

Axel Honneth

YFIA300
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1) Elämä ja tuotanto

- s.1949, opiskeli sosiologiaa ja filosofiaa, Habermasin oppilas, ennen Habermasin ”kommunikatiivisen toiminnan teoriaa”, jota Honneth ei kannata. Kehittää varhaisen Habermasin intersubjektivismia eri suuntaan.
- Frankfurtin koulun sosiaalitutkimusinstituutin nykyinen johtaja; ”kolmannen sukupolven” edustaja (1. Adorno, Horkheimer et al; 2. Habermas), professori Goethe-yliopistossa ja Columbian yliopistossa (New York)
- Kriittisen teorian keskeisenä huolena yhteiskunnan (ml. talous) tuottamat keinotekoiset esteet *emansipaatiolle, hyvälle elämälle; ”sosiaaliset patologiat”*. Käsitteellistykset eroavat eri edustajilla, mutta oleellista teorian omien sosiaalisten ehtojen tiedostaminen.
- Honneth mm. vastustaa Habermasin systeemitteoreettista näkemystä systeemeistä, formalistista moraaliteoriaa ja kommunikatiivisen, kielellisen tason ylikorostusta kokevien, tuntevien, kehollisten, kärsivien toimijoiden kustannuksella. Kuitenkin, intersubjektivistien suhteiden tärkeys varhaiselta Habermasilta.
- Esitelmöi JY:ssä 2001 (”Recognition: A Clue for Social Theory”)

- Pääteos *Kampf um Anerkennung* (1992, engl. *Struggle for Recognition*, 1995). „Taistelu tunnustuksesta“
- Toinen oma, isompi systemaattinen monografia (täydempi yhteiskuntateoria): *Das Recht der Freiheit - Grundriß einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit*, 2011, Suhrkamp.
 - Englanninkielinen maistainen: http://www.suhrkamp.de/fr_buecher/the_right_to_freedom-axel_honneth_58562.pdf
 - Sisällys:
- Lukuisia artikkelikokoelmia, toimitettuja teoksia ja luentosarjoihin perustuvia pienempiä kirjoja (esim. „Reification“ ja „The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel's Social Theory“).
- Deranty (2009) ensimmäinen kokonaistulkinta.
 - Honneth Marxin, Adornon & Horkheimerin, Habermasin *jne.* immanenttina kriitikkona (”risteyskohdat”), Deranty vastaavasti Honnethin sisäinen kriitikko, korostaen, että persoonien välisiä suhteita tulee täydentää luontosuhteilla (kuten Honneth joissain teksteissään tekee)

2. Oikeus vapauteen

– demoraattisen eetoksen pääpiirteet

- *Das Recht der Freiheit. Grundriss einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit.* Suhrkamp 2011.
- Kirjan ensimmäinen osa: kolme vapauskäsitystä (negatiivinen, reflektiivinen, sosiaalinen).
 - Abstrakti negaatio vs ”Aufhebung”
- Toinen osa: vapauden mahdollisuus:
 - legaaliset oikeudet (vrt. negatiivinen vapaus) ja moraaliset oikeudet (vrt. reflektiivinen vapaus)
- Kolmas osa: vapauden todellistuminen instituutioissa (vrt. sosiaalinen vapaus)

The Right to Freedom – Outline of a democratic morality

- “The theory of justice is one of the most intensively reflected fields in contemporary philosophy. Most theories of justice, however, have only reached their high level of argumentation at the cost of a large deficit: with their fixation on purely normative, abstract principles, they stray significantly from the sphere that is in fact their field of application – social reality.
- Axel Honneth takes up a new route and extracts today’s significant criteria of social justice from the normative requirements that have evolved from within western, liberal-democratic societies. Together, these constitute what he calls »democratic morality«: a system that is not only anchored in the law but also in institutionally established norms of action that possess a moral legitimacy.
- To account for this wide-ranging undertaking, Honneth first establishes that all crucial spheres of action in western societies share one characteristic: In each case, they require the realization of a particular aspect of individual freedom.
- In the spirit of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* and under the auspices of recognition theory, the central chapter illustrates how in specific social areas – personal relationships, market-induced economic activity and in the public forum of politics – the principles of individual freedom are generated that form the guiding principles of justice. The aim of this book is highly ambitious: to re-establish the theory of justice as social analysis.”

- “The concrete task of legitimating a concept of justice in relation to individual freedom may seem clear, but it is actually as unclear and as ambiguous as the modern concept of freedom itself.
- Modern philosophy as well as contemporary social practice takes into its purview not simply one single concept of freedom, but at least three competing concepts, which can serve respectively as the normative basis of our conceptions of justice.
- Thus, justice in modernity is conceived by way of developing a negative, a reflective and a social concept of freedom.”(Honneth 2009, 172)
 - [Honneth, Axel \(2009\)](#): Justice as Institutionalized Freedom. A Hegelian Perspective, in: Asger Sorensen, Morten Raffnsøe-Møller, Arne Grøn (Hg.), *Dialectics, Self-consciousness, and Recognition. The Hegelian Legacy*, Malmö: NSU Press 2009, S.171-200.
<http://www.bioeticanet.info/filosofia/08-honnethJust.pdf>
 - Vrt. Neuhauser: Hegel's social theory

- Negative freedom (cf. Hegel: personal freedom)
 - Vapaus tehdä mitä huvittaa, valita itse ilman rajoituksia, ei sisällöllisiä erotteluja. ”Halut”, egoismi.
- Reflective freedom (cf. Hegel: moral freedom)
 - Vapaus halujenkin orjuudesta. Vapaus harkita mikä on tärkeää, omantunnonvapaus, mielipiteenvapaus. ”Tahto” – subjektin mielestä toissijaisten asioiden ulkoinen rajoittaminen ei ole vapauden loukkaamista. Kooperaatio & sen hedelmät.
 - “there arises three *substantive models of reflective freedom* with Rousseau, Kant and Herder: respectively, an authenticity-based, an autonomy-based, and a self-actualization oriented concept of freedom.” (p.173).
 - “In as much as the concept of autonomy is foundational ..., a concept of justice must be devised that is largely procedural and distributive.”(p.173); Mill – individualistic self-realization; Tocqueville – self-realization as a collective enterprise, including solidarity;

- Social freedom (cf. Hegel: social freedom)
 - Vapaus on *instituutioiden* piirre: “we no longer see a given particular institution of social reality as a supplement, but instead as a medium and the condition of the realization of freedom.” (175). “It is not until institutions of these kinds are given in social reality that the individual in its framework can realize the kind of voluntary determination that is mandatory for reflective freedom.” (176)
 - “While the idea of negative freedom, to use our terminology, must founder on the fact that the ‘content’ of the action cannot itself be conceived as ,free’, the idea of reflective freedom is deficient because it opposes action, the substantive content of which is now free in as much as thought is self-determined, to an objective reality, which is in turn to be conceived as still completely heteronymous to freedom.” (176-7) “also the external social reality should be arranged in such a way that it should be free from all heteronomy and every constraint.” (177)
 - Sosiaaliset instituutiot kahden muun vapauden ehto tai edellytys, mutta sosiaalisen vapauden osa tai konstituentti tai olemisentapa.
 - Hegel “observes, in the addition to § 7 of his ,Philosophy of Right,’ that ,friendship’ and ,love’ give us an example of freedom in the exterior sphere of the social: „Here one is not onesidedly in oneself, but instead one limits oneself only too gladly in relation to another, knowing oneself even in this limitation as oneself”.(177) “From the very beginning, the key to Hegel’s idea of freedom has been the category of ,mutual recognition” (178)

- Institutions: love and family, modern economy, state
- “When the individuals now grow up in institutions in which normative practices of reciprocity have been enacted for some time, they will then learn in the course their ,education’ how to limit themselves in their conduct to those wishes and intentions which can be satisfied only through the complementary actions of others”(184) “individuals only really experience and realize freedom if they participate in social institutions that are formed by mutual recognition relationships.”(185)
- “Marx during his lifetime never gave up this specific conception of social freedom; he always believed that the reflective freedom of individuals is effective there where its own, productive self-actualization is created in being supplemented through the self-actualization of others.”(186)
- “While Hegel wanted to create a conceptually expanded and deepened basis for liberalism by highlighting the latter’s need for freedom preserving institutions, Marx has in mind a critique of the mode of socialisation in capitalist society in general”(186)

- Hegel’s Method: “We could just as well call such a method, on the lookout for an agreement between concept and historical reality, a process of „normative reconstruction“.
- “The number of institutions that Hegel must thereby distinguish, are to be determined strictly by the number of goals that he believes individuals can be subordinated to as universalized goals in modernity“ (191)
- “a fictional social contract or the popular will of a democracy. Hegel thinks such suggested constructions always fail in consequence of the fact that they assign freedom to subjects as co-workers on these processes which can’t be earned without participation in institutions that are already just”. (191).

- “Through the acknowledgement of ‚abstract rights‘, the subjects should have the possibility, to make use of their negative freedom under precarious circumstances. But through the recognition of their morality they should, on the other hand, have been in the situation, to be able to hold their reflectively gained opinions against the ruling order. But Hegel only allows both freedoms to a point, insofar as authentic freedom doesn’t endanger the institutional structure of social freedom.”(193)
- “First one needs to design the frame of the institutions of recognition, in which the subjects can achieve social freedom, before they can be, in a second step, endowed with the roles of taking as sketched out in the social order. Perhaps we can say summarily that recognition in institutions precedes the freedom of individual persons and the freedom of discursively related deliberations.”(194)
- “On the other hand, Hegel also does not want to let the distance to the actual beliefs of historically situated subjects become too great, for he doesn’t merely understand his presentation of the ethical order as a „construction“, but as a „reconstruction;“ not as the projection of an ideal, but as the faithful sketch of already given historically factual relationships.”(194)
- “As long as the subjects in their actions actively maintain and reproduce freedom-protecting institutions, this counts as a theoretical proof of their historical value.”(194)

- "If we understand this kind of social freedom as the core of all our ideas of freedom, against which the other ideas we've discussed only hold derivatively, then we have to further infer a revision of our orthodox justice conceptions. What we call "just" in modern societies must no longer be simply measured in terms of the power of all members of society over negative or reflective freedoms, but instead must satisfy those measures processually, securing the possibilities of these subjects being able to participate in institutions of recognition. Therefore at the heart of the idea of social justice there migrates particular, normatively substantive and thus ethically designated institutions of legal security, of state protection and civil society."(196)
- "The interpretative schemata provided by the ideas of negative and reflective freedom, must be applied to the ethical institutions in the sense that they create the appropriate protocol to prove its legitimacy."(197) "If, that is, individual objection and institutional reality as such are to be thought of as interdependent in the sense that the ethical institutions primarily make possible an individual autonomy, whose activation leads once more to a revision of these institutions. This spiral movement precludes a point of stability such as would obtain in a well-structured system of ethical institutions."(197) "As we have remarked, it isn't clear whether Hegel saw his own concept of justice embedded in such processual theory."(197) "the tendency to maintain that the process of the realization of freedom with the institutionalized ethical life of modernity has achieved closure."(197) "For Hegel, the institutions of the bourgeois nuclear family, the corporatively monopolized markets and the state seemed to indicate the end of the moral history of mankind. But we, who have sought to go through Hegel's project almost two hundred years after it was written, are naturally better informed."(198)
- "We require a historical-sociological anatomy of the classes of normative practices, in which today's subjects can so mutually satisfy their ends that, in the experience of this commonality, they can realize their individual freedom."(198)

- Kirjan toinen osa koskee vapauden mahdollisuutta, "possibility of freedom":
- Oikeudellinen vapaus, oikeudet, laki
 - (perusta, rajat ja patologiat)
- Moraalinen vapaus, kunnioitukseen ja oikeuttamiseen liittyvät käytännöt
 - (perusta, rajat ja patologiat)
- Kirjan kolmas osa koskee vapauden todellistumista instituutioissa, joissa suhteet toisiinsa ovat konstitutiivisia. (s.224).

- "Me" henkilökohtaisissa suhteissa:
 - ystävyys, intiimisuhteet, perheet
- "Me" markkinatalouden suhteissa:
 - kulutus (& vaihto?), työ
- "Me" demokraattisessa tahdonmuodostuksessa:
 - demokraattinen julkisuus, demokraattinen oikeusvaltio, poliittinen kulttuuri – katsaus.