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The gestures which we sometimes call empty are perhaps in fact the fullest things of all.

(Erving Goffman, 1967)

ABSTRACT

I argue in this chapter that emotional demeanor (especially in facial expression) is often a crucial way we show moral regard for others. I explore the extent to which such expression is subject to control and consider the problem of insincerity in posing facial expressions. For a robust discussion of these issues, I turn to Seneca’s De Beneficiis (On Doing Kindnesses). Seneca’s concerns in this work overlap in significant ways with those of Erving Goffman in his classic account of deference rituals.

INTRODUCTION

When we think about moral character we sometimes focus on faces and bodies. In particular, we think about emotional attitude and how it is conveyed in physical and facial comportment. So we talk about “a look of concern,” “a compassionate embrace,” “a reassuring smile,” “an empathetic tone of voice.” What is salient is emotional demeanor, or, to adapt a Kantian phrase, the “emotional aesthetic” of virtue (Kant, 1964, 405).

An ancestor of this paper was presented at a conference on moral cultivation at Santa Clara University (March 2001), at Trinity College, Dublin (April 2001), and at the Royal Institute of Philosophy (July 2001). I am grateful to these audiences for helpful discussion, as well as to my emotions seminar students (Spring 2001) at Georgetown. I also would like to thank Elisa Hurley for her help with the final draft of this essay, and to Alisa Carse and Maggie Little for ongoing discussion of these issues.
emotional “aesthetic” of virtue is meant to keep emotion at arm’s length from morality, construed more narrowly in terms of willed action.1 The emotional quality of action, its manner and tone, becomes something of optional trim, “a garment that dresses virtue to advantage,” as he puts it, not itself substantive to morality (Kant, 1963a, p. 282).

In contrast, I take the “emotional aesthetic” of virtue (or character) to be substantive to character. I argue for a conception in which emotional expression is crucial to the way in which we exhibit and appraise moral character. The view is roughly Aristotelian. Indeed, a familiar theme in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1992) is that virtuous states of character are expressed in terms of both appropriate action and appropriate emotions. To hit the mean is to get it right with respect to both:

For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both the mean and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the mean. Now virtue is concerned with emotions and actions, in which . . . the mean is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. (Aristotle, 1992, 1106b18–24; cf.1104b13–14, 110618ff., 1108a30ff.)

So, for example, showing anger or indignation on a particular occasion may be morally requisite for expressing a sense of justice. Moreover, to express the sentiment correctly requires both a moral sensitivity to the particular requirements of the occasion and a capacity to modulate one’s emotional experience and expression in a way that meets those requirements. One misses the mark if anger is somehow displaced onto the wrong object, or is inappropriately excessive or timid, or is motivated by a hot temper rather than an appreciation of the injustice at hand. So, for example, one’s moral response is inappropriate if, in expressing outrage to a friend who has been unjustly victimized, one explodes in a way that exacerbates the friend’s fear rather than shows solidarity. To express appropriate emotions, Aristotle holds, is integral to the moral response. It is constitutive of whether or not one acts morally well.

In this broadly Aristotelian spirit, I explore in this chapter the general relation of emotional expression (and in particular, the facial expression of emotion) to character. I proceed as follows. In section 2, I argue against the view that emotions are primarily modes of passivity by appealing to research on affect regulation and emotional development. In section 3, I consider psychological and sociological literature on the facial expression of emotion and the role of such expression in showing due regard toward others. To illustrate the claim further, I turn in section 4 to an oft-neglected ancient text, Seneca’s De Beneficiis (On Doing Kindnesses). A key theme in this work is the role of emotional demeanor in small, everyday kindnesses. The text is of special interest, insofar as Seneca, as a Roman Stoic, is not an author whom we would expect, ex ante, to be promoting the place of emotional expression in morality. That he does so may suggest something of the indispensability of emotions in moral responsiveness. In section 5, I conclude with an overview of my claims in the chapter.

EMOTION, REGULATION, AND MORAL ASSESSMENT

A broad implication of the Aristotelian view is that we have some control over our emotional lives, both in terms of our emotional experiences and our expression of those experiences. For if to call something “praiseworthy” implies not simply “what is recommended and exemplary” (or “what reflects well on us”) but, more strongly, “what we can be held accountable for,” then emotions and their expressions are states over which we can exercise some degree of control. Moral responsibility or accountability implies control.

The matter is complex, and a full philosophical treatment would cut across a wide swath of literature on moral responsibility for actions, character, and emotions.2 Rather than delve into that literature here, I want to offer more empirically based remarks that argue for a degree of agency and control in emotional experience. I begin with research on affect regulation and emotional development in the early stages of infancy. For even then we are not merely passive with regard to affect. So, for example, Alan Sroufe (1995) has argued that the differentiation of emotions, emerging in the second half-year, involves active attention and cognitive efforts as well as deliberate attempts on the part of the infant to manipulate her environment to bring about certain emotional effects. Even before this, the three-month-old will smile most vigorously at mobiles she can put into motion or in response to smiles she can herself elicit from a caregiver. In the reciprocal exchange of smiles, the young child is learning how to enhance and sustain her experience of pleasure. From seven to nine months, the infant continues to modulate the sources of her affects through intentional bids to parents (through vocalization, touching, and cajoling) to share in emotionally positive experiences (Sroufe, 1995, p. 74). By eight months a child can anticipate the joy she will find in a peek-a-boo game and make efforts to bring about that joy by grabbing the diaper that is hiding her mother’s eyes (Sroufe, 1995, p. 153). During the next phase (9–12 months),

1 See my Making a Necessity of Virtue (1997) for a less orthodox reading.

when strong attachment emotions are in evidence, the infant begins to regulate her separation anxiety and find ways to self-sooth the absence of more mature structures for internalizing an absent parent. Also, by the first year, the child has the skill to regulate emotion by gaze aversion and other controls involving intensification and deintensification (miniaturization) of expressive behavior. So while a ten-month-old’s crying is all or nothing, by twelve months an infant can fight to hold back tears. Pout and crying faces can appear but then evaporate (Malatesta, Culver, Tesman, & Shepard, 1989, pp. 7–8; Sroufe, 1995, pp. 107, 124–130).

The essential point is that, even in the first year, infants do not experience their emotions (or emotional precursors) in a purely passive way. Through their intentional bids with adults, infants seek to elicit, intensify, and share emotional experiences; through gaze aversion and other controls of their expressive behavior, they seek ways to tolerate and manage emotions that are distressing and frustrating. Even before one year of age, the young child is figuring out how to live the emotional life, how to be more, rather than less, an agent of emotional experience.

A conception of emotional agency emerges just as vividly in the psychoanalytic developmental literature. The pioneer in this field is Margaret Mahler (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). On Mahler’s account, the early path of emotional development moves through the successive phases of autism (marked by its inward rather than outward focus), to symbiosis (a period of discovering others and forming attachments), and separation-individuation (the beginnings of a toddler’s independence). The phases chart the “hatching out process,” or ultimate “psychological birth” of the human infant at roughly three years after biological birth. For our purposes, what is key is the cracking of the “autistic shell” during the symbiotic and subsequent separation-individuation phase.

Much has been written on the symbiotic phase (roughly 2–9 months), with its focus, as Sroufe notes, on the positive, reciprocal engagements of caregiver and infant. This is the period of intense visual dialoguing between mother and infant, of sustained facial gazing, of “mirroring” sequences in which the mother’s gleam in her eyes evokes bright and shiny eyes in the child. It is the period in which attachment and merger experiences are created, often, though not exclusively, through the eyes (Schoe, 1999, pp. 71–82). But in addition to the development of empathic synchronies crucial for the formation of attachment ties, the dialoguing of the symbiotic period marks the beginning of an education of the emotions. Infant observers point to the psychobiologically attuned mother who does not simply mirror back the child’s affective rhythms and intensities, but helps modulate them, dispensing stimulation in a way that both keeps the infant from potentially disorganizing states, and amplifies and elaborates capacities for tolerating prolonged positive stimulation (Schoe, 1999, pp. 85–91; Stern, 1974, pp. 187–213). These are periods of fine-tuning the synchrony, of regulating from the outside the child’s capacity for experiencing the precursors of emotions in ways that are not purely passive. The parent’s role, according to these theorists, is to permit the child to endure the early manifestations of the positive emotions of interest, excitement, and joy in a way that at once stretches the boundaries of tolerance without overwhelming the child (Malatesta, Culver et al., 1989, pp. 7–8; Schoe, 1999, p. 89).

But, significantly, and this is the point I wish to emphasize, the child also plays a role, even in this predominantly externally driven regulation. For it is the child’s cues of gaze attention and aversion that typically direct the well-synchronized parent’s input:

A mother’s most effective technique in maintaining an interaction seems to be a sensitivity to her infant’s capacity for attention and need for withdrawal — partial or complete — after a period of attending to her. Although there appears to be continuous attention to the mother on the part of the infant, stop-frame analysis uncovers the cyclical nature of the infant’s looking and not looking. By looking away, infants maintain some control over the amount of stimulation they take in during such intense periods of interaction. (Brazelton & Cramer, 1990; as quoted in Schoe, 1999, p. 85)

Much more can be said by way of empirical evidence for emerging, developmental structures that regulate affect. But we need to clarify
a conceptual issue at this point. Even if the developmental data point to structures that regulate affect, some of these structures will involve unconscious and involuntary mediation through cognitive and psychobiological processes, while others will mark more intentional and explicitly voluntaristic bids. So, for example, does the fact that a child at three or four years can begin to use language to verbalize feelings or imagination to hold an absent parent in mind (Mayes & Cohen, 1992) point to a kind of voluntary control over emotions?

Yes and no. Certainly in the case of the young child who is just learning how to deploy her newly emergent capacities, we have guarded hopes. Education revolves precisely around learning how to use these new skills as a part of impulse control, communication, and self-soothing. But once we reach adulthood, being able to use language and reflection to moderate and shape emotions does seem a reasonable requirement on most of us much of the time. The requirement is routinely imposed upon us in being responsible parents, spouses, and friends. And while we may not always be successful in our attempts at emotional change or growth, especially in the context of intimate relationships, we are typically held responsible for trying.

Still, there is something to the idea introduced at the beginning of this section that emotions can redound to us and be subject to weaker forms of esteem and disesteem than the language of responsibility and "praise" or "blame" suggests. So we might think positively of a woman as "bright" and "sunny," and she, in turn, might identify herself with those emotional attributes, much in the way she thinks of herself as having certain physical attributes or as having a certain ethnicity or religion or ancestral history. It is part of who she is, part of her loose sense of identity, something about which she might herself feel pride. But all the same, it is not something directly or indirectly her doing.

Do emotions and their expression "belong" to us in this sort of way? Are they states with which we identify (and others identify us with), yet which are largely accidental, outside the sphere of moral accountability?

The idea is attractive and certainly captures the vulnerability (and passivity) to which emotions can subject us. They can descend upon us unbidden and overextend their stay; vestiges of early emotional temperaments or encrusted defense structures can unconsciously frame how we process the world; bad luck and tragedy can bring on a welter of emotions that crowds out others that may be morally required. These are all-too-familiar upheavals of emotional life. Still to focus just on these moments is to underrate what we can do to cultivate our emotional lives. Indeed, that emotions can be responsive to reason is just as familiar a part of emotional living. So imagine a moment in which we catch ourselves being amused at a sexist joke. Disappointment over our own response might lead to thoughts about why the joke was not so funny, so that next time around we respond quite differently. Or again, we may find ourselves peeved at another’s remarks, but then lighten up once we realize that we have wildly overreacted. These are common enough occurrences in emotional life. They are the reflective stuff of psychotherapy, but of ordinary reflection as well. They suggest that any picture of emotions that underplays the degree to which we can effect emotional change is seriously lopsided.

**EMOTIONAL DEMEANOR**

We have talked about emotions as mental states over which we have some degree of control. But can we control the expression of emotions in terms of the looks we wear on our faces? That faces are crucial modes of emotional communication is not new. Tomkins (1962, 1982), Izard (1971), and Ekman (1982) have done pioneering work on the emotional expressiveness of the face, and numerous developmentalists have shown the crucial role of the smile (Spitz, 1965) and eye gaze (Baron-Cohen, 1999; Butterworth, 1991; Schore, 1994) in both developmentally early and mature forms of emotional responsivity.

If we hold, loosely with Aristotle, that we are morally appraised for moral action in a way that includes its manner, then the face (and perhaps, too, vocalization and body posture) becomes part of what we assess. They are part of the emotional aesthetic of character, and often part of what we might call a thick conception of moral action. Yet the face is often something over which we have little control. Our eyes can wander and our eyebrows roll, we can grimace or chuckle, blush, crack a smile or furrow our brow—all without too much consciousness. Our eyes can show fear toward our captors in a way we wish they did not.

But while faces sometimes leak inner states, they do not always do so. Indeed, some of us are fairly good at masking or "posing" facial expressions. At such times, we control emotional demeanor. So we may smile as a sign of gratitude even if we do not feel quite so kindly disposed in-side, or we may effect involvement through eye gaze even when we feel mildly bored. The sociologist Erving Goffman (1967) details these aspects of demeanor comportment as part of a more complex discussion of the ceremonial rituals involved in deference behavior. Goffman’s idea is that through demeanor (including dress and deportment, but also physical and emotional bearing) an individual creates an image of herself which may be part of showing deference or due regard. And dissembling may be part of demeanor display:

It appears that deference behavior on the whole tends to be honorific and politely toned, conveying appreciation of the recipient that is in many ways more complimentary to the recipient than the actor’s true sentiments might warrant. The author typically gives the recipient the benefit of the doubt, and may even conceal low regard by extra punctiliousness. Thus acts of deference often attest to ideal guidelines to which the actual activity between actor and recipient can now and then be referred. (Goffman, 1967, p. 60)
Put differently, "regard is something the individual constantly has for others, and knows enough about to feign on occasion" (Goffman, 1967, p. 58). This is not to deny that candor might, on occasion, render the more appropriate and respectful signal, as when concealment of boredom bars a recipient from important feedback. But even here, the poise and timing of one's emotional display may be crucial to the message and a reasonable part of showing due regard.

That there are occasions when due regard requires resembling implies that we actually have such capacities for deliberate, facial posing. According to Paul Ekman (1982), there is evidence that we can pose emotional expressions as early as the preschool years. As adults we share, cross-culturally, a repertoire of core facial expressions corresponding to specific, basic emotions (surprise, disgust, sadness, anger, happiness, fear) that we have some facility in posing and reading. Presumably, the better we know others, the more successful we are in reading a wider range of emotional expressions and, too, in discriminating sincere from posed displays.

The expectation of finding interest, regard, joy, sympathy, or indignation in faces has its seeds in infancy. As we have said, our first lessons in social dialogue involve tracking eye gaze and finding joy in the mutual to-and-fro of smiling. Ruptures in attunement can come from the failure of a parent to adequately mirror (in facial behavior as well as other body movements) a child's own engagement or rhythm (Stern, 1985). Facial expressions are a part of establishing mutuality, but are also instrumental to signaling crucial information about the environment. Thus, recall Mahler's toddler who glances back to parents in order to read distal facial cues (what others have called "social referencing"; Klinnert et al., 1983). In such cases, parents may pose an expression, not in order to be honorific, but didactic. In reading and mimicking expressions, the child begins to self-regulate affect (Greenspan, 1989).

In the next section, I leave behind contemporary research on emotional demeanor and turn to an ancient discussion of the topic. The text in question is Seneca's De Beneficiis. Here we have a rich though sorely neglected account of how emotional demeanor becomes part of the microeconomy of doing kindnesses.

**SENECA ON KINDNESS AND ITS EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION**

Seneca's De Beneficiis is an essay on just that subject — doing favors, showing gratitude, "sort out a matter which more than anything else holds society together" (Seneca, De Beneficiis [hereafter Ben.] 1.4.2). The spirit of the project parallels that of Goffman: in the latter's words, to show in the society together" (Seneca, De Beneficiis [hereafter Ben.] 1.4.2). The spirit of the project parallels that of Goffman: in the latter's words, to show in the

symbolic expressions of regard how a "recipient is told that he is not an island unto himself" (Goffman, 1967, 72). To read Seneca's De Beneficiis, like reading Goffman's work on deference and demeanor, is to be reminded just how social details, including an aesthetic of emotional demeanor, morally matter — that the furrow on a brow, a smile of engagement, a hesitant look, all may be morally significant in specific circumstances. Moreover, for Seneca, they are not mere matters of etiquette, at least in the conventional sense of "add-on's" supplemental to substantive morality. To the contrary, they are part of the casuistry of kindness itself; they fill in, in far more detail than Aristotle at his most descriptive offers, what is involved in morally appropriate emotion as well as action.

One of Seneca's preoccupations in this work is to show that the material details of kindness matter. No one should give "winter clothes at midsummer" or "a present of gladiators or animals for the arena when the show has already been put on" (Ben. 1.12.3). One should give presents to others that bring "the greatest pleasure" and "bring us to mind whenever he comes into contact with it" (1.11.5). This last thought gives us a glimpse of a tension that arises between Seneca's views here and his general subscription to Stoic doctrines elsewhere. Most briefly put, Stoic doctrine urges detachment from material goods insofar as such goods are not themselves essential to genuine happiness. They may be "preferred" rather than "dispreferred," but either way they are to be regarded as "indifferents" that lie outside of happiness. Genuine happiness becomes a matter of what we can fully control. On the Stoic view, that points to virtue, and virtue alone, informed by reason. It would take us too far afield to try to resolve this tension here, or the related tension introduced, as we shall see in a moment, by Seneca's unabashed and seemingly un-Stoic embrace of the emotions as part of the full expression of virtue. As I argue elsewhere (Sherman, forthcoming), the latter tension can be mitigated somewhat within a Stoic account of the emotions. But that excursus is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

Just as the material details of kindness matter according to this treatise, so too do the nuances of emotional attitude and expression. In the best sorts of acts of kindness, emotions are expressive of deeper positive attitudes. But even when the appropriate internal attitudes are absent, making an effort to "show" the right emotional signs is still part of the requirement of virtue. Success at that effort is far better, Seneca suggests, than letting one's emotions betray one's reluctance or ambivalence. Thus, appearances and presentations matter, including the emotions we wear on our face and convey through our body language and voice. The garments that dress virtue, or in some cases hide its absence, have moral weight.

The evidence is striking and plentiful. So, Seneca insists, we should not give a gift in a way that is "humiliating (contumliose)." For we are so
constituted that insults “go deeper than any services” and are more “tena-
ciously remembered” than kindnesses (Ben. 1.1.8). Similarly, “no one can
feel gratitude for a favor haughtily tossed down or angrily thrust on him”
(1.1.7), or given with grudging or flaunting (1.7.3), or “furrowed brows” or
“grudging words” (1.1.5) or with an “insolent expression” or “language
swollen with pride” (2.11.6), or with “a silence that gives an impression of
grim severity” (2.3.1), or in a way that is simply “irritating” (2.6.2). It is like
giving bread with stones in it (2.7.1). Showing arrogance in gift-giving under-
dermines the deed itself: “There are many who make their kindnesses hate-
ful by rough words and superciliousness. Their language and annoyance are
such as to leave you regretting your request was ever granted” (2.4.1).
Again, he exhorts, “don’t remonstrate when giving an act of kindness; save
that for another time. No element of unpleasantness should be mixed with it”
(2.6.2). In short, gifts that are true kindnesses are bestowed “with a look
of human kindness” (2.13.2), be it in the language of words and voice or
facial and bodily expression. Proper emotional bearing is also required on
the part of the recipient in conveying gratitude:

When we have decided to accept, we should do so cheerfully. We should express
our delight and make it obvious to our benefactor so that he gets an immediate
reward. To see a friend joyful is due cause for you, still more to have made him
joyful. We must show how grateful we are by pouring out our feelings and bearing
witness to them not only in his presence but everywhere. (Ben. 2.22.1)

Thus, even when words fail, a feeling of indebtedness ought to “show on
our faces” (2.25.2). That we may lack genuine feelings of indebtedness does
not necessarily excuse us from giving the impression that we have them. To
appeal to Ekman and Goffman, facial posing becomes a way of conveying
due regard.

To argue that emotional comportment matters is, in a sense, to argue
that appearances matter, that, as Seneca repeats, “impressions” or “looks”
of kindness are part of the moral economy. And they are even if there is
a tad of hypocrisy in the display. So just as certain actions, according to
the standard Stoic conception, are duties or appropriate (kathêkonta; i.e., the actions that characterize the Stoic sage) remain the
aim of a complete moral education; performing morally appropriate actions
(kathêkonta) must suffice for those of us who fall short.

The second (two-pronged) point is that the cultivation of appearances
can itself be educative. It can lead to a conversion of the heart in the prac-
titioner as well as set an instructive example to onlookers who take their
cues from others’ appearances. With respect to the first prong, to try on
appearances can be self-exhortative, a way of coaxing along a correspond-
ing inner change. (Recall Pascal’s advice to the skeptic: practice as if you
believe and you will find yourself believing.)4 We nurse a change from
the outside in, as it were. Current research on facial feedback mecha-
nisms lends some support to this process. Experiments have shown that
those who read the “funnies” with upturned lips find the cartoons funnier
than those whose lips are not in the smiling position (Strack, Martin, &
Stepper, 1988, pp. 768—77). Other studies confirm that overt facial expres-
sion can affect the intensity of emotional arousal (Ekman, 1982). Anticipat-
ing this general line of research, Kant says (with a sexism that plagues the
expressed in the following passage, also from the Anthropology:

Men are, one and all, actors – the more so the more civilized they are. They put on
a show of affection, respect for others, modesty and disinterest without deceiving
anyone, since it is generally understood that they are not sincere about it. And
it is a very good thing that this happens in the world. For if men keep on play-
ing these roles, the real virtues whose semblance they have merely been affecting
for a long time are gradually aroused and pass into their attitude of will. (Kant,
1963a, 151)

4 On this, see De Sousa’s (1988) discussion of innocent examples of boot-strapping that do
not shade into deceptions.
Thus, Kant, as dogmatic as he can be about truth telling, is willing here to dismiss the charge of deceit on the grounds that everyone knows the game. It is a wink, wink, nod, nod; with no one being deceived. Moreover, he argues, as we have found in reading Seneca, there are clear pedagogical advantages for stimulating properly grounded virtue through semblance. Kant reiterates the psychological lesson he stated in the Lectures: love born from obligation can itself turn into a more genuine love. With time, one acquires "a taste for it" (Kant, 1963b, 197).

CONCLUSION

I have been arguing for the important role of emotional demeanor in the expression of moral character. The claim has been voiced by a variety of philosophers spanning different historical periods: in the ancient world by Aristotle, in the Hellenistic period by Seneca, in the Enlightenment by Kant. As I have argued, the view represents a position made most familiar and plausible by Aristotle. But Seneca, despite his Stoicism, elaborated on the position by concretely showing the role of emotional bearing in the microeconomy of doing kindnesses. Kant, in a similarly unorthodox move given his Stoic leanings, held that emotional demeanor is part of the aesthetic of virtue. And, he claimed, practice on the surface can effect deeper motivational changes.

In focusing my discussion more on emotional demeanor than on emotional experience, I have tried to circumvent some of the usual worries about directly beginning or stopping the occurrence of emotional states or episodes. Granted, I have suggested with Aristotle that we can gradually cultivate emotional dispositions, but this does not guarantee successful exercise of those dispositions on demand. Circumstances may overwhelm us, impulses may elude control, regression may be the order of the day. In the case of emotional expression, in contrast, we seem to have greater control. The research of Ekman and others suggests that facial posing, in particular, is something we can voluntarily affect early on. I have suggested that we should read Goffman's sociological research as adding an important piece to the puzzle and as indicating the crucial role of emotional expression in our displays of care and regard for others. In showing care, respect, and deference to others, we are sometimes called upon to be actors, giving due to others through facial looks and tones that might lack exact counterparts in our heart. At such moments we act from duty, we might say, just as we do when we perform required or recommended actions without necessarily wanting to. Granted, it may seem morally preferable to have outside behavior in synch with what is within. Certainly, Aristotle often urges this as an ideal of good character: true virtue lies beyond the stage of needing to bear, down on or silence what is wayward.

But such an ideal is a tall order. And to act under the yoke of duty, as Kant would say, is an ineliminable part of morality for us mortals. Even so, we can go a fair way toward appreciating the role Aristotle assigned to emotions without insisting that we must always feel the right ones: at times, emotional demeanor may suffice. Moreover, trying on emotions from the outside in may be an indispensable way not only to respect others but to begin to cultivate an inner change.

References


Our main objective in organizing the symposium of which this book is the outcome was to provide an overview of current theory and findings in the study of emotion. As mentioned in the Introduction, the restrictions of our schedule meant that we could not accommodate all relevant viewpoints and findings. This resulted in our selection of twenty-four contributions, here twenty-four chapters.

Although the range and quality of the contributions are impressive, not all of the potentially relevant disciplines are represented. Missing disciplines include computer science, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and linguistics. Nevertheless, we believe that this volume provides a good reflection of the current state of the art, partly because of the broad range of the topics addressed, but also because many of the chapters refer to important work by others than their authors, both within and outside their own discipline.

For us, the organizers, the symposium was a great pleasure. It contained much that is highly fascinating in terms of new findings and novel insights, providing us with the joys of enhanced understanding and unsuspected implications. We were impressed by the multitude of levels at which emotions can be studied, described, and analyzed. It filled us with respect for the high quality of the presentations and of the reported research.

In this epilogue, we shall try to summarize what we think is the current state of the art, focusing on what seem to us to have been the major contributions over the last three decades. Obviously, however, there is plenty of room for debate as to which have been major contributions rather than revisits to issues that have been addressed by previous thinkers.

The current state of emotion theory can be summarized in terms of several themes, around which our overview will be organized. However, one important feature cuts across them: the sheer explosion of empirical research over the past three decades. Thirty years ago empirical research on emotion had begun to extend beyond the study of autonomic arousal. At the time of Magda Arnold’s 1970 Loyola Symposium, research by Lazarus,