond thought. It has been argued that Proclus did achieve as perfect a union between the logic of his philosophy and its content as could be achieved in trying to comprehend rationally a totality the fundamental principle of which is beyond reason. To overcome the tension of his system one must overcome the incommensurability between the One and the Many, between the μονή of the One and the πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή of its productive activity. The only avenue left open by the Procline philosophy is that the principle must not be beyond thought but thought itself. If it is beyond thought, then the Procline philosophy is adequate to the notion. In fact, to comprehend the beyond-reason principle rationally is to produce the Procline philosophy. Thus, what the inward tension of the Procline philosophy finally shows and demands is that the first principle be not neyond thought but *thinking being alive*. The principle Procline philosophy: namely, the doctrine of the mean term ty cannot contain the logic of the most important principle of the Proclean philosophy: namely, the doctrine of the mean term between extremes. This principle is the basis of the triadic concepts unparticipated, participated, and participating. It is the basis of μονή, πρόοδος, and ἐπιστροφή. In short, it is the whole ground of any triadic development which is circular. The difficulty for Proclus is that on the principle of quantitative logic based on unity and multiplicity any unity which is multiple must be regarded as paradoxical and simply asserted as true in the very face of the

3. It is certainly not Proclus' own view that the One is simply quantitative, but it seems to me that, although Proclus' *claims* for his principle go beyond the limits of quantity, his principle in itself does not. In fact the whole nature of this discrepancy between the principle and the demands made on it is the subject of this study and more especially the argument of this conclusion.

logic which asserts it as false. In order to suppress this assertion of paradox the device of negation is used to explain the first principle in relation to its progeny. It is *not* its progeny. It is *not* divided or multiple. It has *no* parts. It does *not* participate. It is *beyond* thought. And yet to work out this negativity in thought is to assert paradox. This is the paradox which underlies Neoplatonism as a whole and as such it demands that its adherents place religion *above* philosophy. That is, since philosophy cannot explain what is beyond it, an intuitive extra-logical leap must render the unexplainable explained. Even to express this leap involves a paradox. Either one must admit defeat for thought and thus admit that any philosophy is incomplete and incapable of being a measure for its own validity or one must take up the paradox as not paradoxical but the very logical structure of the First Principle itself. In this way, what is and what can be thought can be united and one is forced no longer into mysticism.[4] With regard to the Procline philosophy, the result would be to show that the triad of ὄν, ζωή, and νοῦς is the structure of the One as μονή, πρόοδος, and ἐπιστροφή. This would be to reverse their hierarchical order from the priority of ὄν to the priority of νοῦς, but this no longer in a linear way but circularly. That is, νοῦς would be seen as existing and as the totality of life in its productive activity of thinking itself – as producing a world which is its own activity. Such a principle would be able to allow for the triadic principles of the Procline philosophy since its own activity as νοῦς would in fact be that of subject and object as self-consciously the same. And in allowing for the principles of the Procline philosophy, it would be completing in pure philosophical form the entire history of Greek philosophy in general and of Neoplatonism in particular.

4. For an actual working out of the inevitable dilemmas of speculative metaphysics in the form of a speculative and systematic philosophy see my *Mentaphysics*, Halifax, 1978.

Appendix: Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική and Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας

Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική and Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας

It is generally accepted by commentators on Proclus that the *Elements of Theology* and the *Platonic Theology* are in their major teachings the same. Both E. R. Dodds and A. C. Lloyd are representative of this point of view.[1] Yet, it is equally true that no detailed comparison of these two works in terms of a structural analysis has been attempted. It is hoped by myself that this appendix will be an initial step in this direction; for the *Elements of Theology* and the *Platonic Theology* are Proclus' main philosophical works. Both are systematic and both develop a cosmological schema. A consideration of the two works together can be useful in the understanding both of Proclus' philosophy as a whole and of each work itself because such a consideration will bring to light two questions: Does Proclus have a single philosophy? And is either work in itself a complete philosophy? By comparing the two it can be determined, I think, how far the *Elements of Theology* and the *Platonic Theology* are the same and how far different. At the same time a consideration of these similarities and differences can tell us what exactly Proclus' philosophy is. In answering these questions, I will deal with the comparison of the two works under three divisions: purpose, structure, and complementariety.

1. E. R. Dodds, *Elements of Theology*, Oxford, 1963, p. xvii: "The system expounded in the *Platonic Theology* and the metaphysical commentaries is *substantially* (Dodds' italics) the same as that of the *Elements*, ..." A. C. Lloyd, *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, Chapter 19, "Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism," p. 305: "Proclus believed that his metaphysics was the true though hidden meaning of Plato and that this like all Greek 'theology' derived from the secret doctrines of Pythagoreans and Orphics. It can be studied in two works, the *Elements of Theology* and the *Theology of Plato*, with help here and there from the commentaries on the *Parmenides, Timaeus,* and *Alcibiades* .... Discrepancies of doctrine between these works are probably trifling."

Proclus' purpose in writing the *Elements of Theology* and the *Platonic Theology* can to begin with be gathered from the titles: "Στοιχειώσις" indicates a kind of handbook or compendium of basic principles or constitutents. "Θεολογική", as Dodds points out[2], is meant in the Aristotelian sense of first philosophy – what we might call metaphysics. Proclus himself does not tell us by way of introduction what the work is about or its purpose. Neither does he in the body of the work refer to any other work either by himself or by any other philosopher. The impression one immediately has is that the work is one of total compression in which nothing extra is allowed, in which all the fat is trimmed away. On the other hand, the subject matter extends from the "One" down to "body", and so covers the whole range of what Aristotle calls "ἀκίνητα"[3] and "χωριστά".[4]

The title Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας indicates that the *Platonic Theology* will be, as in the *Elements of Theology*, theological, but, in addition, that it will be the theology of Plato.[5] Unlike the *Elements of Theology* the *Platonic Theology* gives copious references to the works of Plato and to various interpretations of Plato, and mentions occasionally other philosophers, notably Iamblichus and Syrianus, in so far as they are "interpreters" of Plato. There is a long introduction to the *Platonic Theology* in which Proclus indicates that what he wishes to expound is "ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν θείων μυσταγωγία,"[6] which became apparent "δι' ἑνὸς ἀνδρός"[7] (Plato) – which "ἀληθιναὶ τελέται"[8] are those "ἃς τελοῦνται χωρισθεῖσαι τῶν περὶ γῆν τόπων αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ τῶν ὁλοκλήρων καὶ ἀτρεμῶν φασμάτων ὧν μεταλαμβάνουσιν αἱ τῆς εὐδαίμονος καὶ μακαρίας ζωῆς γνησίως ἀντεχόμεναι..."[9] For Proclus this work is a kind of celebration of the Gods – of those beings about whom he says: "οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἱλεώ τε καὶ εὐμενεῖς ἐλθόντες, ἄγοιεν τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν νοῦν καὶ περιάγοιεν <εἰς> τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἑστίαν καὶ τὸ ἄναντες τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης. Οὗ δὴ γενόμενοι σύμπασαν τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν ὑποδεξόμεθα, καὶ τέλος τὸ ἄριστον ἕξομεν τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν ὠδῖνος ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τὰ θεῖα, γνῶναί τι περὶ τούτων ποθοῦντες καὶ παρ' ἄλλων πυνθανόμενοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς εἰς δύναμιν βασανίζοντες."[10] And it is more especially a celebration of the "One", of the principle from which all comes and to which all returns, of the ineffable, unspeakable principle of all, about which Proclus says in a most sublime and beautiful passage: "Ἄγε δὴ οὖν εἴπερ ποτὲ καὶ νῦν τὰς πολυειδεῖς ἀποσκευασώμεθα γνώσεις, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ποικίλον τῆς ζωῆς ἐξορίσωμεν ἀφ' ἡμῶν, καὶ πάντων ἐν ἠραμίᾳ γενόμενοι τῷ πάντων αἰτίῳ προσίωμεν ἐγγύς· ἔστω δὲ ἡμῖν μὴ μόνον δόξης μηδὲ φαντασίας ἠρεμία, μηδὲ ἡσυχία τῶν παθῶν ἡμῶν ἐμποδιζόντων τὴν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀναγωγὸν ὁρμήν, ἀλλὰ ἥσυχος μὲν ἀήρ ἥσυχον δὲ τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο· πάντα δὲ ἀτρεμεῖ τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρρήτου μετουσίαν ἡμᾶς ἀνατεινέτω. Καὶ στάντες ἐκεῖ, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν, εἰ δή τι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὑπερδραμόντες, καὶ οἷον ἥλιον ἀνίσχοντα προσκυνήσαντες μεμυκόσι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς (οὐ γὰρ θέμις ἀντωπεῖν οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐδέν), τὸν τοίνυν τοῦ φωτὸς τῶν νοητῶν θεῶν ἥλιον ἐξ ὠκεανοῦ, φασὶν οἱ ποιηταί, προφαινόμενον ἰδόντες, καὶ αὖθις ἐκ τῆς ἐνθέου ταύτης γαλήνης

2. Dodds, *Elements of Theology*, Oxford, 1963, p. 187.
3. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Λ 1069 a 33, 1026 a.
4. *Ibid.*, 1026 a 16.
5. Proclus wants to show that the theology of Plato is one total science. For example, in considering the idea of the two names of the first principle as "one" and "good" he says: "εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ τῶν διεσπαρμένων περὶ αὐτοῦ δογμάτων ἐν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς λόγοις ἕκαστον θεωρῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τὴν μίαν ἀναγαγεῖν τῆς θεολογίας ἐπιστήμην, σκοπῶμεν, εἰ βούλει, πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ τοῦ Σωκράτους ὅσα ἐκεῖνος ἐν τῷ τῆς Πολιτείας ἕκτῳ κατὰ τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον ἐνδείκνυται, καὶ ὅπως διὰ τῆς ἀναλογίας τὴν θαυμαστὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρὸς πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰς ἀκρότητας τῶν ὅλον ἀναδιδάσκαι." (*Théologie platonicienne*, ed. Saffrey and Westerink, Paris, 1968, [hereafter *S. & W.*], vol. 2, p. 43, ll. 17 - 25.). Again in considering the one as cause Proclus says: "σκεψώμεθα δὲ ἐφεξῆς καὶ τῶν δογμάτων ἕκαστον καὶ ταῖς περὶ τῆς αἰτίας ἐννοίαις ἐφαρμόσωμεν, ἵνα κἀκ τούτων τὸν τῆς ὅλης θεολογίας σκοπὸν τῷ λογισμῷ περιλάβωμεν." (*S. & W.*, vol. 2, p. 51, ll. 9-12.).

6. *S. & W.*, vol. 1, p. 5, l. 17.
7. *S. & W.*, vol. 1, p. 6, l. 2.
8. *S. & W.*, vol. 1, p. 6, l. 3.
9. *S. & W.*, vol. 1, p. 6, ll. 3-6.
10. *S. & W.*, vol. 1, p. 8, ll. 7-15.

εἰς νοῦν καταβάντες καὶ ἀπὸ νοῦ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς χρώμενοι λογισμοῖς εἴπωμεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὧν ἐξῃρημένον ἐν τῇ πορείᾳ ταύτῃ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν τεθείμεθα. Καὶ οἷον ὑμνήσωμεν αὐτὸν, οὐχ ὅτι γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν ὑπέστησε λέγοντες οὐδ' αὖ ὅτι ψυχὰς καὶ ζῴων ἁπάντων γενέσεις· καὶ ταῦτα μὲν γάρ ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐσχάτοις· πρὸ δὲ τούτων ὡς πᾶν μὲν τὸ νοητὸν τῶν θεῶν γένος, πᾶν δὲ τὸ νοερὸν ἐξέφηνε, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ θεοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ ὡς θεός ἐστι θεῶν ἁπάντων, καὶ ὡς ἑνὰς ἑνάδων, καὶ ὡς τῶν ἀδύτων ἐπέκεινα τῶν πρώτων, καὶ ὡς πάσης σιγῆς ἀρρητότερον, καὶ ὡς πάσης ὑπάρξεως ἀγνωστότερον, ἅγιος ἐν ἁγίοις τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐναποκεκρυμμένος θεοῖς.

Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν εἰς λογισμοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς νοερᾶς ὑμνῳδίας καταβάντες καὶ τὴν ἀνέλεγκτον προβαλόντες τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐπιστήμην, θεωρήσωμεν ἑπόμενοι τῇ θέᾳ τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων ὅπως ἐξῄρηται τῶν ὅλων ὁ πρώτιστος θεός, καὶ μέχρι ταύτης ἡ κάθοδος ἔστω· καὶ γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα διαβάλλειν [μήποτε διαβαίνειν] καὶ αὖθις δυνατόν· δόξα δὲ αὖ καὶ φαντασία, καὶ αἴσθησις ἐκλύουσι μὲν ἡμῶν τὴν τῶν θεῶν παρουσίαν, καθέλκουσι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν Ὀλυμπίων ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ τὰ γηγενῆ κινήματα, καὶ διαιροῦσι Τιτανικῶς τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦν, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις ἱδρύσεως ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ὄντων εἴδωλα κατασπῶσι."[11] It can be seen that Proclus' idea of celebration in the fullest sense is not that of sensible ritual but of "dialectic" and "contemplation." The *Platonic Theology* is such a work and, prolix as it is, we shall see that in structure it is throughout a philosophical work.

By inference one might wish to regard the *Elements of Theology* as simply "elementary" in the sense of a kind of beginners' manual by a beginner. In an historical and philological sense some commentators have attempted to argue this view.[12] The contention is based mainly on an attempt to date the work early – as early as possible. Because, however, the *Elements of Theology* does not contain any cross references, it is not possible to date it by finding works which it refers to as presumably earlier and then

11. *S. & W.*, p. 64, l. 11 – p. 65, l. 26.
12. See Dodds, *Elements of Theology*, Oxford, 1963, pp. xiv-xviii.

regarding those it does not refer to as later. What internal evidence there is indicates that it is earlier than the Platonic Theology, as two sets of gods – namely θεοὶ νοητοὶ καὶ νοεροί and ὑπερκόσμιοι καὶ ἐγκόσμιοι – found in the *Platonic Theology* do not occur in the *Elements of Theology*.[13] The *Platonic Theology* is regarded generally as a later work by Proclus, possibly his last, as it refers to his great commentaries on the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus*. This cannot, however, be regarded as absolute proof, because the commentaries were apparently continually added to and can, therefore, be given no firm date for their completion. Rosán, in his book on Proclus, comments on the uncertain question of the dating of Proclus' works in general and of the *Platonic Theology* and the *Elements of Theology* in particular to the effect that philosophically nothing substantial can be gained in the enterprize: "Some attempts have been made to arrange the works of Proclus in their chronological order. For instance, it is generally agreed that the *Elements of Physics* represents a very early exercise while Proclus was still studying Aristotle with Syrianus, and before he had come to Plato. The *Commentary on the Timaeus* is distinctly stated by Marinus to have been written before the age of twenty-eight. Others feel that the *Elements of Theology* is also an early work, whereas the *Platonic Theology* is one of the last. But it is known that Proclus re-edited his writings after they were written and added crossreferences, so that it is unsafe to assume that one book is prior to another merely because it is mentioned in the second. Furthermore, although Proclus obviously had a chronology, it does not follow that he necessarily had a change of thought. On the contrary, the *Elements of Theology* and the *Platonic Theology* which are supposed to have been written in the youth and old age of his life respectively, are in no basic disagreement or conflict, although the latter may be considerably more detailed. Therefore, the chronology of Proclus' works is not only based on uncertain grounds, but is also of no vital importance for understanding his thought."[14]

13. See below, pp. 100 - 105.
14. L. J. Rosán, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

Philosophically, the question of how far the *Elements of Theology* is a "junior" work depends on the totality of its teaching both in relation to its form and its content. That it is systematic can hardly be denied. That it is complete depends on two criteria: one – how completely and how fully developed are the philosophical principles of the work; and two – how fully integrated with those principles are the ontological manifestations and how completely developed are those manifestations. These criteria would apply, of course, to the *Platonic Theology* as well as the *Elements of Theology* and can be considered only on the basis of a structural analysis of the two works.

The structure of the *Elements of Theology* appears at first sight to be quite straightforward. The 211 propositions begin with the One and descend to the soul as embodied. Hypostatically, the order of the work is the One, henads, intellects, and souls. But this hypostatical order would gloss over propositions 7-112. These 105 propositions are of the nature of a logical development of the principles which make possible the transition from the One to the Many. They are in other words the logical propositions which are ontologically manifest in the entities or substances of the cosmos. These propositions, their structure, order, and systematic development and interrelations have already been considered in the main body of zhis study.

The structure of the *Platonic Theology* is somewhat different from that of the *Elements of Theology*. In the *Platonic Theology*, Proclus has consciously endeavoured to expound systematically the theology of Plato. For Proclus this theology is to be found autochthonously in the *Parmenides* of Plato. In the first book of the *Platonic Theology* Proclus develops his views on the nature of the *Parmenides* dialogue. He regards the dialogue as a triumph over eclecticism, as the systematic instrument by which the nature of the One and Being can be known and by which all the other works of Plato can be seen to be in perfect and sublime harmony. For Proclus, the *Parmenides* is that dialogue in which all the axioms and all the gods of theology are perfectly and connectedly set forth: "Καὶ πάντα, ὡς συνελόντι φάναι, τὰ τῆς θεολογικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀξιώματα τελέως ἐνταῦθα καταφαίνεται καὶ τῶν

θείων οἱ διάκοσμοι πάντες συνεχῶς ὑφιστάμενοι δείκνυνται·..."[15] In chapters VI-XIII in Book I of the *Platonic Theology*, Proclus considers the structure and proper interpretation of the *Parmenides*. His main contention is that (a) in the first five hypotheses Parmenides supposes the One as principle and in the last four hypotheses Parmenides supposes there is no One.[16]. Within this framework, the logical relations are those of twofold negation in which negation as privative is productive and negation as affirmative is indicative of exempt causes.[17] [18] [19] This negative relation is that of the first five hypotheses which correspond respectively beginning with the first, with the One, the divine orders, souls, bodies, and matter.[20] The development of these hypotheses and their correspondences is confined in the *Platonic Theology* to the first two hypotheses.[21] Book II is a consideration of the One in

15. *S. & W.*, vol. 1, p. 31, ll. 22-25.

16. *S. & W.*, vol. 1, p. 41.

17. *S. & W.*, vol. 1, p. 57 l. 15 ff.: vol. 2, pp. 37-39. Proclus indicates in the second passage that negation could be considered as threefold if the relation of "being" and "not-being" in the *Sophist* as "other" was thought of as between privative and affirmative negation.

18. An affirmative negation would be, therefore, a double negation; that is, a double negation is an affirmation.

19. Proclus not only argues that privative negations are generative but that with regard to the One negation does not pertain at all. This is another way of negating a negation, but this time not in the same way as with what is below the One (i. e., an affirmative negation) but in the sense of making the One independent of any attributes. (See *S. & W.*, vol. 2, pp. 64-67, esp. p.66, ll. 15-17). What makes the matter complicated is that if affirmative negation is used re: a higher being – for example, "intellect is not not soul" the result is production; but if it is used re: a lower being – for example, "soul is not not intellect" the result is return. The same is true of a privative negation – for example, "intellect is not life" indicates production, but "life is not intellect" indicates return. The problem, of course, is that in a sense the meaning of the negation has as a presupposition the relation of the subjects of the negative proposition. But then these relations are supposed to be recognized through negation. Thus, the demonstration ends up as a circular one.

20. *S. & W.*, vol. 1, p. 56 ff.

21. Saffrey and Westerink have provided in their edition of the *Platonic Theology (La Théologie platonicienne*, vol. 1, Paris, 1968, pp. LX-LXXXIX)

as dependencies of the various divine orders.[24] Thus, it can be said that much the same ground is covered in the *Platonic Theology* as in the *Elements of Theology*.[25] But equally it can be pointed out that nowhere are the logical principles of the *Elements of Theology* systematically presented in the *Platonic Theology* and nowhere are the νόες and ψυχαί systematically presented in the *Platonic Theology*.

In my consideration of the logical principles of the *Elements of Theology*, I came to the conclusion that the tensions within the work between the hypostatical orders and the hypostatical prin-

9. Similitude in causation.
   S. & W., vol. 3, p. 15. – *E. T.*, prop. 30.
   Portus 347 – *E. T.*, prop. 29, 32.
10. Relation of being, life, and thought.
   S. & W., vol. 3, p. 22. – *E. T.*, props. 103, 60.
11. Limit and unlimit re: being.
   S. & W., vol. 3, p. 30. – *E. T.*, prop. 89.
12. Subsistence.
   Portus 253 – *E. T.*, prop. 65.
   Portus 329, 330 – *E. T.*, prop. 65.
13. Cause as everywhere and nowhere.
   Portus 335 – *E. T.*, prop. 98.
14. Whole and Parts.
   Portus 362-363 – *E. T.*, props. 67, 68, 69.

24. See *S. & W.*, vol. 1, p. 118, l. 4 ff.; and Portus, Book VI, chapter II.

25. Proclus himself would probably argue that the two works cover the ground in much the same way as he contends in the *Platonic Theology* that in following the *Parmenides* he follows a geometric system and order: "Ἔτι τοίνυν κἀκ τοῦ τρόπου τῶν ἀποδείξεων τὸ αὐτὸ καταδησώμεθα. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα τῶν συμπερασμάτων δι' ἐλαχίστων ὡς οἷόν τε καὶ ἁπλουστάτων καὶ γνωριμωτάτων καὶ οἷον κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν εὐθὺς κατάδηλα γίνεται, τὰ δὲ τούτων ἐφεξῆς διὰ πλειόνων καὶ ποικιλωτέρων, τὰ δὲ ἔσχατα παντελῶς ἐστι συνθετώτατα· χρῆται γὰρ ἀεὶ τοῖς πρώτοις συμπεράσμασιν εἰς τὰς τῶν ἐχομένων ἀποδείξεις καὶ τῆς ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ τάξεως ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι παράδειγμα προτείνει νοερὸν τὴν τῶν συμπερασμάτων τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα συνάρτησιν." *S & W.*, vol 1, pp. 45, l. 19-4b, l. 2). This assertaion would enable Proclus to argue that the geometrical structure of the *Elements of Theology* was in point of form a mirroing of the argument of the *Parmenides*.

ciples, primarily those of ὄν, ζωή, and νοῦς, made it impossible to reconcile the logical presuppositions of the quantitative relation of one and many with the hypostatical entities of the work. This contention is brought out even more forcibly in the Platonic Theology, and a consideration of it in relation to the *Platonic Theology* will, I think, be a further demonstration of the contention itself and will show how the teaching of the *Elements of Theology* and *Platonic Theology* is only one teaching.

In the *Platonic Theology*, Proclus makes much of the idea that negation (ἀπόφασις) is the mode of procession while that of analogy (ἀναλογία) is the mode of return: "καὶ ἡ μὲν πρόοδος τῶν πάντων τὴν διὰ τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἡμῖν ἐξέφηνεν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἄνοδον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστροφὴ τὴν διὰ τῶν ἀναλογιῶν."[26] In the *Elements of Theology* the concepts of procession and return (πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή) play as important a part as in the *Platonic Theology*, but throughout the work ἀπόφασις is not used.[27] The term is not to be found in the *Elements of Theology*[28]. On the other hand, the term ἀναλογία is used in the *Elements of Theology* to describe the mode of participation of lower and higher orders.[29] Further, ἀναλογία is used by Proclus in the *Platonic Theology* in conjunction with the idea "ὁμοιότης" or similitude. It is the similitude of the mode of analogy that makes up the basis of conversion or return. Now in the *Elements of Theology* ὁμοιότης is used for both procession[30] and return.[31] Because Proclus does not fully develop the concept of negation in the *Elements of Theology* the necessi-

26. *S. & W.*, vol. 2, p. 38, ll. 10 - 12; see *ibid.*, p. 66, ll. 15 - 17.

27. The lack of a specific consideration of negation would lead one to suspect that both the *Parm. Comm.* and the *Platonic Theology* succeeded the *Elements of Theology*. Or it could be argued that negation could only be considered in relation to the *Parmenides* itself. But this is not altogether true as negation can be seen as the basis for posting mean terms (see above notes 18 & 19 and succeeding argument below).

28. See Greek index to Dodds' edition of the *Elements of Theology*, Oxford, 1963, p. 325.

29. *E. T.*, props. 108, 110.

30. *E. T.*, prop. 28, 29.

31. *E. T.*, prop. 32.

ty of triplicity throughout the cosmos is less explicitly argued for and is less explicitly shown in the hypostases themselves. Certainly in the *Elements of Theology* there is a developed doctrine of mean terms and a teaching which depends on the triadicity of μονή, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή and τὸ ἀμέθεκτον, τὸ μετεχόμενον, τὸ μετέχον, but the actual concept of "τριάς" is not found in the work. But in the *Platonic Theology* Proclus, just when he is explaining the totality of negation, says: "Αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποφάσεις τριπλῆν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἰδιότητα προτείνουσι· καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἀρχοειδέστεραι τῶν καταφάσεων οὖσαι, γεννητικαὶ καὶ τελειωτικαὶ τῆς ἀπογεννήσεως αὐτῶν ὑφεστήκασι· ποτὲ δὲ τὴν σύστοιχον ταῖς καταφάσεσιν ἐκληρώσαντο τάξιν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἡ κατάφασις τῆς ἀποφάσεως σεμνοτέρα· ποτὲ δὲ αὖ καταδεεστέραν ἔλαχον φύσιν τῶν καταφάσεων καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ στερήσεις εἰσὶν ἐκείνων."[32] Proclus goes on in considering the supremacy of the One as cause to state:[33] "Καὶ τὸ ἄγνωστον ἄρα τοῦ πρώτου διὰ τῶν προϊόντων ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιστρεφομένων πρὸς αὐτὸ γινώσκειν ἐπιβαλλόμεθα, καὶ τὸ ἄρρητον διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάζειν ἐπιχειροῦμεν. Οὔτε δὲ γνωστὸν ἐκεῖνο τοῖς οὖσιν οὔτε ῥητὸν οὐδενὶ τῶν πάντων, ἀλλὰ πάσης γνώσεως ἐξῃρημένον, καὶ παντὸς λόγου, καὶ ἄληπτον ὑπάρχον, ἀπάσας τε τὰς γνώσεις <καὶ> ἅπαντα τὰ γνωστά καὶ λόγους πάντας καὶ ὁπόσα λόγῳ περιληπτά κατὰ μίαν αἰτίαν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ παρήγαγε. Τὸ δὲ ἑνιαῖον ἐκείνου, καὶ τὸ πάσης διαιρέσεως ἐκβεβηκὸς δυαδικῶς ἐν τοῖς μετ' ἐκεῖνο προφαίνεται, μᾶλλον δὲ τριαδικῶς. Πάντα γὰρ καὶ μένει καὶ πρόεισιν καὶ ἐπιστρέφεται πρὸς τὸ ἕν·..." Proclus follows this idea of triadicity faithfully throughout the *Platonic Theology*. Because he does, we find two orders of Gods which are not in the *Elements of Theology*; namely the θεοὶ νοητοὶ καὶ νοεροί[34] and the θεοὶ ὑπερκόσμιοι καὶ ἐγκόσμιοι.[35] In the *Elements of Theology* the former should occur between proposition 162 and proposition 163, while the latter should occur between proposition 164 and proposition 165. But in the *Elements of Theology* they are left out.

32. *S. & W.*, vol. 2, p. 38, ll. 18-25; see above notes 18 & 19.
33. *S. & W.*, vol. 2, p. 41, ll. 9-21.
34. See above note 21 and Book IV of the *Platonic Theology*.
35. See above note 21 and Book VI of the *Platonic Theology*, especially Portus pp. 386-7 and pp. 402-3.

Now the point at issue in the *Elements of Theology* from the standpoint of tension was the relation between the One, henads, intelligences, souls, and bodies (prop. 20) and the triad ὄν, ζωή, νοῦς (prop. 103).[36] It would appear on the surface that as the principle of intelligence (νοῦς) should correspond to the νοῦς of the triad so the principle of soul (ψυχή) should correspond to the ζωή of the triad. This would leave ὄν to correspond with the henads. It is precisely at this point that a tension arises. On the one hand νοῦς is thought to be prior to ψυχή *vis à vis* the hypostases. On the other hand ζωή, the principle of soul, is thought to be higher than νοῦς. It is this contradiction, which appears only by implication in the following table (Table I) which is based on the correspondences implied in propositions 162-165, but which appears explicitly in the next table (Table II), which is based on the *Platonic Theology*.

36. See above Chapter V, "Linear and Circular Tension in the Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική" pp. 73-79.

TABLE I.[37]



Now what is clearly missing from this schema is ζωή. But in the *Platonic Theology* we have the order of henads which would supply the deficiency — the θεοὶ νοητοὶ καὶ νοεροί.[38] A further problem would arise in trying to find what unparticipated term the θεοὶ ὑπερκόσμιοι καὶ ἐγκόσμιοι would have as a correspondence as it would necessitate a term between soul and body. Thus a table of fuller development would be as follows:

37. Table I is taken from Dodds' commentary to his edition of the *Elements of Theology*, Oxford, 1963, p. 282.

38. For a consideration of the triad ὄν, ζωή, νοῦς in the *Platonic Theology* which argues the same logic as in the *Elements of Theology* Prop. 103, see especially *S. & W.*, vol. 3, pp. 14-28.

TABLE II.



What the above Table (Table II) indicates is that the teaching of the *Platonic Theology* as compared with the *Elements of Theology* is, as regards the hypostases and the triad ὄν, ζωή, νοῦς, a fuller discussion. This is because the *Platonic Theology* is really, I think, a work on the henads. As such it fully considers all the various gods in their full multiplicity. On the other hand, the *Elements of Theology* is neither confined specifically to the *Parmenides* nor to the henads. As such it has a wider and freer compass. This is borne out, I think, by the way in which Proclus develops the logic of his philosophy in propositions 7-112 – the same logic which underlies the henadic argument of the *Platonic Theology* (Books III-VI) and the relation of the One to the Good (Book II). He is not confined to simply a *Parmenidean* exegesis and so he can more transparently introduce Aristotelian[39] concepts – for example, the unmoved

39. I think it is most interesting to compare the triplicity of the Procline logic in which there is always a mean term between two extremes, one of which is more universal and one of which is less universal than the mean, with Aristotle's first figure syllogism in the *Prior Analytics*. Aristotle's definition in that work of the First Figure Syllogism very exactly corresponds to the Procline triplicity: "Ὅταν οὖν ὅροι τρεῖς οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥστε τὸν ἔσχατον ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τὸν μέσον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πρώτῳ ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἄκρων εἶναι συλλογισμὸν τέλειον." (*Prior Anal.* I,3,25b 32-35). It is also, of course, possible to trace the idea of a mean to Plato's definition of whole in the *Parmenides:* "Τὸ ἕν ἄρα ὂν ἕν τέ ἐστί που καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει. — Φαίνεται. — Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ, ἐπείπερ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον; — Ἀνάγκη. — Τί δέ; εἰ ὅλον, οὐ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; ἢ οἷόν τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων; κἄν τοῦ ἓν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι ὅλον εἶναι; — Οὐκ ἐθελήσει." (*Parm.* 145 a 2-10); and to that of the mean in his *Timaeus*: "δύο δὲ μόνω καλῶς συνίστασθαι τρίτου χωρὶς οὐ δυνατόν· δεσμὸν γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ δεῖ τινα ἀμφοῖν συναγωγὸν γίγνεσθαι. δεσμῶν δὲ κάλλιστος ὃς ἂν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ συνδούμενα ὅτι μάλιστα ἓν ποιῇ, τοῦτο δὲ πέφυκεν ἀναλογία κάλλιστα ἀποτελεῖν. ὁπόταν γὰρ ἀριθμῶν τριῶν εἴτε ὄγκων εἴτε δυνάμεων ὠντινωνοῦν ᾖ τὸ μέσον, ὅτιπερ τὸ πρῶτον πρὸς αὐτό, τοῦτο αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον, καὶ πάλιν αὖθις, ὅτι τὸ ἔσχατον πρὸς τὸ μέσον, τὸ μέσον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον, τότε τὸ μέσον μὲν πρῶτον καὶ ἔσχατον γιγνόμενον, τὸ δ' ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αὖ μέσα ἀμφότερα, πάνθ' οὕτως ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι συμβήσεται, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ γενόμενα ἀλλήλοις ἓν πάντα ἔσται." (*Tim.* 31 b 8 c 7). Nevertheless, it is interesting that those philosophers who were most interested in reconciling the Greek religion and philosophy – namely, Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus – should have done so by a series of first figure syllogisms.

mover in proposition 14 and the language of actuality (ἐνέργεια) and potentiality (δύναμις) in proposition 77. In the *Platonic Theology* such language is confined more purely to the δημιουργός of the Timaeus or Zeus in the intellectual triad of Gods.[40]

In summary then, it seems to me that the *Platonic Theology* and the *Elements of Theology* are complementary to one another. The *Elements of Theology* works out most fully the principles of the cosmos, while the *Platonic Theology* works out their elaboration in the fullest way.[41] Together they give a complete exposition of the Procline philosophy. In fact, it should be said, in my opinion, that together they are the Procline philosophy.

40. See especially in the *Platonic Theology:* Book V, Chapters XVI, XVII, and XVIII.

41. As has been noted the *Platonic Theology* does not as does the *Elements of Theology* deal with the νόες and ψυχαί so explicitly, but in developing the henadic orders it provides a complete παράδειγμα that is not so fully found in the *Elements of Theology*. See above Tables I and II, pp. 102 and 103.

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ABBREVIATIONS

E.T. – Elements of Theology, ed. E.R. Dodds, Oxford 1963.

JHS – Journal of Hellenic Studies, London.

PhR – Philosophische Rundschau, Tübingen.

RE – Real-encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. Pauly–Wissowa, Stuttgart.

RPhL – Revue philosophique, Louvain.

RSPhT – Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques, Paris.

SBH – Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Heidelberg.

S&W – Théologie platonicienne, ed. Saffrey and Westerink, Paris 1968–.

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